Essays on multi-sector macroeconomic models for policy analysis by Cantelmo, A.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Cantelmo, A. (2018). Essays on multi-sector macroeconomic models for policy 
analysis. (Unpublished Doctoral thesis, City, University of London) 
This is the accepted version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/19942/
Link to published version: 
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
Essays on Multi-Sector Macroeconomic
Models for Policy Analysis
Alessandro Cantelmo
City, University of London
May, 2018
A thesis submitted to
the Academic Faculty
by
Alessandro Cantelmo
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Economics
City, University of London
London, United Kingdom
May, 2018
2
Contents
Abstract v
Acknowledgements vii
1 Introduction 1
2 Monetary Policy and the Relative Price of Durable Goods 7
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Structural vector-autoregressive models . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.1 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3 New-Keynesian model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3.1 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3.2 Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3.3 Fiscal and monetary policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3.4 Market clearing and exogenous processes . . . . . . . . 26
2.3.5 Functional forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3.6 Bayesian estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3.7 Estimated sectoral price stickiness in extended models 36
2.4 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.5 Data: sources and transformations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.5.1 Durables and Residential Investments . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.5.2 Nondurables and Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.5.3 Only broad measure of houses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
i
2.5.4 Durable goods and New-single family houses . . . . . . 47
2.5.5 Durable goods and broad measure of houses . . . . . . 47
2.5.6 Data transformation for Bayesian estimation . . . . . . 48
2.6 SVAR methodologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.6.1 Recursive approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.6.2 Sign restrictions approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.6.3 Narrative approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.7 Robustness checks for the SVAR model . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.7.1 SVAR Models with trend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.7.2 Alternative definitions of durables . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.7.3 Subsample analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.7.4 Sign restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.7.5 Proxy SVAR approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.7.6 Three-sector SVAR model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.8 The DSGE models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.8.1 Symmetric equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.8.2 Steady state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.8.3 Symmetric equilibrium of the extended models . . . . . 64
2.9 Robust impulse responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.10 Bayesian impulse responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.11 Posterior distributions of Inverse Frisch Elasticities . . . . . . 76
2.12 Models comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.12.1 The importance of the income share of patient households 80
2.13 Posterior estimates of extended models . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3 Sectoral Labor Mobility and Optimal Monetary Policy 87
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.2.1 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.2.2 Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.2.3 Fiscal and monetary policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.2.4 Market clearing conditions and exogenous processes . . 95
3.2.5 Functional forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
ii
3.3 Bayesian estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.3.1 Calibration and priors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.3.2 Estimation results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.4 Optimal monetary policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.4.1 The monetary policy rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.4.2 Welfare measure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3.4.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.4.4 Robustness to alternative calibrations and interest rate
rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
3.6 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
3.6.1 Durables and Residential Investments . . . . . . . . . . 113
3.6.2 Nondurables and Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
3.6.3 Data transformation for Bayesian estimation . . . . . . 113
3.7 Symmetric equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
3.8 Steady state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
3.8.1 Alternative calibration of steady state hours . . . . . . 117
3.9 Estimation diagnostics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4 Shocks and Policy Stance in the Euro Area 121
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.2.1 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
4.2.2 Financial intermediaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
4.2.3 Non-financial firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
4.2.4 New capital producers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
4.2.5 Policymakers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
4.2.6 Equilibrium and exogenous processes . . . . . . . . . . 139
4.3 Bayesian estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
4.3.1 Calibration and priors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
4.3.2 Posterior estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
4.3.3 Dynamic properties of the estimated model . . . . . . . 146
iii
4.3.4 The role of non-policy structural shocks . . . . . . . . 150
4.3.5 Policy stance in the Euro Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
4.4 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
4.5 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
4.6 Equilibrium conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
4.7 Steady state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
4.8 Detailed derivation of the wage setting equation . . . . . . . . 165
4.9 The consolidated government budget constraint . . . . . . . . 167
4.10 Bayesian impulse response to standard shocks . . . . . . . . . 169
4.11 Variance decomposition of the estimated model . . . . . . . . 171
4.12 Estimation diagnostics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
4.13 Bayesian estimation and historical decompositions: robustness
checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
4.13.1 The role of the ZLB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
4.13.2 The role of the measurement error . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
4.13.3 Output historical decompositions: Policy stance . . . . 181
4.13.4 Output historical decompositions: all shocks . . . . . . 183
4.13.5 Output historical decompositions: all policies . . . . . 185
4.13.6 Output historical decompositions: Monetary vs Fiscal
policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
4.13.7 Inflation historical decompositions: Policy stance . . . 189
4.13.8 Inflation historical decompositions: all shocks . . . . . 191
4.13.9 Inflation historical decompositions: all policies . . . . . 193
4.13.10 Inflation historical decompositions: Monetary vs Fiscal
policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
5 Thesis conclusions 197
Bibliography 199
iv
Abstract
This thesis studies multi-sector macroeconomic models suitable for policy
analysis. The first and second chapters use a variety of empirical and the-
oretical macroeconomic models allowing for the consumption of goods with
different durability, and analyze which modeling assumptions and features
of the economy are crucial for the conduct of monetary policy. The third
chapter focuses on the role of fiscal and monetary policies in the Euro Area,
thus providing insights about the joint policy stance that have the potential
to inform future policy choices.
In the first chapter, we challenge a crucial assumption made in the lit-
erature of Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models with
durable and nondurable goods about their relative price stickiness. We start
with a thorough empirical analysis by estimating a Structural Vector Au-
toregressive model of the US economy, in which we find that the response of
the relative price of durables to a monetary policy contraction is either flat
or mildly positive. It significantly falls only if narrowly defined as the ratio
between new-house and nondurables prices. These findings are then rational-
ized via the estimation of two-sector New-Keynesian (NK) models. Durables
prices are estimated to be as sticky as those of nondurables, leading to a flat
relative price response to a monetary policy shock. Conversely, house prices
are estimated to be almost flexible. Such results survive several robustness
checks and a three-sector extension of the NK model. These findings have
implications for building NK models with durable and nondurable goods,
and for the conduct of monetary policy. This chapter is based on an article
co-authored with Dr. Giovanni Melina (International Monetary Fund) and
published in the Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.
v
The second chapter adds imperfect labor mobility to a two-sector New-
Keynesian model with durable and nondurable goods and estimates it with
Bayesian methods. We use the model to design optimal monetary policy
and find that an inverse relationship between sectoral labor mobility and the
optimal weight the central bank should attach to durables inflation arises.
Moreover, we show that the combination of nominal wage stickiness and
limited labor mobility leads to a nonzero optimal weight for durables inflation
even if durables prices were fully flexible. These results survive alternative
calibrations and interest-rate rules and point toward a non-negligible role of
sectoral labor mobility for the conduct of monetary policy. This chapter is
co-authored with Dr. Giovanni Melina (International Monetary Fund).
The third chapter of the thesis focuses on the role of shocks and policies
in the Euro Area business cycle. We consider the long-term structure of
government debt and introduce a financial sector. These features allow the
model to account for both the recent financial and sovereign debt crises,
and the effects of the unconventional monetary policy implemented by the
European Central Bank. We then determine the joint fiscal and monetary
policy stance in the Euro Area and find that it has been expansionary in the
aftermath of the financial crisis but has turned to be contractionary after
the sovereign debt crisis. The joint effect of the austerity measures taken by
governments of European countries and the zero-lower-bound constraint on
the monetary policy rate caused the reversion of the policy stance, which was
prevented to be even more contractionary only by the quantitative easing
implemented by the European Central Bank. This chapter is based on a
paper co-authored with Dr. Nicoletta Batini (International Monetary Fund),
Dr. Giovanni Melina (International Monetary Fund) and Dr. Stefania Villa
(Bank of Italy).
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis collects three individual papers studying multi-sector macroeco-
nomic models with the aim of contributing to the current academic debate
and informing policy decisions. Since the seminal contributions of Lucas and
Prescott (1971), Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Christiano et al. (2005),
among many others, DSGE models have been widely used to study the busi-
ness cycle properties of the economy, to evaluate and design policies and
also to forecast macroeconomic variables. In addition to informing the aca-
demic debate, DSGE models have become the workhorse macroeconomic
models used by central banks and policy institutions throughout the world.
The standard DSGE model, augmented with nominal and real frictions, in
the New-Keynesian spirit (see, e.g. Christiano et al., 2005 and Smets and
Wouters, 2007), often assumes that the economy comprises a single produc-
tion sector that produces a single homogeneous consumption good purchased
by households. However, empirical evidence highlights important sectoral
heterogeneity, i.e. that different types of goods react differently to macroe-
conomic shocks.
In particular, by broadly differentiating goods by their durability, durable
goods are estimated to be much more interest rate sensitive than nondurables
and services (see Bernanke and Gertler, 1995, among others). It follows
that a growing literature has developed, along two main strands. Empirical
macroeconomic studies have documented a comovement between consump-
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tion of durable and nondurable goods in response to a monetary policy shock.
However, Barsky et al. (2007) were the first to notice that a standard New-
Keynesian model in which agents consume both types of goods, is unable to
reproduce such a regularity, hence the so-called comovement puzzle. Several
papers then engaged in solving this puzzle but, as noted in the first chapter
of this thesis, the reason it arises crucially depends on the assumption about
sectoral price stickiness.
From an optimal monetary policy perspective, accounting for durable
goods presents policymakers with more severe trade-offs and policy choices.
Indeed, central bankers have only one instrument available to stabilize output
and inflation in the two sectors. One way to exploit such a trade-off entails
creating a suitable measure of aggregate inflation to employ as the target
of monetary policy. As a consequence, choosing the appropriate weights to
assign to sectoral inflation rates is crucial for the conduct of monetary policy.
How the choice of such a weights is influenced by realistic features of multi-
sector economies and its consequences for welfare is the focus of the second
chapter of this thesis.
Extending the standard New-Keynesian model to include durable goods is
not the only dimension explored to build multi-sector models. The global fi-
nancial crisis erupted in 2008 had consequences not only for the real economy,
but also triggered a lively academic and policy debate about the suitability
of DSGE models that had hitherto largely neglected any role of the financial
sector. As a consequence, DSGE models have been extended to incorporate
financial intermediaries with the aim of explaining the financial crisis and
policy responses. This is the starting point of the third chapter of this the-
sis, in which the inclusion of a financial sector is vital for analysis of fiscal
and monetary policies in the Euro Area.
Given that accounting for heterogeneity in the economy is of a paramount
importance, multi-sector models are the object of this thesis which con-
tributes to the literature along a number of dimensions.
The first chapter, Monetary Policy and the Relative Price of Durable
Goods, challenges a common assumption made in DSGE models with durable
and nondurable goods, namely that prices of durables are substantially more
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flexible than those of nondurables. This assumption, mainly made on the
basis that house prices are flexible and on the microeconometric evidence
reported in Bils and Klenow (2004), prevents a two-sector DSGE model
from generating the desired comovement between durable and nondurable
consumption in response to a monetary policy shock. In the paper, this as-
sumption is questioned on two grounds. First, more recent microeconometric
studies report price stickiness in many varieties of durable goods. Further-
more, durable goods comprise many categories other than houses. As a
consequence, we thoroughly assess the definition of the durables sector and
estimate the degree of price stickiness in durable goods. We start our analy-
sis by reporting empirical evidence about the relative degree of sectoral price
rigidities by estimating a battery of two-sector Structural Vector Autoregres-
sive models and looking at the response of the relative price of durable goods
to a monetary policy shocks. We find that the response of the relative price of
durables to a monetary policy contraction crucially depends on the definition
of the durables sector itself. Indeed, a broad definition of durables, which
includes non-housing and housing durables, leads to a flat or non-negative re-
sponse of the relative price of durables. This result points to a similar degree
of price stickiness across sectors. Conversely, a definition of durables that
includes only residential investment leads to a fall in the relative price thus
suggesting that house prices are significantly more flexible than nondurables
prices. To rationalize these results, we construct and estimate a two-sector
DSGE model, in which durables are used by credit-constrained households
as a collateral to borrow. We estimate the model with Bayesian methods
and confirm the results of the empirical model. The results survive also sev-
eral extensions, in particular the estimation of a three-sector DSGE model
in which we treat housing and non-housing durables separately. The results
reported in the paper carry two important implications. From a modeling
viewpoint, the contribution of the paper implies that a DSGE model with a
durables sector has to assume that durables prices are sticky, unless it com-
prises only housing goods. Moreover, a three-sector model is required to fully
capture the heterogeneity of non-housing and housing durables. From a pol-
icy viewpoint, we contribute to the debate by inferring that monetary policy
3
does not create big allocative distortions between non-housing durables and
nondurables whereas it might create them between housing and non-housing
goods.
The second chapter of the thesis, Sectoral Labor Mobility and Optimal
Monetary Policy, takes an optimal monetary policy perspective of a two-
sector DSGE model. Indeed, when the model comprises two sectors, the cen-
tral bank has to define an appropriate inflation rate to target. The problem
is not trivial as, in a multi-sector context, the central bank has to stabilize
sectoral output and inflation with only one instrument, namely the policy
rate. In the paper we determine how the central bank optimally assigns
weights to sectoral inflations and how such a choice is determined by the
degree of labor mobility across sectors. We do so by first estimating a two-
sector DSGE model in which households choose in which sector supply their
labor services. Crucially we estimate that the degree at which workers can
be reallocated across sectors in response to macroeconomic shocks is rather
limited. We then use the estimated model to perform optimal monetary
policy analysis. We start by finding the first best allocation and then we
search for the combination of parameters in the Taylor rule adopted by the
central bank that delivers the second best outcome. In doing so, we let the
policymaker optimally choose the weight to assign to the sectoral inflation
rates. Our novel finding is that such a weight heavily depends on the degree
of labor mobility in the economy and we provide intuition for this result.
We furthermore determine which interest rate rule entails desirable welfare
implications. We thus shed light and contribute to the debate about the
inflation measure central banks should target by showing that the degree of
segmentation in the labor market is a crucial aspect central bankers should
consider in the conduct of monetary policy.
The final chapter of this thesis, Shocks and Policy Stance in the Euro
Area, focuses on the role of shocks and policies on the Euro Area business
cycle. The ultimate aim of the paper is to estimate the Euro Area joint mone-
tary and fiscal policy stance in a model that accounts for crucial features and
episodes of the Euro Area. To serve this purpose, the multi-sector dimension
of the DSGE model studied in this chapter is achieved by including a financial
4
sector. This extension is crucial for two reasons. First, it creates a trans-
mission channel of credit shocks, thus allowing the model to account for the
recent financial crisis. Moreover, it constitutes also the main channel through
which the central bank affects the real economy via unconventional monetary
policy. In addition, we model a detailed fiscal sector whereby government
debt is long-term and can be purchased by the central bank to implement
unconventional monetary policy. The active role of fiscal policy is introduced
via distortionary taxes and government expenditures. Introducing long-term
government debt allows the model to account both for the sovereign debt
crisis and the role of unconventional monetary policy. Such a detailed mod-
eling of monetary and fiscal policies is vital for the analysis of the Euro Area
joint policy stance. To reach our conclusions, we bring the DSGE model to
the data via Bayesian estimation. We then compute the historical contri-
bution of shocks and policies on the Euro Area output and find interesting
insights. First, we detect a crucial role of credit shocks in the build-up and
development of the recent financial crisis. Overall, output dynamics of the
Euro Area have been mainly shaped by preference and price-markup shocks.
As far as policies are concerned, the joint policy stance is estimated to have
been countercyclical in the aftermath of the financial crisis. However, as
the zero-lower-bound constraint started binding and the sovereign debt crisis
forced governments to implement austerity measures, the joint policy stance
became contractionary. Unconventional monetary policy helped sustaining
output but did not revert the policy stance. We thus find a potential role
of fiscal policies in member countries with fiscal space to turn the policy
stance to expansionary. Our paper thus adds to the debate about the policy
stance in the Euro Area in the aftermath of the financial and sovereign debt
crises by assessing the joint role of fiscal, conventional and unconventional
monetary policies, which constitutes the main contribution of the paper.
5
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Chapter 2
Monetary Policy and the
Relative Price of Durable
Goods
2.1 Introduction
Whether monetary policy innovations create distortions in allocations across
durable and nondurable goods boils down to the extent to which such shocks
change their relative price. The importance of the response of the relative
price of durables to monetary policy has been explored in a small number of
theoretical contributions, but surprisingly largely neglected in the empirical
literature.1
In the context of optimal policy, Erceg and Levin (2006) show that the
relative price of durables affects both the user cost and the demand of durable
goods. A stable relative price of durables keeps output close to potential in
both sectors and its role for the conduct of monetary policy is therefore non-
negligible.2 Petrella and Santoro (2011), in an economy with input-output
structure, show that the relative price of services affects sectoral marginal
costs and creates a channel through which the comovement between con-
1One exception is Reis and Watson (2010) who estimate a dynamic factor model to
argue that relative price movements are a main determinant of aggregate inflation.
2In a similar model Aoki (2001) reaches the same conclusion.
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sumption of the two goods is attained. They claim that their results can be
generalized to any sticky price model with two sectors. In fact, in a similar
model featuring durable and nondurable goods, Sudo (2012) demonstrates
that if the change in the relative price is small, the substitution effect be-
tween durables and nondurables is likewise small and the two goods comove
in response to a monetary policy shock.
The comovement between durables and nondurables in response to mon-
etary policy has indeed been a popular topic in the literature and has been
documented in a number of papers employing recursive Structural Vector-
Autoregressive (SVAR) models (see Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Erceg and
Levin, 2006; Monacelli, 2009; Sterk and Tenreyro, 2014; Di Pace and Her-
tweck, 2016, among others). Barsky et al. (2003) confirm this empirical result
using Romer dates. However, Barsky et al. (2003, 2007, BHK henceforth)
were the first to notice that a two-sector New-Keynesian (NK) model fails to
replicate such a comovement, hence the so-called comovement puzzle. Conse-
quently, several extensions of the baseline model have been explored in order
to solve it.3
The crucial assumption that prevents the baseline model from generating
the comovement concerns sectoral price stickiness. In fact, BHK assume
that prices of durable goods are flexible whereas prices of nondurables are
sticky. This assumption is made for two reasons. First, durables prices such
as houses are largely negotiated and most homes are priced for the first
time when they are sold. Second, they appeal to microeconometric studies,
such as Bils and Klenow (2004), documenting that durables are more flexible
than nondurables. On these grounds, although durables price stickiness turn
out to play a key role in the comovement issue (see Sterk, 2010), BHK and
most of the subsequent papers assume that durables prices are completely
flexible. In contrast, more recently, Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), Boivin
3Carlstrom and Fuerst (2010), DiCecio (2009) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010) introduce
nominal wage stickiness; Monacelli (2009), Sterk (2010), Chen and Liao (2014) and Tsai
(2016) evaluate the role of credit frictions; Bouakez et al. (2011) and Sudo (2012) study an
economy with input-output interactions; Kim and Katayama (2013) assume non-separable
preferences; finally, Di Pace and Hertweck (2016) introduce search and matching frictions.
For an extensive literature review see Cantelmo and Melina (2015).
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et al. (2009), Klenow and Malin (2010) and Petrella and Santoro (2012)
report microeconometric evidence of stickiness in many categories of durables
other than houses (investment in housing represents about 23% of aggregate
durables in US NIPA tables in the post-war period).
The assumption about sectoral price stickiness is closely related to the
response of the relative price of durables to a monetary policy shock. In fact,
when durables prices are assumed to be flexible, while nondurables prices
are sticky, the relative price of durables necessarily falls following a mone-
tary policy tightening, implying that monetary policy creates a distortion in
sectoral allocations.
Quite surprisingly, little empirical analysis has focused specifically on this
issue.4 Table 2.1 reports unconditional correlations between lags of changes
in the federal funds rate (FFR) and changes in key macroeconomics variables
over the main sample considered in the paper. The durables sector is defined
as the sum of durable goods and residential investment and we report both
the relative price of durables and the relative price of houses.5 As expected,
changes in the FFR are negatively associated with changes in real GDP,
durables, houses and nondurables with some lags. As regards inflation, it
takes up to three years to detect a negative (though insignificant) correlation.
Changes in the relative price of durables seem to be uncorrelated with changes
in the FFR, this being in accordance with overall price stickiness not being
dramatically different across the two sectors. The relative price of houses
exhibits negative but insignificant correlation.
4With different objectives in mind, Boivin et al. (2009) estimate a dynamic factor model
to show that the price setting behavior of firms changes according to the nature of the shock
hitting the economy. Sectoral prices appear to be sticky in response to aggregate shocks
such as monetary policy innovations but flexible in response to sector-specific shocks.
Makowiak et al. (2009) largely confirm these results and compare a Calvo model with
sticky information and rational inattention models to reproduce them. They argue in
favor of the latter as the former two models need implausible calibrations to match the
distribution of sectoral prices responses to aggregate and sector-specific shocks. However,
Beck et al. (2016) challenge these empirical results thus reducing the importance of sector-
specific shocks. They conclude that multi-sector, multi-country models are needed be
consistent with their empirical findings but a rational inattention model proves to be a
good approximation to them.
5Section 2.2.1 discusses the choice of the sample and the definitions of durable and
housing sectors employed.
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GDP Durables Houses Nondurables Inflation
Rel. Price Rel. Price
Durables Houses
FFR (-1) 0.0801 -0.3282* -0.2534* -0.3020* 0.1675* 0.0804 -0.0985
FFR (-4) -0.1806* -0.2865* -0.3081* -0.2411* 0.2230* 0.1110 -0.0049
FFR (-8) -0.1810* -0.0727 -0.0903 -0.0803 0.1392 0.0438 -0.0497
FFR (-12) 0.0318 -0.0533 0.1198 0.0634 -0.0070 0.0599 -0.0596
Note: GDP, durables, houses and nondurables are first differences in log real per-capita
variables. Inflation is the first difference in the log of the GDP deflator. The relative
prices are the first difference of the ratios of the relevant price indices. More data details
are available in the Appendix. Frequency: quarterly. Sample: 1969Q2-2007Q4. * denotes
significance at a 5 percent level.
Table 2.1: Correlations between lags of changes in the Federal funds rate
(FFR) and changes in selected macroeconomic variables
Given the important policy and modeling implications, this topic deserves
more careful investigation. In the paper we exploit both SVAR and Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models, in order to assess the effects
of a monetary policy shock on the relative price of durables and the relative
house price. The monetary policy shock in SVAR models is identified through
recursive, sign restrictions and narrative approaches. Across subsamples and
methodologies, the response of the relative price of durables is either flat
or mildly positive, but it never falls, contrary to what most DSGE models
imply under the assumption of flexible durables prices. A significant fall
is found only if the relative price is narrowly defined as the ratio between
house prices and nondurables prices, this being consistent with flexible house
prices. The estimation of DSGE models corroborates and helps rationalise
the SVAR results. We build a two-sector NK model in which durable goods
are used by credit-constrained impatient households as collateral to borrow
funds from patient households. The Bayesian estimation unveils that the
degree of price stickiness in the sector comprising all durable goods (housing
and non-housing) is not significantly different from the nondurables sector.
Thus the credible set of impulse responses of the relative price to a monetary
policy shock includes zero. In contrast, when durables comprise only housing,
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house prices are estimated to be almost flexible whereas nondurables prices
are substantially stickier. Only in this case, a monetary policy tightening
affects the relative price of durable goods, namely the relative house price.
These results on price stickiness survive also modifications affecting sec-
toral Phillips curves, i.e. if we allow for imperfect labor mobility across
sectors, or if we introduce sectoral price indexation to past inflation, and
they hold true also in a generalization to a three-sector model.
Our DSGE analysis is related to recent contributions in the literature.
Our results on price stickiness are broadly in line with those of Bouakez
et al. (2009) who estimate price stickiness in a six-sector model. In their
framework, however, there is full symmetry in modeling the various types of
goods, which fully depreciate within one period. In contrast, we capture two
important features of durable goods that distinguish them from nondurables.
First, they yield utility over time rather than being completely consumed
in one use. Second, they serve as collateral for borrowing purposes. In a
simpler two-sector model Barsky et al. (2016) show that different degrees
of durability have implications also for optimal monetary policy. Normative
monetary policy implications in a two-sector model are drawn also in Petrella
et al. (2017) who focus on input-output interactions. These last two papers,
however, do not estimate price stickiness parameters as we do. Iacoviello
and Neri (2010) estimate a two-sector model where durables comprise only
housing and house prices are assumed a priori to be fully flexible. In contrast,
we consider both housing and non-housing durables and estimate all price
stickiness parameters.
Our SVAR and DSGE results have two important implications for model-
ing and policy. The first is that, when building a two-sector New-Keynesian,
model it is desirable to assume that prices of durable goods are somewhat
sticky, unless the model’s aim is to focus on the housing sector in isolation
from other durables. A three-sector model is needed to fully capture the
intrinsic differences between housing and non-housing durables, such as the
type of goods that can be used as collateral and their different degree of dura-
bility. The second is that overall monetary policy innovations do not foster
big distortions in sectoral allocations between durables and nondurables, this
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representing a desirable feature of the monetary policy conduct. Conversely,
since monetary policy does affect the relative house price, it may potentially
create allocative distortions between housing and non-housing goods.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we
perform the SVAR analysis. Section 2.3 presents the DSGE model, its ex-
tensions, and discusses the results of the Bayesian estimation. Section 2.4
concludes. An appendix complements the paper by providing details about
the dataset, the theoretical model, and by reporting robustness checks.
2.2 Structural vector-autoregressive models
2.2.1 Methodology
As regards the estimation of the empirical model, we use quarterly, seasonally
adjusted US data for the Federal funds rate, real GDP, real durable goods,
real nondurable goods and services, the GDP deflator and the relative price
of durables.6 In order to thoroughly investigate the effects of a monetary
policy shock on the relative price of durables, we employ two alternative
definitions of durables sector. We first follow Erceg and Levin (2006), Mona-
celli (2009), Sterk and Tenreyro (2014) and Di Pace and Hertweck (2016) in
defining durables as the sum of durable goods consumption and residential
investments.7 Then, we assume that durables comprise only houses. We
label the former model baseline SVAR and the latter housing SVAR. Table
2.2 summarizes the various definitions of durables sector and relative prices
used throughout the paper. Definitions I and II are used in the main analysis
whereas III and IV serve for robustness checks. The algebraic details for the
computation of all relative prices are reported in Appendix 2.5.
The main analysis is performed over the sample 1969Q2-2007Q4. This
choice is dictated by the availability of the narrative measure of monetary
policy shocks constructed by Romer and Romer (2004, RR henceforth) and
6A detailed description of the data can be found in Section 2.5 of the Appendix.
7Erceg and Levin (2006) slightly depart from the other studies by disaggregating GDP
into an index of consumer durables and residential investment and an index of all other
components of output.
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Definition Description
I Relative Price of Durables
Ratio of price deflator of durables and
residential investment to
price deflator
of nondurables and services.
II Relative House Price
Ratio of price deflator of new single and
multifamily houses components
of residential investment
to price deflator of nondurables and services.
III
Relative Price of Durables and
Ratio of price deflator of durables
and new single family houses
New Single Family Houses components of residential investment to price
deflator of nondurables and services.
IV
Relative Price of Durables and
Ratio of price deflator of durables
and new single and multifamily houses
Broad Measure of Houses components of residential investment
to price deflator of nondurables and services.
Table 2.2: Definitions of Relative Prices
extended by Coibion et al. (2012) and Tenreyro and Thwaites (2016).
The vector of variables employed in the SVAR is the following:
xt ≡ [GDPt, Dt, Ct, Pt, Qt, FFRt]
′
(2.1)
where GDPt denotes gross domestic product; Dt and Ct represent consump-
tion of durable and nondurable goods, respectively; Pt is the GDP deflator;
Qt is the the relative price of durable goods; and FFRt denotes the Federal
funds rate, with the ordering used in the estimations being exactly that of
equation (2.1). We take the natural logarithm of all variables except for the
FFR, which is in levels.
For the sake of robustness, we take three different approaches to the
identification of monetary policy shocks:8
i) recursive (Cholesky) approach in which we make the standard assump-
tion that the monetary policy variable is ordered last, hence it has no con-
temporaneous effect on the other variables (see Bernanke and Mihov, 1998,
8A detailed discussion of the methodologies is in Appendix 2.6.
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among others);
ii) sign restrictions imposed on the impulse responses of the variables and
derived from a DSGE model as in Canova (2002), Dedola and Neri (2007),
Pappa (2009) and Bermperoglu et al. (2013), among others. Fry and Pagan
(2011) critically review the sign restrictions approach arguing that if there
is not enough information to discriminate among the various shocks, it may
be problematic to correctly identify them. In principle, only if the researcher
describes the sign pattern for each shock in the model it is possible to avoid
this problem. In order to partially address this identification issue we proceed
as follows. Following Peersman (2005), we first determine the sign pattern of
two standard supply and demand shocks, and then we identify the monetary
policy shock.9
Table 2.3 summarizes the set of sign restrictions imposed. A contrac-
tionary supply shock curbs output, nondurable and durable consumption,
while increasing inflation, which leads the central bank to raise the nomi-
nal interest rate. A negative demand shock reduces both all the mentioned
real variables and inflation, thus leading the central bank to cut the interest
rate. Conversely, the monetary policy shock is characterized by an increase
in the nominal interest rate, which leads to a decrease in output, nondurable
consumption and inflation. As discussed in Appendix 2.9, notwithstanding
the lack of a robust response, in order to correctly identify the monetary
policy shock, we assume that the nominal interest rate is positive in the first
quarter. We remain agnostic on the response of the relative price and con-
sumption of durables as it is the main objective of our investigation. The
different restrictions imposed on the responses of the GDP deflator and the
interest rate ensure the orthogonality between the disturbances and the cor-
rect identification of the monetary policy shock.
iii) recursive narrative approach: we follow Romer and Romer (2004),
Coibion (2012) and Cloyne and Hurtgen (2016) and re-estimate the recur-
sive SVAR model by replacing the FFR with the monetary policy shock
constructed by RR and extended by Coibion et al. (2012) and Tenreyro and
9Robust IRFs for the supply and demand shocks are completely standard and are
available upon request.
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Shock GDP D C P Q FFR
Supply < 0 < 0 < 0 > 0 none > 0
Demand < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 none < 0
Monetary Policy < 0 none < 0 < 0 none > 0
Table 2.3: Sign restrictions
Thwaites (2016). In the macro-fiscal literature, Mertens and Ravn (2013)
and Mertens and Ravn (2014) challenge the use of narrative measures to
identify fiscal shocks in SVAR models on the ground that such measures do
not represent truly exogenous fiscal shocks. They therefore build on Stock
and Watson (2012) and use narrative measures as external instruments for
the identification of the structural shocks in the SVAR model (Proxy SVAR
henceforth).10 However, as noted by Cloyne and Hurtgen (2016), while fiscal
narrative measures are directly derived from historical sources, thus repre-
senting potential noisy proxies for the structural shocks, the monetary policy
measure derived by RR is the result of a first-stage regression which yields
a direct measure of the structural shock rather than a proxy. It is therefore
reasonable to use such a measure directly in the VAR model rather than
as an external instrument. In any case, for the sake of robustness, Figure
2.20 in Appendix 2.7.5 reports the impulse responses obtained with a Proxy
SVAR model using the RR measure as external instrument to identify the
structural shock linked to the monetary policy variable, i.e. the federal funds
rate.11 The relative prices exhibit the same sign patter to those reported in
the main analysis.12
10Such an approach has also been employed to identify monetary policy shocks by Kliem
and Kriwoluzky (2013) and Gertler and Karadi (2015). The former try to reconcile the
monetary policy shock identified with the standard recursive approach with the RR mea-
sure since the two result in non-negligible discrepancies. They use the RR measure as
external instrument in the Proxy SVAR but conclude that the correlation between the
two resulting monetary shocks remains rather low. The latter adopt the Proxy SVAR
approach to circumvent the timing issue posed by the presence of financial variables in the
VAR model.
11In doing so, we employ a similar approach to Gertler and Karadi (2015) with the
difference that they use a narrative measure derived form a high-frequency approach that
applies to their model including financial and real variables.
12Note that the Proxy SVAR approach does not impose any timing restriction hence the
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2.2.2 Results
The estimated impulse responses are presented in Figure 2.1. Rows refer
to the variables of the model whereas columns refer to the three different
identification approaches. The shock is a one standard deviation increase in
the monetary policy measure. Solid lines depict the responses for the base-
line SVAR model, and the shaded areas are the corresponding one-standard-
deviation confidence bands. Dashed lines show the responses for the housing
SVAR model, with dotted lines representing the corresponding one-standard-
deviation confidence bands.13 The impulse responses show that results are
broadly robust across models and identification approaches, with the excep-
tion of the relative price. There is evidence for the comovement between
durables and nondurables, and the responses of durables are always larger
than those of nondurables, a finding that is consistent with the empirical
literature.14
Turning to the dynamic behavior of the relative price, the estimated re-
sponses to a monetary policy tightening are highly dependent on the defini-
tion of the durables sector adopted. If durables account for both consumption
goods and residential investment, the response of the relative price is either
flat or mildly positive, this being at odds with the assumption of flexible
durable prices adopted in most of the theoretical literature. Conversely, a
model in which the durables sector coincides exclusively with the housing
sector, the relative price falls consistently with the notion of flexible new
house prices. These results are confirmed by the responses of the relative
price across seven subsamples.15 In Figure 2.2 rows plot the relative price
responses for each subsample, whereas columns represent the three identifi-
cation approaches. The relative price of durables never falls in the baseline
impact responses are not zero by construction as implied by the recursive identification.
13One-standard-deviation confidence bands in the recursive approaches are computed by
Monte Carlo methods based on 2000 draws. In the sign restrictions approach we construct
a distribution of impulse responses and we report the median together with the 16th and
the 84th percentiles in order to report a comparable confidence band.
14See Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Erceg and Levin (2006), Monacelli (2009), Sterk and
Tenreyro (2014) and Di Pace and Hertweck (2016), who estimate similar SVAR models.
15The size of each subsample is 24 years. See Appendix 2.7.3 for details.
16
5 10 15 20
−8
−6
−4
−2
0
2
x 10−3 Cholesky
G
D
P
5 10 15 20
−6
−4
−2
0
x 10−3 Sign Restrictions
5 10 15 20
−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
x 10−3 Narrative Approach
5 10 15 20
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
D
U
R
A
B
L
E
S
5 10 15 20
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
5 10 15 20
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
0.04
5 10 15 20
−4
−2
0
2
x 10−3
N
O
N
D
U
R
A
B
L
E
S
5 10 15 20
−4
−2
0
x 10−3
5 10 15 20
−4
−2
0
2
x 10−3
5 10 15 20
−8
−6
−4
−2
0
x 10−3
G
D
P
 D
E
F
L
A
T
O
R
5 10 15 20
−4
−2
0
x 10−3
5 10 15 20
−10
−5
0
x 10−3
5 10 15 20
−10
−5
0
x 10−3
R
E
L
 P
R
IC
E
5 10 15 20
−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
x 10−3
5 10 15 20
−10
−5
0
x 10−3
5 10 15 20
−0.5
0
0.5
M
O
N
 P
O
L
5 10 15 20
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
5 10 15 20
0
0.2
0.4
Figure 2.1: impulse responses to a one standard deviation increase in the
monetary policy measure. Sample: 1969Q2-2007Q4 (bold lines refer to the
model with all durable goods; dashed lines refer to the model with only
houses; shaded areas and dotted lines represent one-standard-deviation con-
fidence bands)
17
5 10 15 20
−10
−5
0
x 10−3 Cholesky
1
9
6
9
Q
2
−
1
9
9
3
Q
1
5 10 15 20
−4
−2
0
2
4
x 10−3 Sign Restrictions
5 10 15 20
−8−6
−4−2
02
4
x 10−3 Narrative Approach
5 10 15 20
−8−6
−4−2
02
x 10−3
1
9
7
1
Q
4
−
1
9
9
5
Q
3
5 10 15 20
−4
−2
0
2
4
x 10−3
5 10 15 20
−10
−5
0
x 10−3
5 10 15 20
−5
0
5
x 10−3
1
9
7
4
Q
2
−
1
9
9
8
Q
1
5 10 15 20
−2
0
2
4
6
x 10−3
5 10 15 20
−5
0
5
x 10−3
5 10 15 20
−2
0
2
x 10−3
1
9
7
6
Q
4
−
2
0
0
0
Q
3
5 10 15 20
−2
0
2
4
x 10−3
5 10 15 20
−4
−2
0
2
4
x 10−3
5 10 15 20
−2
0
2
x 10−3
1
9
7
9
Q
2
−
2
0
0
3
Q
1
5 10 15 20
−2
0
2
4
x 10−3
5 10 15 20
−5
0
5
x 10−3
5 10 15 20
−8
−6
−4
−2
0
2
x 10−3
1
9
8
1
Q
4
−
2
0
0
5
Q
3
5 10 15 20
−4
−2
0
2
4
x 10−3
5 10 15 20
−8
−6
−4
−2
0
2
x 10−3
5 10 15 20
−10
−5
0
5
x 10−3
1
9
8
4
Q
2
−
2
0
0
7
Q
4
5 10 15 20
−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
x 10−3
5 10 15 20
−10
−5
0
x 10−3
Figure 2.2: responses of the relative price to a one standard deviation in-
crease in the monetary policy measure. Rows denote samples, columns de-
note identification methods (bold lines refer to the model with all durable
goods; dashed lines refer to the model with only houses; shaded areas and
dotted lines represent one-standard-deviation confidence bands)
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SVAR model whereas it significantly decreases in the housing SVAR model,
thus confirming the previous results across subsamples and identifications of
the monetary policy shock. To sum up, this empirical evidence suggests that
the definition of the durables sector is crucial. If durable goods are defined
to include both non-housing goods and residential investment, these display
dynamics consistent with a non-negligible degree of price stickiness. Con-
versely, durable goods defined to include only the housing sector exhibit a
behavior compatible with flexible prices.
These results survive several robustness checks reported in Appendix
2.7: (i) inclusion of a linear time-trend (2.7.1); (ii) alternative definitions
of durables as described in Table 2.2 (see Appendix 2.7.2); (iii) subsample
analysis (2.7.3); (iv) sign restrictions imposed for two, four and six quar-
ters (2.7.4); (v) the Proxy SVAR approach (2.7.5); (vi) a three-sector SVAR
model in which durables and housing are treated separately in the same
model (2.7.6). It is noticeable from Section 2.7.2 that when any measure
of house prices is bundled with non-house durables prices, the relative price
never falls in response to a monetary policy tightening.
2.3 New-Keynesian model
To rationalize the SVAR estimates, we analyze a two-sector New-Keynesian
model in which households consume both durable and nondurable goods.
Following Monacelli (2009), Sterk (2010) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010) we
assume that impatient households obtain loans from patient ones using their
durables stock as collateral, with the amount they can borrow tied to the
value of the collateral, thus allowing for a further transmission mechanism of
monetary policy beyond the standard interest-rate channel.16 The economy
is characterized by several frictions, the importance of which is empirically
assessed. These are price and wage stickiness, investment adjustment costs
16This important transmission mechanism is not considered in related studies, such as
Bouakez et al. (2009) and Kim and Katayama (2013). Furthermore, Walentin (2014)
estimates the model of Iacoviello and Neri (2010) on the Swedish economy to investigate
how macroprudential policies (i.e. changes in the LTV ratio) further alter the effects of
monetary policy shocks.
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in durable goods (IAC, henceforth) and habit formation in consumption of
nondurable goods. Finally, the monetary authority sets the nominal interest
rate according to a Taylor-type interest rate rule.
2.3.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of two groups of infinitely-lived
households (patient and impatient) each indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] in which con-
sumers derive utility from consumption of durable and nondurable goods
and get disutility from supplying labor. Impatient households have a lower
discount factor than patient ones (β′ < β) that is why they borrow in equi-
librium. Throughout the paper, variables and parameters with a ′ refer to
impatient households.
2.3.1.1 Patient households
Patient household’s lifetime utility is represented by
E0
∞∑
t=0
eBt β
tU (Xi,t, N i,t) , (2.2)
where eBt is a preference shock, Xi,t = Z
1−α
i,t D
α
i,t is a Cobb-Douglas con-
sumption aggregator between nondurable (Zi,t) and durable goods (Di,t) with
α ∈ [0, 1] representing the share of durable consumption on total expendi-
ture, andNi,t being the household’s labor supply. We assume that nondurable
consumption is subject to external habit formation so that
Zi,t = Ci,t − ζSt−1, (2.3)
St = ρcSt−1 + (1− ρc)Ct, (2.4)
where Ci,t is the level of the household’s nondurable consumption; St, ζ ∈
(0, 1) and ρc ∈ (0, 1) are the stock, the degree and the persistence of external
habit formation, respectively, while Ct represents average consumption across
20
households.17 Each household monopolistically supplies labor to satisfy the
following demand function:
Ni,t =
(
wi,t
wt
)−eWt η
Nt, (2.5)
where wi,t is the real wage of each household whereas wt is the average
real wage in the economy. Parameter η is the intratemporal elasticity of
substitution between labor services and eWt is a wage markup shock. Fi-
nally, firms on average demand a quantity Nt of labor services. Nominal
wages are subject to quadratic costs of adjustment as in Rotemberg (1982):
ϑW
2
(
wi,t
wi,t−1
ΠCt − ΠC
)2
wtNt, where ϑ
W is the parameter governing the degree
of wage stickiness, ΠCt is the gross rate of inflation in the non-durable sector,
and ΠC is its steady-state level. The stock of durables evolves according to
law of motion
Di,t+1 = (1− δ)Di,t + eIt IDi,t
[
1− S
(
IDi,t
IDi,t−1
)]
, (2.6)
where δ is the depreciation rate of durables, IDi,t is investment in durable
goods that is subject to adjustment costs and eIt represents an investment-
specific shock. The adjustment costs function S (·) satisfies S (1) = S ′ (1) = 0
and S
′′
(1) > 0. In addition, each household purchases nominal bonds Bi,t,
receives profits Ωi,t from firms and pays a lump-sum tax Tt so that the period-
17As explained by Fuhrer (2000), the extra source of persistence in superficial habit
formation determined by ρc implies that the reference level for habit formation can either
be only the previous period consumption (for ρc = 0) or consumption further back in time
(for 0 < ρc ≤ 1). Fuhrer (2000) then demonstrated that this extra source of persistence is
key to fit the model to the data and produce plausible impulse responses of consumption
to macroeconomic shocks. The same specification of persistence has been proved to be
empirically relevant in estimated models with deep habits in consumption (see Ravn et al.,
2006, Cantore et al., 2014a and Zubairy, 2014). Moreover, Cantore et al. (2014b) show
that including the extra persistence in superficial habits makes a NK model fit the data
as well as a NK model with deep habits. Given that accounting for the plausible response
of consumption to a monetary policy shock is crucial in our paper, we included the extra
source of persistence in superficial habits.
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by-period real budget constraint reads as follows:
Ci,t +QtI
D
i,t +
ϑW
2
(
wi,t
wi,t−1
ΠCt − ΠC
)2
wtNt +
RtBi,t−1
ΠCt
=
Bi,t
PCt
+
Wi,t
PCt
Ni,t + Ωi,t − Tt, (2.7)
where Qt ≡ PD,tPC,t is the relative price of durables, Rt is the gross nominal inter-
est rate andWi,t is the nominal wage. Households choose Zi,t, Bi,t, Di,t+1, I
D
i,t, wi,t
to maximize (2.2) subject to (2.3), (2.4), (2.5), (2.6) and (2.7). At the sym-
metric equilibrium, the patient household’s optimality conditions are:
1 = Et
[
Λt,t+1
Rt
ΠCt+1
]
, (2.8)
Qtψt =
UD,t
UZ,t
+ (1− δ)Et [Λt,t+1Qt+1ψt+1] , (2.9)
1 = ψte
I
t
[
1− S
(
IDt
IDt−1
)
− S ′
(
IDt
IDt−1
)
IDt
IDt−1
]
+
+Et
{
Λt,t+1ψt+1
Qt+1
Qt
eIt+1
[
S
′
(
IDt+1
IDt
)(
IDt+1
IDt
)2]}
, (2.10)
0 =
[
1− eWt η
]
+
eWt η
µt
− ϑW (ΠWt − ΠC)ΠWt +
+Et
[
Λt,t+1ϑ
W
(
ΠWt − ΠC
)
ΠWt+1
wt+1Nt+1
wtNt
]
. (2.11)
Equation (2.8) is a standard Euler equation with Λt,t+1 ≡ β UZ,t+1UZ,t
eBt+1
eBt
repre-
senting the stochastic discount factor and UZ,t denoting the marginal utility
of habit-adjusted consumption of nondurable goods. Equation (2.9) repre-
sents the asset price of durables, where UD,t is the marginal utility of durables
consumption and ψt is the Lagrange multiplier attached to constraint (2.6).
Equation (2.10) is the optimality condition with respect to investment in
durable goods. Finally, equation (2.11) is the wage setting equation in which
µt ≡ wtMRSt is the wage markup, MRSt ≡ −
UN,t
UZ,t
is the marginal rate of sub-
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stitution between consumption and leisure, UN,t is the marginal disutility of
work and ΠWt =
wt
wt−1
ΠCt is the gross wage inflation rate.
2.3.1.2 Impatient households
Impatient households solve a maximization problem analogous to patient
households, with the additional assumption that the former are limited in
the amount they can borrow from the latter by the value of their durables
stock according to the following borrowing constraint:
B′i,t ≤ mEt
(
Qt+1D
′
i,tΠ
C
t+1
Rt
)
, (2.12)
where m represents the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio.18 At the symmetric equi-
librium, the impatient household’s optimality conditions are:
λ′t = e
B
t UZ′,t, (2.13)
λ′t = β
′Et
[
λ′t+1
Rt
ΠCt+1
]
+ λBCt Rt, (2.14)
Qtψ
′
t =
UD′,t
UZ′t
+ β′ (1− δ)Et
[
λ′t+1
λ′t
ψ′t+1Qt+1
]
+
+
λBCt
UZ′t
mEt
[
Qt+1Π
C
t+1
]
, (2.15)
1 = ψ′te
I
t
[
1− S
(
ID
′
t
ID
′
t−1
)
− S ′
(
ID
′
t
ID
′
t−1
)
ID
′
t
ID
′
t−1
]
+
+ β′Et
λ′t+1Qt+1λ′tQt ψ′t+1eIt+1
S ′ (ID′t+1
ID
′
t
)(
ID
′
t+1
ID
′
t
)2 , (2.16)
0 =
[
1− eWt η
]
+
eWt η
µ′t
− ϑW
(
ΠW
′
t − ΠC
)
ΠW
′
t +
+ β′Et
[
λ′t+1
λ′t
ϑW
(
ΠW
′
t+1 − ΠC
)
ΠW
′
t+1
w′t+1N
′
t+1
w′tN ′t
]
. (2.17)
Variables λ′t and λ
BC
t are the Lagrangian multipliers attached to the bud-
18As noted by Iacoviello and Neri (2010), patient households are subject to a similar
constraint that never binds due to β′ < β.
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get and borrowing constraints, respectively. Notice that (2.14) is a modified
version of the typical Euler equation due to the presence of the borrowing
constraint. Equations (2.15) and (2.16) show the optimal decisions about
the stock and flow of durables whereas (2.17) is the wage equation. Here,
ΠW
′
t =
w′t
w′t−1
ΠCt is the gross wage inflation rate of impatient households.
2.3.2 Firms
Firms face quadratic costs of changing prices as in Rotemberg (1982):
Φjω,t =
ϑj
2
(
P jω,t
P jω,t−1
− 1
)2
Y jt , where ϑj is the parameter of sectoral price sticki-
ness. Each firm produces differentiated goods according to a constant returns
to scale production function,
Y jω,t = e
A
t
(
N jω,t
)ψ˜ (
N ′
j
ω,t
)1−ψ˜
, (2.18)
where ω ∈ [0, 1] and j = C,D are indices for firms and sectors respectively,
ψ˜ ∈ [0, 1] denotes the share of the patient household and eAt is a labor aug-
menting shock.19 Firms maximize the present discounted value of profits,
Et
{ ∞∑
t=0
Λt,t+1
[
P jω,t
P jt
Y jω,t −
Wω,t
P jt
N jω,t −
W ′ω,t
P jt
N ′
j
ω,t − Φjω,t
]}
, (2.19)
subject to production function (2.18) and a standard Dixit-Stiglitz demand
equation Y jω,t =
(
P jω,t
P jt
)−ejt j
Y jt , where j and e
j
t are the sectoral intratemporal
elasticities of substitution across goods and the sectoral price markup shocks,
respectively. At the symmetric equilibrium, the price setting equations for
19We follow Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and assume a Cobb-Douglas production function.
Conversely, Monacelli (2009) and Sterk (2010) assume perfect substitutability between
labor inputs and use a linear production function. We opted for the former because,
given the different saving choices across the two households, they will bargain different
wages. The income share of the two households is different and governed by parameter
ψ˜. Assuming that workers are perfect substitutes would lead to the same income share
across households, thus neglecting the different saving motive across them. It must be said
that Iacoviello and Neri (2010) argue that estimating a model in which hours are perfect
substitutes doesn’t materially affect their results.
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the two sectors read as
(
1− eCt c
)
+ eCt cMC
C
t = ϑc
(
ΠCt − 1
)
ΠCt −
− ϑcEt
[
Λt,t+1
Y Ct+1
Y Ct
(
ΠCt+1 − 1
)
ΠCt+1
]
, (2.20)(
1− eDt d
)
+ eDt dMC
D
t = ϑd
(
ΠDt − 1
)
ΠDt −
− ϑdEt
[
Λt,t+1
Qt+1Y
D
t+1
QtY Dt
(
ΠDt+1 − 1
)
ΠDt+1
]
. (2.21)
If ϑj = 0 prices are flexible and are set as constant markups over the marginal
costs.
2.3.3 Fiscal and monetary policy
Every period, a lump-sum tax equates government spending so that the gov-
ernment budget is balanced. Government spending eGt follows an exogenous
process and, as in Erceg and Levin (2006), we assume that the government
purchases only nondurable goods and services. Monetary policy is set ac-
cording to the following Taylor rule:
log
(
Rt
R
)
= ρr log
(
Rt−1
R
)
+
+ (1− ρr)
[
ρpi log
(
Π˜t
Π˜
)
+ ρy log
(
Yt
Y
)]
+ eRt , (2.22)
where ρr is the interest rate smoothing parameter, ρpi and ρy are the monetary
policy responses to the deviations of the inflation aggregator and output from
their respective steady states, and eRt represents the exogenous innovation to
the monetary policy rule. Π˜t ≡
(
ΠCt
)1−τ (
ΠDt
)τ
is an aggregator of the gross
rates of inflation in the two sectors with τ ∈ [0, 1] representing the weight of
durables. Different monetary policy rules have been used in two-sector NK
models with no difference in their main implications.20
20Barsky et al. (2007); Katayama and Kim (2010); Bouakez et al. (2011); Sudo (2012,
2007) specify a money supply rule. Carlstrom and Fuerst (2010); Monacelli (2009); Sterk
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2.3.4 Market clearing and exogenous processes
In equilibrium all markets clear and the model is closed by the following
identities:
Yt = Y
C
t +QtY
D
t +
ϑW
2
(
ΠWt − ΠC
)2
wtNt +
+
ϑW
2
(
ΠW
′
t − ΠC
)2
w′tN
′
t , (2.23)
Y Ct = Ct + C
′
t +Gt +
ϑc
2
(
ΠCt − ΠC
)2
Y Ct , (2.24)
Y Dt = [Dt − (1− δ)Dt−1] +
[
D′t − (1− δ)D′t−1
]
+
+
ϑd
2
(
ΠDt − ΠD
)2
Y Dt , (2.25)
0 = Bt +B
′
t, (2.26)
Nt = N
C
t +N
D
t , (2.27)
N ′t = N
′C
t +N
′D
t . (2.28)
As in Smets and Wouters (2007), the wage markup and the price markup
shocks follow ARMA(1,1) processes:
log
(κt
κ¯
)
= ρκ log
(κt−1
κ¯
)
+ κt − θiκt−1, (2.29)
with κ =
[
eW , eC , eD
]
, i = [W,C,D], whereas all other shocks follow an
AR(1) process:
log
(κt
κ¯
)
= ρκ log
(κt−1
κ¯
)
+ κt , (2.30)
where κ =
[
eB, eI , eR, eA, eG
]
is a vector of exogenous variables, ρκ and ρκ
are the autoregressive parameters, θi are the moving average parameters, 
κ
t
and κt are i.i.d shocks with zero mean and standard deviations σκ and σκ.
21
(2010); Chen and Liao (2014) introduce an interest rate rule that responds only to inflation.
Following Junhee (2009); Auray et al. (2013); Kim and Katayama (2013); Katayama and
Kim (2013); Di Pace and Hertweck (2016); Tsai (2016), we set a Taylor-type rule featuring
interest rate smoothing and responses to inflation and output.
21The systems of equations describing the full symmetric equilibrium and the steady
state are presented in Sections 2.8.1 and 2.8.2 of the Appendix.
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2.3.5 Functional forms
The utility function is additively separable and logarithmic in the consump-
tion aggregator: U (Xt, N t) = log (Xt)− νN
1+ϕ
t
1+ϕ
, where ν is a scaling param-
eter for hours worked and ϕ is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply. Following Christiano et al. (2005), we assume quadratic adjustment
costs in durables investment: S
(
IDt
IDt−1
)
= φ
2
(
IDt
IDt−1
− 1
)2
, with φ > 0 rep-
resenting the degree of adjustment costs. The same functional forms are
assumed for the impatient households, with the preference and investment
adjustment cost parameters specific to them.
2.3.6 Bayesian estimation
The model is estimated with Bayesian methods. The Kalman filter is used
to evaluate the likelihood function, which combined with the prior distribu-
tion of the parameters yields the posterior distribution. Then, the Monte-
Carlo-Markov-Chain Metropolis-Hastings (MCMC-MH) algorithm with two
parallel chains of 150,000 draws each is used to generate a sample from the
posterior distribution in order to perform inference. We estimate the model
over the sample 1969Q2-2007Q4, the same as in the SVAR analysis. We use
eight observables: GDP, investment in durable goods, consumption of non-
durable goods, real wage, hours worked, inflation in the nondurables sector,
inflation in the durables sector and the nominal interest rate, using US data.
Similarly to the SVAR analysis, we first define the durables sector as the
sum of durable goods and residential investments and label this model as
the baseline DSGE. Then, we estimate the model by assuming that durables
comprise only houses and we will refer to it as the housing DSGE. This model
becomes then very close to Iacoviello and Neri (2010) who, however do not
estimate the price stickiness parameter in the housing sector and assume that
prices are flexible.22 The following measurement equations link the data to
22Another difference between our model and Iacoviello and Neri (2010) is that we assume
perfect labor mobility across sectors hence sectoral wages are always equal.
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the endogenous variables of the model:
∆Y ot = γ + Yˆt − Yˆt−1, (2.31)
∆IoD,t = γ + Iˆ
∗
D,t − Iˆ∗D,t−1, (2.32)
∆Cot = γ + Cˆ
*
t − Cˆ*t−1, (2.33)
∆W ot = γ + Wˆ
*
t − Wˆ *t−1, (2.34)
N ot = Nˆ
∗
t , (2.35)
ΠoC,t = p¯iC + Πˆ
C
t , (2.36)
ΠoD,t = p¯iD + Πˆ
D
t , (2.37)
Rot = r¯ + Rˆt. (2.38)
Variables with a ˆ are in log-deviations from their own steady state while ∗
denotes that the variable has been aggregated between the patient and im-
patient households (i.e. x∗t = xt + x
′
t).
23 γ is the common quarterly trend
growth rate of GDP, investment of durables, consumption of nondurables
and the real wage; p¯iC and p¯iD are the average quarterly inflation rates in
nondurable and durable sectors respectively; r¯ is the average quarterly Fed-
eral funds rate. Hours worked are demeaned so no constant is required in
the corresponding measurement equation (2.35).
2.3.6.1 Calibration and priors
The structural parameters and steady state values presented in Table 2.4
are calibrated at a quarterly frequency. As in Iacoviello and Neri (2010),
the discount factors β and β′ are 0.99 and 0.97, respectively. Following
Monacelli (2009), the depreciation rate of durable goods δ is calibrated at
0.010 amounting to an annual depreciation of 4%, and the durables share of
total expenditure α is set at 0.20. The sectoral elasticities of substitution
across different varieties c and d equal 6 in order to target a steady-state
gross mark-up of 1.20. The elasticity of substitution in the labor market η is
set equal to 21 as in Zubairy (2014), implying a 5% steady-state gross wage
23The aggregation for the real wage is borrowed from Iacoviello and Neri (2010).
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Parameter Value
Discount factor patient households β 0.99
Discount factor impatient households β′ 0.97
Durables depreciation rate δ 0.010
Durables share of total expenditure α 0.20
Elasticity of substitution nondurable goods c 6
Elasticity of substitution durable goods d 6
Elasticity of substitution in labor η 21
Preference parameters ν, ν ′ target N = N ′ = 0.33
Loan-to-value ratio m 0.85
Share of patient households ψ˜ 0.79
Government share of output gy 0.20
Table 2.4: Calibrated parameters
mark-up. The preference parameters ν and ν ′ are set to target steady-state
hours of work of 0.33 for both households. The government-output ratio gy
is calibrated at 0.20, in line with the data. Finally, we follow Iacoviello and
Neri (2010) and set the loan-to-value ratio m to 0.85 and the share of patient
households ψ˜ at their estimated value 0.79.24
Table 2.5 summarizes the prior and posterior distributions of the parame-
ters and the shocks. The choice of priors correspond to a large extent to those
in previous studies of the US economy. We set the prior mean of the inverse
Frisch elasticities ϕ and ϕ′ to 0.5, in line with Smets and Wouters (2007, SW
henceforth) who estimate a Frisch elasticity of 1.92. We also follow SW in
setting the prior means of the habit parameter, ζ and ζ ′, to 0.7, the interest
rate smoothing parameter, ρr, to 0.80 and in assuming a stronger response of
the central bank to inflation than output. As far as the the constants in the
measurement equations are concerned, we set the prior means equal to the
average values in the dataset. In general, we use the Beta (B) distribution
for all parameters bounded between 0 and 1. We use the Inverse Gamma
(IG) distribution for the standard deviation of the shocks for which we set
a loose prior with 2 degrees of freedom. Kim and Katayama (2013) are the
only authors who jointly estimate the price and wage stickiness parameters
24This calibration is also consistent with the findings in Jappelli (1990), who estimates
an income share of 80% for savers in the U.S economy.
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whereas all the other studies calibrate them such that prices of nondurable
goods are sticky whereas prices of durable goods are flexible. However, they
define Calvo parameters for prices and a Rotemberg parameter for wages.
Our model features Rotemberg parameters for both prices and wages and we
choose a Gamma (G) distribution, given that these are non-negative. One of
our main interests is to assess whether the durables price stickiness parameter
is close to zero, or whether it tends towards values closer to those estimated
for the nondurables sector. This is crucial in order to assess whether the
response of the relative price of durables is significantly different from zero
or not. To this aim, we assign a prior whereby durables prices are as sticky
as nondurables prices and both degrees of price stickiness are low (corre-
sponding to firms resetting prices around 2.3 quarters on average in a Calvo
world).25 Then, we let the data decide whether and to what extent these
should depart from one another.
2.3.6.2 Estimation results
Table 2.5 also reports the posterior mean with 90% probability intervals in
square brackets of the baseline and the housing DSGE models. The poste-
rior means suggest that various frictions are supported by the data in both
models.26 Impatient households display a higher degree of habits in non-
durables consumption (ζ < ζ ′), as found by Iacoviello and Neri (2010) but
with a lower persistence (ρc > ρ
′
c). In addition, patient households face larger
costs of adjusting their durables stock (φ > φ′). The posterior mean of the
inverse Frisch elasticities of labor supply in both models are higher than the
prior and are well identified in the data (as can be seen from comparing prior
and posterior distributions in Figure 2.25, Appendix 2.11). Estimates of the
Taylor rule parameters show a high degree of policy inertia, and a stronger
response to inflation than to output, a likely consequence of estimating the
25We follow Woodford (2003) and Monacelli (2009) to convert the Rotemberg to Calvo
parameters and obtain the average price duration.
26In Appendix 2.12 we perform likelihood comparisons and a number of robustness
checks and show that the frictions considered are important when the theoretical model is
brought to the data. In addition, Appendix 2.12.1 discusses the implications of changing
the income share of patient households.
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Parameter Prior Posterior Mean Posterior Mean
Distr. Mean Sd/df Baseline DSGE Housing DSGE
Structural
Inv. Frisch elasticity patients ϕ N 0.50 0.10 0.5504 [0.4010;0.6986] 0.6448 [0.4933;0.7942]
Inv. Frisch elasticity impatients ϕ′ N 0.50 0.10 0.6468 [0.4952;0.8028] 0.6860 [0.5300;0.8431]
Habits patients ζ B 0.70 0.10 0.6505 [0.5979;0.7036] 0.6615 [0.6188;0.6965]
Habits. impatients ζ′ B 0.70 0.10 0.9336 [0.9240;0.9442] 0.9404 [0.9338;0.9465]
Habit persist. patients ρc B 0.70 0.10 0.5068 [0.3964;0.6206] 0.6399 [0.5412;0.7436]
Habit persist. impatients ρ′c B 0.70 0.10 0.2195 [0.1564;0.2809] 0.3221 [0.2366;0.4142]
Price stickiness nondurables ϑc G 15.0 5.00 23.38 [15.82;30.61] 26.06 [18.56;33.99]
Price stickiness durables ϑd G 15.0 5.00 24.45 [16.09;33.26] 1.79 [1.13;2.43]
Wage stickiness ϑW G 100.0 10.00 152.39 [136.15;169.71] 168.06 [158.30;177.30]
IAC durables patients φ N 1.5 0.50 3.4738 [2.8002;4.1114] 3.7908 [3.2240;4.4022]
IAC durables impatients φ′ N 1.5 0.50 1.9112 [1.2022;2.5902] 1.7710 [1.0228;2.4684]
Share of durables inflation τ B 0.20 0.10 0.1440 [0.0519;0.2299] 0.0516 [0.0367;0.0672]
Inflation -Taylor rule ρpi N 1.50 0.20 1.4042 [1.2298;1.5702] 1.7285 [1.5062;1.9437]
Output -Taylor rule ρy G 0.10 0.05 0.0175 [0.0056;0.0291] 0.0221 [0.0059;0.0368]
Interest rate smoothing ρr B 0.80 0.10 0.7088 [0.6657;0.7545] 0.7681 [0.7314;0.8054]
Averages
Trend growth rate γ N 0.49 0.10 0.4017 [0.3678;0.4343] 0.4054 [0.3752;0.4356]
Inflation rate nondurables p¯iC G 1.05 0.10 1.0135 [0.9120;1.1146] 1.0427 [0.9348;1.1438]
Inflation rate durables p¯iD G 0.37 0.10 0.4324 [0.3200;0.5495] 0.3462 [0.2180;0.4767]
Interest rate r¯ G 1.65 0.10 1.6140 [1.4898;1.7467] 1.6404 [1.4980;1.7754]
Exogenous processes
Technology ρeA B 0.50 0.20 0.9775 [0.9574;0.9970] 0.9555 [0.9223;0.9903]
σeA IG 0.10 2.0 0.6933 [0.6196;0.7607] 0.7483 [0.6678;0.8308]
Monetary Policy ρeR B 0.50 0.20 0.1019 [0.0258;0.1774] 0.0777 [0.0173;0.1320]
σeR IG 0.10 2.0 0.2880 [0.2566;0.3180] 0.2803 [0.2503;0.3109]
Investment Durables ρeI B 0.50 0.20 0.4915 [0.3072;0.6710] 0.9205 [0.8872;0.9543]
σeI IG 0.10 2.0 6.1724 [4.0832;8.2543] 6.1915 [5.4443;6.9462]
Preference ρeB B 0.50 0.20 0.7465 [0.6805;0.8167] 0.8641 [0.8198;0.9103]
σeB IG 0.10 2.0 1.8512 [1.5433;2.1479] 2.1900 [1.7840;2.5739]
Price mark-up nondurables ρeC B 0.50 0.20 0.9053 [0.8544;0.9595] 0.9098 [0.8490;0.9728]
θC B 0.50 0.20 0.5643 [0.4506;0.6733] 0.6449 [0.5262;0.7698]
σeC IG 0.10 2.0 2.0840 [1.6533;2.4938] 2.2972 [1.7984;2.7678]
Price mark-up durables ρeD B 0.50 0.20 0.9869 [0.9768;0.9976] 0.9888 [0.9778;0.9994]
θD B 0.50 0.20 0.7037 [0.6025;0.8045] 0.8903 [0.8561;0.9265]
σeD IG 0.10 2.0 4.3290 [3.0803;5.5682] 24.451 [20.311;28.074]
Wage mark-up ρeW B 0.50 0.20 0.9481 [0.9210;0.9761] 0.9557 [0.9346;0.9791]
θW B 0.50 0.20 0.5544 [0.4511;0.6632] 0.5661 [0.4608;0.6780]
σeW IG 0.10 2.0 5.2236 [4.3012;6.1217] 5.5840 [4.6366;6.5235]
Government spending ρeG B 0.50 0.20 0.9658 [0.9458;0.9879] 0.9565 [0.9283;0.9857]
σeG IG 0.10 2.0 3.5099 [3.1807;3.8336] 3.3376 [3.0351;3.6504]
Table 2.5: Prior and posterior distributions of estimated parameters (90%
confidence bands in square brackets)
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model over a sample including the Great Moderation. Overall, estimates
from both models are quite close to each other.
As regards price stickiness in the two sectors, when we employ the broad
measure of durable goods (baseline DSGE) the posterior means are very
similar – with confidence intervals almost entirely overlapping. The point es-
timates of durables and nondurables price stickiness (ϑd = 24.45, ϑc = 23.38)
correspond to Calvo probabilities of resetting the price of 35.9% and 36.5%
and an average price duration of 2.8 and 2.7 quarters respectively. Conversely,
in the housing DSGE the posterior mean of house prices (ϑd = 1.79) is dra-
matically lower than that of nondurables (ϑc = 26.06) corresponding to Calvo
probabilities of resetting the price of 78.1% and 35% and average price du-
rations of 1.3 and 2.8 quarters respectively. In addition, confidence intervals
never overlap. Here, the estimated degree of wage stickiness (ϑW = 168.06)
guarantees that the comovement between consumption in the two sectors is
still attained despite house prices being estimated to be quasi-flexible.27
Figure 2.3 shows the prior and posterior distributions of the price sticki-
ness parameters in both models. First, we notice that the data is informative
as the posterior distributions are rather apart from the prior. In the baseline
DSGE (left box), the two distributions almost entirely overlap thus pointing
to a negligible difference in the price stickiness across the nondurables and
durables sectors. Conversely, in the housing DSGE (right box) the posterior
distribution of the housing price stickiness moves towards zero and in oppo-
site direction with respect to the posterior distribution of nondurables prices.
Such estimates highlight that when a broad measure of durables is employed,
then prices display the same degree of stickiness with respect to nondurables
whereas, if the durables sector coincides with the housing sector, then prices
are estimated to reset almost every quarter.
This result that durables prices are as sticky as nondurables contrasts
with Kim and Katayama (2013) who find that prices of durables are substan-
tially more flexible than prices of nondurables, in a model with homogenous
27The importance of wage stickiness for the comovement between the two sectors is also
highlighted in a calibrated version of the model with flexible durables prices, see Figure
2.26 in Appendix 2.12.
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Figure 2.3: Prior and posterior densities of price stickiness parameters. Left
box: baseline DSGE. Right box: housing DSGE (left-scale refers to distribu-
tion of housing parameter, right-scale refers to nondurables).
households and no role for durables as collateral, fewer shocks and different
observables.28 We try and be as close as possible to mainstream estimated
models as far as shocks and observables are concerned, with the natural ad-
dition of observables related to durables consumption and durables inflation.
Moreover, such results are closer to the latest microeconometric evidence. In
particular, Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), Klenow and Malin (2010) and
Petrella and Santoro (2012) use highly disaggregated data and find no de-
cisive evidence that categories of nondurables are stickier than durables. In
addition, Boivin et al. (2009) argue that inflation in sectors with high price
stickiness display a high autocorrelation and low volatility. They estimate
that durables inflation has higher autocorrelation and lower volatility than
nondurables inflation hence it is possible to infer that prices of durables are
stickier than nondurables.
28Also Bouakez et al. (2009) provide qualitatively similar results to Kim and Katayama
(2013) in a larger model estimated using GMM and a different dataset.
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Figure 2.4: Bayesian impulse responses to a contractionary monetary policy
shock. Bold lines: mean responses baseline model. Dashed lines: mean
responses housing model.
2.3.6.3 Impulse response functions
In order to investigate the dynamic properties of the models, Figure 2.4
displays the estimated impulse responses of the variables of interest to a one
standard-deviation increase in the nominal interest rate across the baseline
and housing DSGE models.29 As the estimated parameters are very similar
across the two models, the mean responses do not show large differences.
Taking into account the 68%, 90% and the 95% confidence bands (see Figures
2.23 and 2.24 in Appendix 2.10) further highlights these similarities. An
increase in the monetary policy rate leads to an output contraction and
a decrease in overall and sectoral inflations. Furthermore, the presence of
wage and price stickiness generates the desired comovement between durables
and nondurables. The only noticeable difference between the two models
concerns the response of the relative price, due to the different degree of
29Impulse responses represent percentage deviations from the steady state. Bayesian
impulse responses of each model together with confidence bands are reported in Appendix
2.10.
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Figure 2.5: Bayesian impulse responses of relative prices to a contractionary
monetary policy shock (bold lines are mean responses, dark-shaded areas are
68% confidence bands, medium and lighter shaded areas represent 90% and
95% confidence bands respectively)
estimated price stickiness. In the baseline model, prices of durables and
nondurables are equally sticky hence the response of the relative price is flat
whereas in the housing model, house prices are almost flexible and prices of
nondurables are sticky hence the relative price falls in response to a monetary
policy contraction. Figure 2.5 highlights the Bayesian impulse responses of
the relative prices in the two models together with the 68%, 90% and the
95% confidence bands. The credible set of estimated impulse responses in
the baseline model does not exclude zero at any of the confidence levels
considered whereas it is significantly negative in the housing DSGE. Such
dynamic properties of the models are consistent with the findings of the
SVAR models estimated in Section 2.2 (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2) and represent
the main novel contribution of our paper.30
To sum up, we have estimated prices of durables (defined as the sum
of durable goods and residential investments) to be as sticky as nondurables
which is at odds with the assumption made in most two-sectors New-Keynesian
models that they are fully flexible. We have then demonstrated that such
assumption is consistent only with a narrow definition of durables sector that
30In general, qualitatively the responses of the estimated DSGE models are consistent
with those of the SVAR model. Also from a quantitative perspective, durables turn out
to be more volatile than nondurables and output, as in the SVAR results.
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coincide with exclusively with residential investments.
2.3.7 Estimated sectoral price stickiness in extended
models
The two-sector DSGE model estimated in the previous section builds mainly
on Barsky et al. (2007) with the addition of several frictions and of the collat-
eral constraint as in Monacelli (2009), Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and Sterk
(2010). In this section we extend the model to account for two additional
features affecting sectoral Phillips curves, namely imperfect sectoral labor
mobility and price indexation. We re-estimate the DSGE model jointly with
the additional parameters. Then, we further generalize our analysis and esti-
mate a three-sector DSGE model in which housing and non-housing durables
are treated separately and display heterogeneity in terms of rate of deprecia-
tion, adjustment costs and degree of substitutability with nondurable goods.
Table 2.6 reports the estimated sectoral price stickiness across the extended
models whereas the full set of estimated parameters is in Appendix 2.13.
2.3.7.1 Imperfect sectoral labor mobility
Households in two-sector models are allowed to optimally choose the quantity
of labor to supply in each sector according to their preferences. Standard two-
sector models typically assume either that labor is perfectly mobile hence
sectoral wages are equalized across the two sectors or assume no mobility at
all.31 However, more recent contributions have emphasized the importance
of limited labor mobility in accounting for the behavior of the economy in
multi-sector models. Indeed, Bouakez et al. (2009) argue that imperfect labor
mobility affects the dispersion of hours across sectors whereas Bouakez et al.
(2011) show that accounting for limited labor mobility jointly with inter-
sectoral linkages solves the comovement puzzle. Moreover, Iacoviello and
31See, among others, Aoki (2001), Huang and Liu (2005), Barsky et al. (2007), Monacelli
(2009), Sterk (2010), Jeske and Liu (2013), Kim and Katayama (2013), Katayama and
Kim (2013), Jeske and Liu (2013) and Barsky et al. (2016) for models with perfect labor
mobility and Erceg and Levin (2006) and Benigno (2004) for models with no labor mobility.
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Neri (2010) find evidence of limited labor mobility across the consumption
and housing sectors.32
In the context of our main two-sector model above, perfect labor mobility
implies that the production structure and thus marginal costs are always the
same across the two sectors. Therefore, it seems sensible to modify it to allow
for limited labor mobility, and hence for different dynamics of wages and the
marginal costs across the two sectors, and to check the robustness of our
results as regards the estimation of the price stickiness parameters. Following
the abovementioned contributions, limited labor mobility is introduced by
specifying a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregator between
sectoral hours for each household:
Nt =
[(
χC
)− 1
λ
(
NCt
) 1+λ
λ +
(
1− χC)− 1λ (NDt ) 1+λλ ] λ1+λ , (2.39)
where the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution λ ∈ (0,∞) governs the
degree of labor mobility.33 Note that λ→ 0 denotes the case of labor immo-
bility, while as λ→∞ labor can be freely reallocated and all workers earn the
same wage at the margin. For λ <∞ the economy displays a limited degree
of labor mobility and sectoral wages are not equal. Moreover, χC ≡ NC/N
represents the steady-state share of labor supply in the nondurables sector.
We then replace the labor market clearing conditions (2.27) and (2.28)
with the CES aggregators and bring the model to the data. Typically, lim-
ited labor mobility is calibrated at a value of λ = 1 (see Bouakez et al. 2009,
Petrella and Santoro 2011 and Petrella et al. 2017), except Bouakez et al.
(2011) who explore values between 0.5 and 1.5 whereas Iacoviello and Neri
(2010) estimate values of 1.51 and 1.03 for savers and borrowers, respec-
tively.34 Accordingly, we set the prior mean of the labor mobility parameters
32Imperfect sectoral labor mobility plays a role also for the conduct of optimal monetary
policy, as demonstrated by Petrella and Santoro (2011) and Petrella et al. (2017).
33The same functional form is assumed for impatient households, with variables and
parameters specific to them denoted by ′. Details about the symmetric equilibrium are in
Appendix 2.8.3.1.
34Iacoviello and Neri (2010) specify the CES aggregator such that the labor mobility
parameter is the inverse of λ. They find values of 0.66 and 0.97 for savers and borrowers
respectively hence the values of 1/0.66=1.51 and 1/0.97=1.03 we reported.
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at the posterior estimates of Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and bring the model
to the data. The third and fourth columns of Table 2.6 report the estimated
price stickiness in the baseline and housing DSGE models with imperfect
sectoral labor mobility and show that the results of our main model (first
and second columns of Table 2.6) continue to hold. In the baseline DSGE,
price stickiness is similar across the two sectors with 90% confidence intervals
widely overlapping. Conversely, in the housing DSGE prices of nondurables
are significantly stickier than house prices, which are quasi-flexible. The top
panel of Figure 2.6 plots the posterior distribution of the price stickiness pa-
rameters in the baseline and housing DSGE models with imperfect sectoral
labor mobility. While in the baseline DSGE the two posterior distributions
widely overlap, in the housing DSGE the posterior distributions are rather
apart from each other thus implying a significant difference between the two
sectoral price stickiness parameters. In addition, labor mobility in the hous-
ing DSGE is estimated to be somewhat lower than in the baseline DSGE (see
Table 2.12, Appendix 2.13).35
2.3.7.2 Price indexation
The price setting behavior of firms specified in equations (2.20) and (2.21)
yield purely forward-looking sectoral Phillips curves. In this section we in-
troduce a backward-looking component of the Phillips curves by estimating
the degree of sectoral indexation to past inflation and verify that the results
reported in Section 2.3.6.2 as regards price stickiness are not driven by the
absence of indexation. Following Ireland (2007; 2011) and Ascari et al. (2011)
we introduce indexation in the Rotemberg price adjustment cost specifica-
tion, which now read as:
ϑj
2
(
P ji,t(
Πjt−1
)ςj
P ji,t−1
− 1
)2
Y jt , (2.40)
35Confidence bands of the estimated elasticities do not overlap for patient households,
but they overlap for impatient households.
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where ςj ∈ [0, 1] determines the degree of indexation to past inflation and
j = C,D.36
When bringing the extended model to the data, we set the prior mean
of the sectoral indexation parameters as in Smets and Wouters (2007) and
Iacoviello and Neri (2010) at 0.50 and standard deviation 0.20. Table 2.6
(fifth and sixth columns) shows that the estimated sectoral price stickiness
is very similar across sectors in the baseline DSGE, whereas in the housing
DSGE nondurables prices are much stickier than house prices, which are
virtually flexible. This confirms the results of the main model. Looking at
the posterior distributions of the price stickiness parameters in the baseline
and housing DSGE models with sectoral price indexation (middle panel of
Figure 2.6) leads to the same inference as in the main model. The estimated
degrees of price rigidity are not significantly different in the baseline DSGE
whereas in the housing DSGE house prices are significantly more flexible
than nondurable prices. Finally, we estimate a low degree of sectoral price
indexation (see Table 2.13, Appendix 2.13).37
2.3.7.3 Three-sector model
We have so far demonstrated that the definition of the durables sector plays a
crucial role in the estimation of the sectoral price stickiness. In this section,
we verify that our results continue to hold when we generalize the model
to a three-sector economy producing nondurables, housing and non-housing
durables, where only housing goods serve as collateral. Non-housing and
housing durables display several sources of heterogeneity with respect to each
other: (i) different depreciation rates, i.e. different degrees of durability; (ii)
different adjustment costs in investment in these two goods; (iii) different
degree of substitutability between housing and non-housing durables with
36Appendix 2.8.3.2 provides details about the modified symmetric equilibrium.
37Our estimates of the price indexation parameters are in line with Smets and Wouters
(2007) and Ascari et al. (2011). In contrast, Benati (2008) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010)
report higher values whereas Ireland (2007; 2011) finds evidence of no indexation. How-
ever, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that estimates the sectoral
degree of price indexation within a two-sector DSGE model with durable and nondurable
goods (Iacoviello and Neri, 2010 estimate price stickiness and price indexation only for the
nondurables sector).
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nondurable goods. In particular, here parameter δ denotes the depreciation
rate only of non-housing durables, while parameter δH 6= δ denotes the de-
preciation of housing goods. Similarly, while parameters φ and φ′ refer to
investment adjustment costs of non-housing durables, parameters φH and
φ′H refer to adjustment costs of housing goods. Finally, accounting for dif-
ferent degrees of substitutability between housing and non-housing durables
with nondurable goods requires a generalization of the consumption aggre-
gator, which we specify as a nested constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES)
function of the three goods as follows:
Xt =
[
(1− α) C˜
ρ−1
ρ
t + αH
ρ−1
ρ
t
] ρ
ρ−1
, (2.41)
C˜t =
[
(1− α˜)Z
ρ˜−1
ρ˜
t + α˜D
ρ˜−1
ρ˜
t
] ρ˜
ρ˜−1
, (2.42)
where parameters ρ, ρ˜ ∈ (0,∞) represent the elasticities of substitution be-
tween non-housing (durables and nondurables) and housing goods and be-
tween nondurable and non-housing durable goods, respectively. The result-
ing degree of substitutability between non-durables and housing and between
non-durables and non-housing durables is then a function of these two elas-
ticities and is allowed to be different.38
Housing goods are used as collateral by impatient households, hence the
borrowing constraint (2.12) now reads as:
B′t ≤ mEt
(
QHt+1H
′
tΠ
C
t+1
Rt
)
, (2.43)
with QHt ≡
PHt
PCt
being the relative house price. Firms in the housing sector
behave as firms in the nondurables and durables sector, as outlined in Section
2.3.2: they maximize profits and are subject to quadratic costs of adjusting
prices, with three different price stickiness parameters: ϑc, ϑd, ϑh ∈ [0,∞),
38The same CES aggregators are used for impatient households, with the correspond-
ing variables denoted by ′. Full description of the symmetric equilibrium is provided in
Appendix 2.8.3.3.
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denoting price stickiness in the non-durables, non-housing durables and hous-
ing durables sector, respectively. Finally, distinguishing between housing
and non-housing investment requires making a distinction between (i) hous-
ing and non-housing investment-specific shocks; and (ii) housing and non-
housing durables price markup shocks. These are assumed to follow AR(1)
and ARMA(1,1) processes, respectively, in line with the analysis above. This
means that the extended model features two more shocks relative to that in
Section 2.3.
Consistently to this new structure, we bring the model to the data by
distinguishing between residential and non-residential investment in durable
goods, as well as inflation in the housing and non-housing durables sectors.
Since now the observables of durables investment and inflation exclude hous-
ing goods, we need to add the following two measurement equations for
residential investment and house price inflation respectively:
∆IoH,t = γ + Iˆ
∗
H,t − Iˆ∗H,t−1, (2.44)
ΠoH,t = p¯iH + Πˆ
H
t . (2.45)
In addition to the parameters calibrated in Table 2.4, we set the elasticity of
substitution in the housing sector h to 6 and the distributional parameters of
the CES consumption aggregators α, α˜ ∈ [0, 1] to match the sectoral expendi-
ture shares over the sample considered. The calibration of depreciation rates
of the non-housing durables δ and housing goods δH deserves more atten-
tion. These parameters are crucial for the property of quasi-constancy of the
shadow-value of long-lived goods, as demonstrated by Barsky et al. (2007)
and Barsky et al. (2016). The literature has used a variety of values, ranging
from a quarterly depreciation of 0.01 (see, among others, Monacelli, 2009;
Sterk, 2010; Iacoviello and Neri, 2010; Chen and Liao, 2014), to 0.025 (see
Erceg and Levin, 2006; Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2010; Petrella and Santoro,
2011; Sudo, 2012).39
39Other values used in the literature are 0.0125 (Barsky et al., 2007; Kim and Katayama,
2013; Katayama and Kim, 2013; Barsky et al., 2016) and 0.0035 (Jeske and Liu, 2013).
Barsky et al. (2016) explore the implications for optimal monetary policy of several values
between 0.01 and 0.20.
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Main model Imperfect Labor Mobility Price Indexation Three sector
Baseline Housing Baseline Housing Baseline Housing
ϑc 23.38 26.06 25.72 51.08 20.58 23.87 33.37
[15.82;30.61] [18.56;33.99] [18.07;33.85] [45.73;56.06] [13.63;27.65] [16.55;31.31] [24.07;42.82]
ϑd 24.45 1.79 27.02 0.72 22.05 1.26 46.13
[16.09;33.26] [1.13;2.43] [17.95;35.59] [0.56;0.85] [13.77;30.25] [0.69;1.79] [34.99;57.06]
ϑh \ \ \ \ \ \
4.70
[2.34;7.09]
Table 2.6: Estimated price stickiness parameters in extended models (90%
confidence bands in square brackets)
In accordance with the microeconometric evidence (see, e.g. Fraumeni,
1997) and the literature just mentioned, we assume that non-housing durables
display a higher depreciation rate than housing goods. We thus calibrate
δ = 0.025 and δH = 0.01. Price stickiness and investment adjustment costs
parameters are estimated using the same priors as outlined in Section 2.3.6.1
whereas we set the prior mean of the consumption elasticities of substitution
ρ and ρ˜ to 1 (which imply a nested Cobb-Douglas aggregator), and a standard
deviation of 0.1.
It turns out that point estimates of investment adjustment cost parame-
ters differ across sectors, and confidence intervals of both consumption elas-
ticities of substitution do not exclude the Cobb-Douglas case (Tables 2.14
and 2.15, Appendix 2.13). The last column of Table 2.6 reports the esti-
mated price stickiness parameters across the three sectors. Although the dis-
tance between the point estimates of non-housing durables and nondurables
price stickiness is larger than that existing between overall durables and
nondurable (see two-sector model estimates, Table 2.6, column 1), their con-
fidence intervals overlap at any conventional confidence level, as it can also
be seen by inspecting the posterior distributions (bottom panel of Figure
2.6). This means that they are not significantly different from each other
in a statistical sense. It is not surprising that, with respect to our main
42
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
Baseline DSGE
Nondurables
Durables
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
Housing DSGE
Nondurables
Housing
(a) Imperfect Labor Mobility
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
Baseline DSGE
Nondurables
Durables
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
Housing DSGE
Nondurables
Housing
(b) Price Indexation
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07Nondurables
Durables
Houses
(c) Three-sector model
Figure 2.6: Posterior distributions of price stickiness parameters in extended
models
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model, the posterior distribution of the non-housing durable price stickiness
moves further to the right, as we have deducted housing from the relevant
observables. Indeed, house prices robustly continue to be the most flexible
component of durables prices also in the three-sector model. Confidence in-
tervals of house price stickiness still never overlap with the other two, given
that its posterior distribution moves rather apart from the others towards
zero (see bottom panel of Figure 2.6).
2.4 Concluding remarks
Several papers have engaged in building a two-sector New-Keynesian model
able to generate the comovement between durable and nondurable goods
following a monetary policy shock, as documented by the SVAR literature.
This paper contributes to the existing literature by focusing on a less studied
but equally important issue: the effects of a monetary policy innovation on
the relative price of durables.
We show that, robustly across identifications and subsamples, in SVAR
models the response of the relative price of durables to monetary policy
shocks crucially depends on the definition of the durables sector. If durables
include both non-housing durable goods and residential investment (as com-
mon in the literature), the relative price marginally increases or stays flat in
response to a monetary policy contraction. Conversely, employing a narrow
measure of durable goods that includes only new houses generates a fall in
the relative price.
To rationalize the SVAR results, we build a rather canonical two-sector
DSGE model in which impatient households borrow from patient households
against the value of their durables collateral. We bring the model to the data
using Bayesian methods employing, first, the broad definition of durables
(non-housing durables and residential investments) and then the narrow mea-
sure of durables including only residential investment. Similarly to the most
recent microeconomic evidence, we estimate the degree of price stickiness to
be almost the same when non-housing durables are bundled with residential
investment. It follows that the credible set of responses of the relative price
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of durables to a monetary policy shock includes zero. Conversely, durables
-defined as including only residential investment- display a much lower stick-
iness than nondurables hence the credible set of responses of the relative
price of durables to a monetary policy shock is significantly negative. Such
results not only agree, but also rationalize our SVAR estimates. The results
regarding the estimation of price stickiness parameters survive extensions of
the DSGE model affecting sectoral Phillips curves and a three-sector gener-
alization. The importance of these findings is twofold. First, when building
a two-sector New-Keynesian model it is desirable to assume that prices of
durable goods are sticky, unless the aim is modeling the housing sector in
isolation from other durables. When this is the case, the comovement puz-
zle is no longer an issue: if prices are sticky in both sectors, durables and
nondurables will move in the same direction in response to monetary innova-
tions. A three-sector model is needed to fully capture the intrinsic differences
between housing and non-housing durables, such as the type of goods that
can be used as collateral and their different degree of durability. Second,
from a policy viewpoint, while the central bank is not likely to create big
allocative distortions between the durables and nondurables sector, it may
indeed create allocative distortions regarding the housing sector. Whether
this has large welfare implications, and the optimal monetary policy design
in this context, are beyond the scope of this paper, but these issues should
certainly be investigated in future research.
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Appendix
2.5 Data: sources and transformations
Series Definition Source Mnemonic
DURN Nominal Durable Goods BEA Table 2.3.5 Line 3
RIN Nominal Residential Investment BEA Table 1.1.5 Line 13
NDN Nominal Nondurable Goods BEA Table 2.3.5 Line 8
SN Nominal Services BEA Table 2.3.5 Line 13
PDUR Price Deflator, Durable Goods BEA Table 1.1.9 Line 4
PRI Price Deflator, Residential Investment BEA Table 1.1.9 Line 13
PND Price Deflator, Nondurable Goods BEA Table 1.1.9 Line 5
PS Price Deflator, Services BEA Table 1.1.9 Line 6
Y N Nominal GDP BEA Table 1.1.5 Line 1
PY Price Deflator, GDP BEA Table 1.1.9 Line 1
FFR Effective Federal Funds Rate FRED FEDFUNDS
N Nonfarm Business Sector: Average Weekly Hours FRED PRS85006023
W Nonfarm Business Sector: Compensation Per Hour FRED COMPNFB
POP Civilian Non-institutional Population, over 16 FRED CNP16OV
CE Civilian Employment, 16 over FRED CE16OV
NHN Nominal New-single family houses BEA Table 5.3.5 Line 23
PNH Price Deflator, New-single family houses BEA Table 5.3.4 Line 23
MHN Nominal Multifamily houses BEA Table 5.3.5 Line 24
PMH Price Deflator, Multifamily houses BEA Table 5.3.4 Line 23
Table 2.7: Data Sources
2.5.1 Durables and Residential Investments
1. Sum nominal series: DURN +RIN = DRN
2. Calculate sectoral weights of deflators: ωD = DUR
N
DRN
; ωRI = RI
N
DRN
3. Calculate Deflator: PD = ω
DPDUR + ω
RIPRI
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4. Calculate Real Durable Consumption: D = DUR
N+RIN
PD
2.5.2 Nondurables and Services
1. Sum nominal series: NDN + SN = NSN
2. Calculate sectoral weights of deflators: ωND = ND
N
NSN
; ωS = S
N
NSN
3. Calculate Deflator: PC = ω
NDPND + ω
SPS
4. Calculate Real Nondurable Consumption: C = ND
N+SN
PC
2.5.3 Only broad measure of houses
1. Sum nominal series: NHN +MHN = DRN
2. Sectoral weights of deflators: ωNH = NH
N
DRN
; ωMH = MH
N
DRN
3. Calculate Deflator: PD = ω
NHPNH + ω
MHPMH
4. Calculate Real Durable Consumption: D = NH
N+MHN
PD
2.5.4 Durable goods and New-single family houses
1. Sum nominal series: DURN +NHN = DRN
2. Calculate sectoral weights of deflators: ωD = DUR
N
DRN
; ωNH = NH
N
DRN
3. Calculate Deflator: PD = ω
DPDUR + ω
NHPNH
4. Calculate Real Durable Consumption: D = DUR
N+NHN
PD
2.5.5 Durable goods and broad measure of houses
1. Sum nominal series: DURN +NHN +MHN = DRN
2. Sectoral weights of deflators: ωD = DUR
N
DRN
; ωNH = NH
N
DRN
; ωMH = MH
N
DRN
3. Calculate Deflator: PD = ω
DPDUR + ω
NHPNH + ω
MHPMH
4. Calculate Real Durable Consumption: D = DUR
N+NHN+MHN
PD
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2.5.6 Data transformation for Bayesian estimation
Variable Description Construction
POPindex Population index POPPOP2009:1
CEindex Employment index CECE2009:1
Y o Real per capita GDP ln
 YNPYPOPindex
 100
IoD Real per capita investment: durables ln
(
ID
POPindex
)
100
IoH Real per capita investment: houses ln
(
IH
POPindex
)
100
Co Real per capita consumption: nondurables ln
(
C
POPindex
)
100
W o Real wage ln
(
W
PY
)
100
N o Hours worked per capita ln
(
H×CEindex
POPindex
)
100
ΠoC Inflation: nondurables sector ∆ (lnPC) 100
ΠoD Inflation: durables sector ∆ (lnPD) 100
ΠoH Inflation: housing sector ∆ (lnPH ) 100
Ro Quarterly Federal Funds Rate FFR
4
Table 2.8: Data transformation - Observables
2.6 SVAR methodologies
2.6.1 Recursive approach
Let Σε be the variance-covariance matrix of the reduced-form shocks of the
SVAR model. Under the recursive approach, the structural shocks are iden-
tified through a Cholesky decomposition of Σε. Consequently, the order of
the variables in vector xt matters for the identification of the monetary dis-
turbance. Indeed, at time t one variable is affected by the previous but not
from those which follow. In our estimation, we make the standard assumption
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that the monetary policy variable is ordered last hence it has no contempo-
raneous effect on the other variables (see Bernanke and Mihov, 1998, among
others). Our SVAR model includes a vector of constant terms and four lags,
as commonly assumed in the literature for a monetary SVAR with quarterly
frequency.
2.6.2 Sign restrictions approach
The second approach we employ is the pure sign restrictions proposed by Uh-
lig (2005). This method implies that shocks are identified when they follow
specific and unique patterns by imposing restrictions on the impulse response
functions (IRFs) of the SVAR model. Several orthogonal matrices linking
the reduced-form and the structural shocks are drawn, where we retain those
generating impulse responses that satisfy the set of restrictions while dis-
carding the others.40 We employ the model-based methodology outlined by
Canova (2002) and applied in Dedola and Neri (2007), Pappa (2009) and
Bermperoglu et al. (2013), among others, according to which the restrictions
are extracted from a theoretical model. We can summarize the procedure in
three main steps: i) build a nested DSGE model in which nominal and real
frictions can be removed via appropriate parametrizations. We do this in
Section 2.3, where our two-sector model encompasses a continuum of models
featuring different subsets of frictions; ii) define ranges for the structural pa-
rameters, generate thousands of random draws of the parameter values from
their support and obtain IRFs for each draw;41 iii) use the robust IRFs to
impose sign restrictions on the IRFs of the SVAR model.
2.6.3 Narrative approach
The third approach we employ is based on the contribution of Romer and
Romer (2004). RR develop a new measure of U.S. monetary policy shock that
is somewhat immune to two problems embedded in monetary policy variables
40We repeat this process a large number of times until 500 draws are accepted.
41See section 2.9 for a discussion of the choice of ranges and of the impulse responses.
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such as the actual FFR. Indeed, RR argue that such measures suffer from en-
dogeneity and anticipatory movements. In particular, the former implies that
the FFR moves with changes in economic conditions hence not with changes
in the conduct of monetary policy. The latter implies that movements in the
FFR represent responses to information about future events in the economy.
As a result, RR argue that such measures of monetary policy do not really
represent exogenous shocks and they derive a new measure that enables the
researcher to overcome these shortcomings. The derivation of the alternative
monetary policy variable consists of two main steps. RR first derive a series
of intended FFR changes around meetings of the Federal Open Market Com-
mittee (FOMC) of the Federal Reserve (Fed). They rely on a combination of
narrative and quantitative evidence in order to retrieve the direction and the
magnitude of such intended changes. This step eliminates the endogeneity
between the interest rate and economic conditions thus solving the first of
the two shortcomings outlined above. The second step consists of controlling
for the Fed’s internal forecasts in order to disentangle the effects of informa-
tion about future economic developments. RR then regress the change in the
intended FFR on its level, on the level and the changes of forecasts about
GDP growth and the GDP deflator, and forecasts about the unemployment
rate. Then they take the residuals of this regression as the new measure of
monetary policy shocks. Consequently, the resulting series gains a higher
degree of exogeneity with respect to the FFR since it represents movements
in the monetary policy measure not stemming from forecasts about inflation,
GDP growth and unemployment.
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2.7 Robustness checks for the SVAR model
2.7.1 SVAR Models with trend
(a) Baseline SVAR
(b) Housing SVAR
Figure 2.7: Impulse responses: SVAR models with trend (bold lines = base-
line model without trend; dashed lines = baseline model with trend; shaded
areas and dotted lines = one-standard-deviation confidence bands)
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2.7.2 Alternative definitions of durables
Figure 2.8: SVAR impulse responses. Sample: 1969Q2-2007Q4 (bold lines =
baseline model; dashed lines = durables goods and new single family houses;
shaded areas and dotted lines = one-standard-deviation confidence bands)
Figure 2.9: SVAR impulse responses. Sample: 1969Q2-2007Q4 (bold lines =
baseline model; dashed lines = durables goods and broad measure of houses;
shaded areas and dotted lines = one-standard-deviation confidence bands)
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Figure 2.10: SVAR impulse responses. Sample: 1969Q2-2007Q4 (bold lines
= baseline model; dashed lines = new single family houses; shaded areas and
dotted lines represent one-standard-deviation confidence bands)
2.7.3 Subsample analysis
Figure 2.11: SVAR impulse responses. Sample: 1969Q2-1993Q1 (bold lines
= all durable goods; dashed lines = only houses; shaded areas and dotted
lines = one-standard-deviation confidence bands)
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Figure 2.12: SVAR impulse responses. Sample: 1971Q4-1995Q3 (bold lines
= all durable goods; dashed lines = only houses; shaded areas and dotted
lines = one-standard-deviation confidence bands)
Figure 2.13: SVAR impulse responses. Sample: 1974Q2-1998Q1 (bold lines
= all durable goods; dashed lines = only houses; shaded areas and dotted
lines = one-standard-deviation confidence bands)
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Figure 2.14: SVAR impulse responses. Sample: 1976Q4-2000Q3 (bold lines
= all durable goods; dashed lines = only houses; shaded areas and dotted
lines = one-standard-deviation confidence bands)
Figure 2.15: SVAR impulse responses. Sample: 1979Q2-2003Q1 (bold lines
= all durable goods; dashed lines = only houses; shaded areas and dotted
lines = one-standard-deviation confidence bands)
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Figure 2.16: SVAR impulse responses. Sample: 1981Q4-2005Q3 (bold lines
= all durable goods; dashed lines = only houses; shaded areas and dotted
lines = one-standard-deviation confidence bands)
Figure 2.17: SVAR impulse responses. Sample: 1984Q2-2007Q4 (bold lines
= all durable goods; dashed lines = only houses; shaded areas and dotted
lines = one-standard-deviation confidence bands)
56
2.7.4 Sign restrictions
Figure 2.18: Sign restrictions imposed for 2, 4 and 6 quarters against 1
quarter, baseline model. Sample: 1969Q2-2007Q4 (bold lines = one quarter;
dashed lines = more quarters; shaded areas and dotted lines = one-standard-
deviation confidence bands)
Figure 2.19: Sign restrictions imposed for 2, 4 and 6 quarters against 1
quarter, model with broad measure of houses as durables. Sample: 1969Q2-
2007Q4 (bold lines = one quarter; dashed lines = more quarters; shaded
areas and dotted lines = one-standard-deviation confidence bands)
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2.7.5 Proxy SVAR approach
Figure 2.20: Proxy SVAR impulse responses to a one standard deviation increase
in the monetary policy measure. Sample: 1969Q2-2007Q4 (bold lines: baseline
VAR; dashed lines: housing VAR; shaded areas and dotted lines represent one-
standard-deviation confidence bands)
2.7.6 Three-sector SVAR model
Figure 2.21: SVAR impulse responses in a three-sector SVAR model. Sam-
ple: 1969Q2-2007Q4 (bold lines = mean response; shaded areas = one-standard-
deviation confidence bands)
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2.8 The DSGE models
2.8.1 Symmetric equilibrium
Patient households
Xt = Z
1−α
t D
α
t (2.46)
Zt = Ct − ζSt−1 (2.47)
St = ρcSt−1 + (1− ρc)Ct (2.48)
U (Xt, Nt) = log (Xt)− νN
1+ϕ
t
1 + ϕ
(2.49)
UZ,t =
(1− α)
Zt
(2.50)
UD,t =
α
Dt
(2.51)
UN,t = −νNϕt (2.52)
Λt,t+1 = β
UZ,t+1
UZ,t
eBt+1
eBt
(2.53)
[
1− eWt η
]
+
eWt η
µt
= ϑW
(
ΠWt − ΠC
)
ΠWt +
+ Et
[
Λt,t+1ϑ
W
(
ΠWt+1 − ΠC
)
ΠWt+1
wt+1Nt+1
wtNt
]
(2.54)
µt = −UZ,t
UN,t
wt (2.55)
Qtψt =
UD,t
UZ,t
+ (1− δ)Et [Λt,t+1Qt+1ψt+1] (2.56)
1 = Et
{
Λt,t+1ψt+1
Qt+1
Qt
eIt+1
[
S
′
(
IDt+1
IDt
)(
IDt+1
IDt
)2]}
+
+ ψte
I
t
[
1− S
(
IDt
IDt−1
)
− S ′
(
IDt
IDt−1
)
IDt
IDt−1
]
(2.57)
S
(
IDt
IDt−1
)
=
φ
2
(
IDt
IDt−1
− 1
)2
(2.58)
S
′
(
IDt
IDt−1
)
= φ
(
IDt
IDt−1
− 1
)
(2.59)
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1 = Et
[
Λt,t+1
Rt
ΠCt+1
]
(2.60)
Impatient households
X ′t = Z
′1−α
t D
′α
t (2.61)
Z ′t = C
′
t − ζ ′S ′t−1 (2.62)
S ′t = ρ
′
cS
′
t−1 + (1− ρ′c)C ′t (2.63)
U (X ′t, N
′
t) = log (X
′
t)− ν ′
N ′1+ϕ
′
t
1 + ϕ′
(2.64)
UZ′,t =
1− α
Z ′t
(2.65)
UD′,t =
α
D′t
(2.66)
UN ′,t = −ν ′ (N ′t)ϕ
′
(2.67)
λ′t = e
B
t UZ′,t (2.68)
λ′t = β
′Et
[
λ′t+1
Rt
ΠCt+1
]
+ λBCt Rt (2.69)
Qtψ
′
t =
UD′,t
UZ′t
+ β′ (1− δ)Et
[
λ′t+1
λ′t
ψ′t+1Qt+1
]
(2.70)
1 = β′Et
λ′t+1Qt+1λ′tQt ψ′t+1eIt+1
S ′ (ID′i,t+1
ID
′
i,t
)(
ID
′
i,t+1
ID
′
i,t
)2+
+ ψ′te
I
t
[
1− S
(
ID
′
t
ID
′
t−1
)
− S ′
(
ID
′
t
ID
′
t−1
)
ID
′
t
ID
′
t−1
]
(2.71)
S
(
ID
′
t
ID
′
t−1
)
=
φ′
2
(
ID
′
t
ID
′
t−1
− 1
)2
(2.72)
S
′
(
ID
′
t
ID
′
t−1
)
= φ′
(
ID
′
t
ID
′
t−1
− 1
)
(2.73)
0 =
[
1− eWt η
]
+
eWt η
µ′t
− ϑW
(
ΠW
′
t − ΠC
)
ΠW
′
t +
+ β′Et
[
λ′t+1
λ′t
ϑW
(
ΠW
′
t+1 − ΠC
)
ΠW
′
t+1
w′t+1N
′
t+1
w′tN ′t
]
(2.74)
µ′t = −w′t
UZ′,t
UN ′,t
(2.75)
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Firms
Y Ct = e
A
t
(
NCt
)ψ˜ (
N ′
C
t
)1−ψ˜
(2.76)
Y Dt = e
A
t
(
NDt
)ψ˜ (
N ′
D
t
)1−ψ˜
(2.77)
eCt cMC
C
t =
(
eCt c − 1
)
+ ϑc
(
ΠCt − 1
)
ΠCt −
− ϑcEt
[
Λt,t+1
Y Ct+1
Y Ct
(
ΠCt+1 − 1
)
ΠCt+1
]
(2.78)
wt = MC
C
t ψ˜
Y Ct
NCt
(2.79)
w′t = MC
C
t
(
1− ψ˜
) Y Ct
N ′Ct
(2.80)
eDt dMC
D
t =
(
eDt d − 1
)
+ ϑd
(
ΠDt − 1
)
ΠDt −
− ϑdEt
[
Λt,t+1
Qt+1
Qt
Y Dt+1
Y Dt
(
ΠDt+1 − 1
)
ΠDt+1
]
(2.81)
wt = MC
D
t ψ˜
QtY
D
t
NDt
(2.82)
w′t = MC
D
t
(
1− ψ˜
) QtY Dt
N ′Dt
(2.83)
Π˜t =
(
ΠCt
)1−τ (
ΠDt
)τ
(2.84)
Monetary policy and market clearing
log
(
Rt
R
)
= ρr log
(
Rt−1
R
)
+
+ (1− ρr)
[
ρpi log
(
Π˜t
Π˜
)
+ ρy log
(
Yt
Y
)]
+ Mt (2.85)
Yt = Y
C
t +QtY
D
t +
ϑW
2
(
ΠWt − 1
)2
wtNt+
+
ϑW
2
(
ΠWt
′ − 1)2w′tN ′t (2.86)
Y Ct = Ct + C
′
t +Gt +
ϑc
2
(
ΠCt − 1
)2
Y Ct (2.87)
Y Dt = I
D
t + I
D′
t +
ϑd
2
(
ΠDt − 1
)2
Y Dt (2.88)
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0 = Bt +B
′
t (2.89)
Nt = N
C
t +N
D
t (2.90)
N ′t = N
′C
t +N
′D
t (2.91)
2.8.2 Steady state
In the deterministic steady state all expectation operators are removed and
for each variable it holds that xt = xt+1 = x. Moreover, the stochastic shocks
are absent. The variables UZ , UZ′ , Q,N
D′ solve equations (2.50), (2.65),
(2.82) and (2.91) respectively. In steady state N = N ′ = 0.33 and the
parameters ν and ν ′ are endogenized to match these values. The remaining
variables are found recursively as follows:
Λ = β (2.92)
R =
1
β
(2.93)
ψ = 1 (2.94)
µ =
η
η − 1 (2.95)
ψ′ = 1 (2.96)
µ′ =
η
η − 1 (2.97)
MCC =
c − 1
c
(2.98)
MCD =
d − 1
d
(2.99)
UD = QψUZ [1− β (1− δ)] (2.100)
D =
α
UD
(2.101)
λ′ = UZ′ (2.102)
λBC =
(1− β′R)λ′
R
(2.103)
UD′ = Qψ
′UZ′ [1− β′ (1− δ)]− λBCmQ (2.104)
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D′ =
α
UD′
(2.105)
B′ = m
QD′
R
(2.106)
Y D = δ (D +D′) (2.107)
w′ = MCD
(
1− ψ˜
) QY D
N ′D
(2.108)
ND =
[
Y D
N ′D
] 1
ψ˜
N ′
D
(2.109)
NC = N +ND (2.110)
UN ′ = −w′UZ′
µ′
(2.111)
ν ′ = − UN ′
N ′ϕ′
(2.112)
C ′ = (1−R)B′ + w′N ′ −QδD′ (2.113)
S ′ = C ′ (2.114)
Z ′ = C ′ − ζS ′ (2.115)
X ′ = Z ′1−αD′α (2.116)
N ′
C
=
MCC (1− ψ˜) (NC)ψ˜
w′
 1ψ˜ (2.117)
Y C =
[
NC
]ψ˜ [
N ′
C
]1−ψ˜
(2.118)
w = MCCψ˜
Y C
NC
(2.119)
UN = −wUZ
µ
(2.120)
ν = −UN
Nϕ
(2.121)
Y = Y C +QY D (2.122)
G = gyY (2.123)
C = Y C − C ′ −G (2.124)
S = C (2.125)
Z = C − ζS (2.126)
X = Z1−αDα (2.127)
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2.8.2.1 Alternative calibration of steady state hours
Throughout the paper, and following the relevant literature, we have defined
U (Xt, N t) = log (Xt)− νN
1+ϕ
t
1+ϕ
such that hours worked enter the utility func-
tion in a separable fashion. We then normalized steady state hours to 1/3 and
found the value of the scale parameter ν consistent with this normalization.
However, defining hours as Nt rather than the complement to one of
leisure (i.e. 1−Lt) implies that hours are dimensionless so targeting a steady
state value of 1/3 is arbitrary and the parameter ν has merely the effect of
scaling the steady state values of the other variables.
Moreover, ν does not have any effect in the log-linearized model hence the
dynamic properties of the model are not affected by either targeting steady
state hours to be 1/3 or by calibrating ν = 1 and calculating the resulting
steady state value of hours. Indeed, consider the labor supply of the patient
households (the same applies to impatients):
νNϕt = Uz,twt. (2.128)
Log-linearizing it around the steady-state yields:
Nˆt =
1
ϕ
(
Uˆz,t + wˆt
)
, (2.129)
where vairables withˆare expressed in log-deviations from the steady-state.
It is clear that the log-deviations of hours from steady state do not depend
on the constant ν whose value does have any effect on the dynamics of hours.
2.8.3 Symmetric equilibrium of the extended models
This section reports the changes in the symmetric equilibrium of Appendix
2.8.1 when the model is extended to allow for limited labor mobility, index-
ation and a three-sector economy as in Sections 2.3.7.1, 2.3.7.2 and 2.3.7.3,
respectively.
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2.8.3.1 Imperfect Sectoral Labor Mobility
Equations (2.90) and (2.91) are replaced by the CES aggregators of sectoral
hours:
Nt =
[(
χC
)− 1
λ
(
NCt
) 1+λ
λ +
(
1− χC)− 1λ (NDt ) 1+λλ ] λ1+λ (2.130)
N ′t =
[(
χ′C
)− 1
λ′
(
N ′Ct
) 1+λ′
λ′ +
(
1− χ′C)− 1λ′ (N ′Dt ) 1+λ′λ′ ] λ
′
1+λ′
(2.131)
Given these labor aggregators, each households determines their labor supply:
N jt = χ
j
(
wjt
wt
)λ
Nt (2.132)
N ′jt = χ
′j
(
w′jt
w′t
)λ′
N ′t (2.133)
with j = C,D. Finally, sectoral wages are different hence equations (2.79),
(2.80), (2.82) and (2.83) are replaced by:
wCt = MC
C
t ψ˜
Y Ct
NCt
(2.134)
w′Ct = MC
C
t
(
1− ψ˜
) Y Ct
N ′Ct
(2.135)
wDt = MC
D
t ψ˜
QtY
D
t
NDt
(2.136)
w′Dt = MC
D
t
(
1− ψ˜
) QtY Dt
N ′Dt
(2.137)
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2.8.3.2 Price Indexation
The sectoral price setting equations (2.78) and (2.81) are amended as follows:
eCt cMC
C
t =
(
eCt c − 1
)
+ ϑc
(
ΠCt(
ΠCt−1
)ςC − 1
)
ΠCt(
ΠCt−1
)ςC −
− ϑcEt
[
Λt,t+1
Y Ct+1
Y Ct
(
ΠCt+1
(ΠCt )
ςC − 1
)
ΠCt+1
(ΠCt )
ςC
]
(2.138)
eDt dMC
D
t =
(
eDt d − 1
)
+ ϑd
(
ΠDt(
ΠDt−1
)ςD − 1
)
ΠDt(
ΠDt−1
)ςD −
− ϑdEt
[
Λt,t+1
Qt+1
Qt
Y Dt+1
Y Dt
(
ΠDt+1
(ΠDt )
ςD − 1
)
ΠDt+1
(ΠDt )
ςD
]
(2.139)
Then, since the price adjustment costs enter the sectoral market clearing
conditions, equations (2.87) and (2.88) now read as:
Y Ct = Ct + C
′
t +Gt +
ϑc
2
(
ΠCt(
ΠCt−1
)ςC − ΠC
)2
Y Ct (2.140)
Y Dt = I
D
t + I
D′
t +
ϑd
2
(
ΠDt(
ΠDt−1
)ςD − ΠD
)2
Y Dt (2.141)
2.8.3.3 Three-sector model
1 = Et
[
Λt,t+1
Rt
ΠCt+1
]
(2.142)
Qtψt =
UD,t
UZ,t
+ (1− δ)Et [Λt,t+1Qt+1ψt+1] (2.143)
1 = ψte
I
t
[
1− S
(
IDt
IDt−1
)
− S ′
(
IDt
IDt−1
)
IDt
IDt−1
]
+
+ Et
{
Λt,t+1ψt+1
Qt+1
Qt
eIt+1
[
S
′
(
IDt+1
IDt
)(
IDt+1
IDt
)2]}
(2.144)
QHt ψ
H
t =
UH,t
UZ,t
+
(
1− δH)Et [Λt,t+1QHt+1ψHt+1] (2.145)
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1 = ψHt e
IH
t
[
1− S
(
IHt
IHt−1
)
− S ′
(
IHt
IHt−1
)
IHt
IHt−1
]
+
+ Et
{
Λt,t+1ψ
H
t+1
QHt+1
QHt
eI
H
t+1
[
S
′
(
IHt+1
IHt
)(
IHt+1
IHt
)2]}
(2.146)
0 =
[
1− eWt η
]
+
eWt η
µt
− ϑW (ΠWt − ΠC)ΠWt +
+ Et
[
Λt,t+1ϑ
W
(
ΠWt+1 − ΠC
)
ΠWt+1
wt+1Nt+1
wtNt
]
(2.147)
Dt+1 = (1− δ)Dt + eIt IDt
[
1− S
(
IDt
IDt−1
)]
(2.148)
Ht+1 = (1− δH)Ht + eIHt IHt
[
1− S
(
IHt
IHt−1
)]
(2.149)
Xt =
[
(1− α) C˜
ρ−1
ρ
t + αH
ρ−1
ρ
t
] ρ
ρ−1
(2.150)
Zt = Ct − ζSt−1 (2.151)
St = ρcSt−1 + (1− ρc)Ct (2.152)
C˜t =
[
(1− α˜)Z
ρ˜−1
ρ˜
t + α˜D
ρ˜−1
ρ˜
t
] ρ˜
ρ˜−1
(2.153)
Nt = N
C
t +N
D
t +N
H
t (2.154)
Λt,t+1 = β
UZ,t+1
UZ,t
eBt+1
eBt
(2.155)
67
µt = −wtUZ,t
UN,t
(2.156)
UZ,t =
(1− α)
C˜
1
ρ
t X
ρ−1
ρ
t
(1− α˜) C˜
1
ρ˜
t
Z
1
ρ˜
t
(2.157)
UD,t =
(1− α)
C˜
1
ρ
t X
ρ−1
ρ
t
α˜C˜
1
ρ˜
t
D
1
ρ˜
t
(2.158)
UH,t =
α
H
1
ρ
t X
ρ−1
ρ
t
(2.159)
UN,t = −νNϕt (2.160)
λ′t = e
B
t UZ′,t (2.161)
λ′t = β
′Et
[
λ′t+1
Rt
ΠCt+1
]
+ λBCt Rt (2.162)
Qtψ
′
t =
UD′,t
UZ′t
+ β′ (1− δ)Et
[
λ′t+1
λ′t
ψ′t+1Qt+1
]
(2.163)
1 = ψ′te
I
t
[
1− S
(
IDt
′
IDt−1′
)
− S ′
(
IDt
′
IDt−1′
)
IDt
′
IDt−1′
]
+
+ β′Et
{
λ′t+1Qt+1
λ′tQt
ψ′t+1e
I
t+1
[
S
′
(
IDt
′
IDt−1′
)(
IDt
′
IDt−1′
)2]}
(2.164)
QHt ψ
H′
t =
UH′,t
UZ′,t
+ Et
[
β′
λ′t+1
λ′t
ψH
′
t+1Q
H
t+1
(
1− δH)+ λBCt
λ′t
m
(
QHt+1Π
C
t+1
)]
(2.165)
1 = ψH
′
t e
IH
t
[
1− S
(
IHt
′
IHt−1′
)
− S ′
(
IHt
′
IHt−1′
)
IHt
′
IHt−1′
]
+
+ Et
{
ψH
′
i,t+1
λ′i,t+1Q
H
t+1
λ′i,tQ
H
t
eI
H
t+1
[
S
′
(
IHt+1
′
IHt
′
)(
IHt+1
′
IHt
′
)2]}
(2.166)
0 =
[
1− eWt η
]
+
eWt η
µ′t
− ϑW (ΠWt ′ − ΠC)ΠWt ′+
+ β′Et
[
λ′t+1
λ′t
ϑW
(
ΠWt+1
′ − ΠC)ΠWt+1′w′t+1N ′t+1w′tN ′t
]
(2.167)
B′t = mEt
(
QHt+1H
′
tΠ
C
t+1
Rt
)
(2.168)
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D′t+1 = (1− δ)D′t + eIt IDt ′
[
1− S
(
IDt
′
IDt−1′
)]
(2.169)
H ′t+1 = (1− δH)H ′t + eI
H
t I
H′
t
[
1− S
(
IH
′
t
IH
′
t−1
)]
(2.170)
X ′t =
[
(1− α) C˜ ′
ρ−1
ρ
t + αH
′
ρ−1
ρ
t
] ρ
ρ−1
(2.171)
Z ′t = C
′
t − ζS ′t−1 (2.172)
S ′t = ρcS
′
t−1 + (1− ρc)C ′t (2.173)
C˜ ′t =
[
(1− α˜)Z ′
ρ˜−1
ρ˜
t + α˜D
′
ρ˜−1
ρ˜
t
] ρ˜
ρ˜−1
(2.174)
N ′t = N
′C
t +N
′D
t +N
′H
t (2.175)
B′t = C
′
t +QtI
D
t
′ +QHt I
H
t
′ +Rt−1B′t−1+ (2.176)
+
ϑW
2
(
w′t
w′t−1
ΠCt − ΠC
)2
w′tN
′
t − w′tN ′t (2.177)
µ′t = −w′t
UZ′,t
UN ′,t
(2.178)
UZ′,t =
(1− α)
C˜
′ 1
ρ
t X
′ ρ−1
ρ
t
(1− α˜) C˜ ′
1
ρ˜
t
Z
′ 1
ρ˜
t
(2.179)
UD′,t =
(1− α)
C˜
′ 1
ρ
t X
′ ρ−1
ρ
t
α˜C˜
′ 1
ρ˜
t
D
′ 1
ρ˜
t
(2.180)
UH′,t =
α
H
′ 1
ρ
t X
′ ρ−1
ρ
t
(2.181)
UN ′,t = −ν ′ (N ′t)ϕ (2.182)
Y Ct = At
[
NCt
]ψ˜ [
NCt
′]1−ψ˜ (2.183)
Y Dt = At
[
NDt
]ψ˜ [
NDt
′]1−ψ˜ (2.184)
Y Ht = At
[
NHt
]ψ˜ [
NHt
′]1−ψ˜ (2.185)
wt = MC
C
t ψ˜
Y Ct
NCt
(2.186)
w′t = MC
C
t
(
1− ψ˜
) Y Ct
NCt
′ (2.187)
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eCt cMC
C
t =
(
eCt c − 1
)
+ ϑc
(
ΠCt − 1
)
ΠCt −
− ϑcEt
[
Λt,t+1
Y Ct+1
Y Ct
(
ΠCt+1 − 1
)
ΠCt+1
]
(2.188)
wt = MC
D
t ψ˜
QtY
D
t
NDt
(2.189)
w′t = MC
D
t
(
1− ψ˜
) QtY Dt
NDt
′ (2.190)
eDt dMC
D
t =
(
eDt d − 1
)
+ ϑd
(
ΠDt − 1
)
ΠDt −
− ϑdEt
[
Λt,t+1
Qt+1
Qt
Y Dt+1
Y Dt
(
ΠDt+1 − 1
)
ΠDt+1
]
(2.191)
wt = MC
H
t ψ˜
QHt Y
H
t
NHt
(2.192)
w′t = MC
H
t
(
1− ψ˜
) QHt Y Ht
NHt
′ (2.193)
eHt hMC
H
t =
(
eHt h − 1
)
+ ϑh
(
ΠHt − 1
)
ΠHt −
− ϑhEt
[
Λt,t+1
QHt+1
QHt
Y Ht+1
Y Ht
(
ΠHt+1 − 1
)
ΠHt+1
]
(2.194)
log
(
Rt
R¯
)
= ρr log
(
Rt−1
R¯
)
+
+ (1− ρr)
[
ρpi log
(
Π˜t
Π˜
)
+ ρy log
(
Yt
Y¯
)]
+ Mt (2.195)
Π˜t =
(
ΠCt
)(1−τ) (
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2.9 Robust impulse responses
This section describes the methodology employed to impose the sign restric-
tions in Section 2.2.1. Let θ be a N×1 vector of the structural parameters of
the model. We assume that each parameter is uniformly distributed over a
particular range Θi, that is each parameter i in θ is defined over Θ =
∏
i Θi.
Each interval is set around a value consistent with a quarterly calibration
of the U.S. economy and its length is determined both to include reasonable
values and to avoid indeterminacy. As a result, some ranges are narrower
whereas others are broader, but overall our choices should be uncontroversial.
Table 2.9 summarizes the supports of the structural parameters. Consistently
with the calibration of the two-sector NK models so far used in the literature,
we define the same range for the parameters of price stickiness but we impose
the restriction ϑc ≥ ϑd so that prices of nondurables are stickier or at least
as sticky as prices of durables. Note that this condition does not prevent us
from obtaining a fully-flexible price model whenever a random draw implies
that ϑc = ϑd = 0. We perform our main simulations by randomly drawing
the values of the Rotemberg parameter of wage stickiness from the support
[0, 180] hence including cases in which wages are completely flexible. How-
ever, in order to highlight the crucial role played by wage stickiness in solving
the comovement puzzle, we perform another set of simulations with flexible
wages while keeping the same ranges for the remaining parameters.42 Then
we randomly draw the parameter values θmi , i = 1, ..., N ; m = 1, ..., 10034
from each Θi, where m is the number of random draws. Two issues are likely
to arise when parameter values are randomly drawn from their support. The
first is indeterminacy whenever the Blanchard-Kahn conditions are not sat-
isfied. The second consists of violating the condition that we impose on the
degree of price stickiness in the two sectors. In order to make our analysis
robust, our aim is to generate about 10000 sets of impulse response functions.
42We calibrate ϑW = 2. Calibrating ϑW < 2 leads to severe indeterminacy issues.
However, a value of 2 implies almost fully flexible wages. Indeed, in Section (2.3.6) we
estimate ϑW = 153 in the baseline model and ϑW = 168 in the housing DSGE. These
values are extremely larger than 2 that is why we are confident that such value represents
a good approximation of the case of fully flexible wages.
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Parameter Range
Patient households’ discount factor β [0.985, 0.995]
Impatient households’ discount factor β′ [0.96, 0.984]
Durables depreciation rate δ [0.0025, 0.025]
Durables share of total expenditure α [0.05, 0.35]
Elasticity of substitution in nondurables c [4, 11]
Elasticity of substitution in durables d [4, 11]
Elasticity of substitution in labor η [4, 25]
Inverse Frisch elasticities ϕ, ϕ′ [0.3, 3]
Disutilities of labor ν, ν ′ N,N ′ ∈ [0.2, 0.5]
Habits degree parameters ζ, ζ ′ [0, 0.9]
Habits persistence parameters ρc, ρ
′
c [0, 0.9]
Price stickiness in nondurables ϑc [0, 58]
∗
Price stickiness in durables ϑd [0, 58]
∗
Nominal wage rigidities ϑW [0, 180]
Investment adjustment cost parameters φ, φ′ [0, 5]
Loan-to-value ratio m [0.55, 0.95]
Share of patient households ψ˜ [0.60, 0.90]
Share of durables inflation in inflation aggregator τ [0, 1]
Steady state government share of output gy [0.1, 0.3]
Monetary policy to inflation ρpi [1.05, 5]
Monetary policy to output gap ρy [0, 0.5]
Interest rate smoothing ρR [0, 0.9]
Persistence of monetary policy shock ρeR [0, 0.95]
Persistence of business cycle shock ρeA [0, 0.95]
Persistence of preference shock ρeB [0, 0.95]
Persistence of durables investment shock ρeI [0, 0.95]
Persistence of wage markup shock ρeW [0, 0.95]
Persistence of nondurables price markup shock ρeC [0, 0.95]
Persistence of durables price markup shock ρeD [0, 0.95]
Persistence of government consumption shock ρeG [0, 0.95]
Note: * denotes that parameters are subject to the restriction ϑc ≥ ϑd.
Table 2.9: Parameter ranges
That is why we performed 22000 draws, of which 10034 were accepted. 92%
of the discarded draws did not satisfy the restriction on price stickiness and
only 7% of them did not satisfy the Blanchard-Kahn conditions. Finally, for
each accepted draw, we construct a K×1 vector of impulse response functions
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Note: Blue dashed lines refer to the model in which wages are sticky. Red dotted lines
refer to a model with flexible wages. Each pair of lines depicts the 84th and 16th
percentiles of the distribution of impulse responses. The shock is a 1% increase in the
nominal interest rate.
Figure 2.22: Robust impulse responses to a contractionary monetary policy
shock
of the data h (yt (θ
m|ut)) to the structural shocks ut and order them increas-
ingly. A function hK (yt (θ|ut)) is considered robust if in the impact period
the signs of the 84th and 16th percentiles of the simulated distribution of
h (yt (θ|ut)) are the same, that is sign
[
hKU (yt (θ|ut))
]
= sign
[
hKL (yt (θ|ut))
]
where hU and hL are the 84th and 16th percentiles respectively.
Figure 2.22 plots the 68% probability bands of impulse responses to a 1%
increase in the nominal interest rate for two sets of simulations. The first
leaves the wage stickiness parameter unrestricted (blue dashed lines) whereas,
in the second, wages are fully flexible (red dotted lines). Regarding the first
set of simulations, on impact, output, nondurable and durable consumption,
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and inflation exhibit robust negative responses. In fact, our model features
frictions such as wage and price rigidities that solve the comovement puzzle
for different combinations of parameter values. In order to be consistent
with the literature, we impose that price stickiness of durables can either be
lower or equal to price rigidity in the nondurables sector but never higher.
Consequently, the response of the relative price of durables is by construction
bounded below zero. The response of the nominal interest rate deserves more
attention as it is not robust and in some cases at odds with the monetary
policy shock being restrictive. However, this is a common issue of two-
sector NK models as reported by BHK and Sterk (2010). According to BHK,
the counter-intuitive response of the nominal interest rate follows from the
near constancy of the shadow value of durables which makes their real rate
of return constant thus forcing the nominal interest rate to track expected
inflation in the durable goods sector.
We next proceed to discuss the results of the simulations of the model with
fully-flexible wages (red dotted lines of Figure 2.22). As expected, nominal
wage rigidities play a crucial role in solving the comovement puzzle (see
Carlstrom and Fuerst 2006, 2010). Indeed, when wages are kept flexible, there
exist combinations of parameter values such that consumption of durables
increases in response to a monetary policy tightening. Furthermore, also
in this second set of simulations there are cases in which the comovement
between durables and nondurables is attained due to specific values of the
parameters of price stickiness (see Sterk, 2010). However, the aim of this
second set of simulations is to show that when wages are assumed to be
flexible there exist fewer combinations of parameter values that generate a
comovement between consumption in the two sectors.
2.10 Bayesian impulse responses
In this section we plot the Bayesian impulse responses of the models es-
timated in Section 2.3.6 together with the 68%, 90% and 95% confidence
bands. Figure 2.23 refers to the baseline DSGE whereas Figure 2.24 refers
to the housing DSGE.
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Figure 2.23: Bayesian impulse responses of relative prices to a contractionary
monetary policy shock in the baseline DSGE (bold lines are mean responses,
dark-shaded areas are 68% confidence bands, medium and lighter shaded
areas represent 90% and 95% confidence bands respectively)
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Figure 2.24: Bayesian impulse responses of relative prices to a contractionary
monetary policy shock in the housing DSGE (bold lines are mean responses,
dark-shaded areas are 68% confidence bands, medium and lighter shaded
areas represent 90% and 95% confidence bands respectively)
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The same conclusions as in Section 2.3.6.3 can be drawn also when tak-
ing into account the different confidence levels. Indeed, in both models the
comovement is attained due to the presence of prices and wages stickiness
whereas the only noticeable difference concerns the response of the relative
prices, as discussed in the main text.
2.11 Posterior distributions of Inverse Frisch
Elasticities
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Figure 2.25: Prior and posterior densities of Inverse Frisch Elasticities. Left
box: baseline DSGE. Right box: housing DSGE (left-scale refers to distribu-
tion of housing parameter, right-scale refers to nondurables).
2.12 Models comparison
We take two approaches to assess how well our (unrestricted) model’s features
help fitting the data. First, we perform a likelihood race between the baseline
and five restricted models, in which the DSGE model is estimated with one
friction removed at a time.43 Then, we plot the impulse responses of the
43We perform such estimations only for the baseline DSGE model.
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Model Restrictions Log-marg. likelihood Kass-Raftery
Baseline −1472.494
Flexible Wages ϑW= 0 −1672.300 399.612
Flexible Durables Prices ϑd= 0 −1538.150 131.312
No IAC φ = φ′ = 0 −1970.003 995.018
No Habit ζ = ζ ′ = 0 −1698.053 451.118
No Durables Inflation τ = 0 −1473.396 1.804
Table 2.10: Likelihood comparison
baseline and a few restricted models to a contractionary monetary policy
shock.
Table 2.10 reports the log-marginal likelihoods of the models, in conjunc-
tion with the statistic by Kass and Raftery (1995, KR henceforth).44 The KR
statistic decisively favors the baseline model. Indeed, there is slight evidence
in favor of this with respect to the model in which the central bank responds
only to inflation in nondurables (τ = 0). Furthermore, very strong evidence
is found against a model with flexible prices in the durables sector (ϑd = 0),
a model with flexible wages (ϑW = 0), a model without IAC in durable
goods (φ = φ′ = 0), and a model without habit formation in consumption of
nondurable goods (ζ = ζ ′ = 0).
These results suggest that the frictions considered are important when
the theoretical model is brought to the data, although the main result about
the sectoral price stickiness survives in the restricted models, except for the
case of flexible wages. Indeed, Table 2.11 shows that the point estimate of
the price stickiness parameter in the durables sector is higher than the price
stickiness parameter in the nondurables sector, although by a small margin.
44The KR statistic is computed as twice the log of the Bayes Factor (BF), with the BF
between the baseline models mi and the restricted model mj being
BFi/j =
L(Y |mi)
L(Y |mj) =
exp(LL(Y |mi))
exp(LL(Y |mj))
where L(Y |mi) is the marginal data density of model i for the common dataset Y and LL
stands for log-marginal likelihood. Values of the KR statistics above 10 can be considered
“very strong” evidence in favor of model i relative to model j; between 6 and 10 represent
“strong” evidence; between 2 and 6 “positive” evidence; while values below 2 are “not
worth more than a bare mention”.
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Model Restrictions Price stickiness Price stickiness
nondurables ϑc durables ϑd
Baseline 23.38 [15.82;30.61] 24.45 [16.09;33.26]
Flexible Wages ϑW= 0 1.2032 [0.5643;1.7338] 2.4006 [1.4801;3.3098]
No IAC φ = φ′ = 0 47.135 [32.832;62.022] 51.378 [37.533;65.994]
No Habit ζ = ζ ′ = 0 27.629 [19.122;35.731] 30.482 [19.540;41.270]
No Durables Inflation τ = 0 22.338 [15.209;28.933] 25.961 [16.311;35.075]
Table 2.11: Estimated price stickiness parameters
In all cases, the confidence intervals of the two parameters widely overlap
thus pointing to the fact that there is only a negligible difference between
the two.
The importance of the real and nominal frictions is further depicted in
Figure 2.26. The black-solid line represents the same impulse responses of
the baseline model as in Figure 2.4, while the blue-dashed line depicts the
dynamic behavior of a model with flexible wages.45 Thanks to price stickiness
in durable goods, the responses are close to the baseline model and the
comovement between durables and nondurables is attained. When prices of
durables are assumed to be flexible and wages are sticky (red-dotted line), the
comovement still survives. The only tangible difference lies in the response
of the relative price, which is almost flat in the baseline case, whereas it
decreases in the restricted scenario.
Excluding habit formation in consumption of nondurable goods (red-
dashed and dotted line) leads to a considerable larger fall in nondurables and
output. In particular, we confirm the results of Katayama and Kim (2013)
that including this friction is crucial to obtain reasonable sizes in the re-
sponses of nondurables consumption and output. Similarly, IACs in durable
45We calibrate the parameters with the point estimates of the baseline model and remove
a friction at a time. Impulse responses are rescaled to generate a 1% increase in the policy
rate. In order to ease the graphical analysis, we do not plot the responses of the model in
which the central bank responds only to inflation in nondurables since they overlap with
the others.
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Figure 2.26: Impulse responses to a 1% increase in the nominal interest rate
across restricted models
goods are crucial to account for plausible magnitudes of the responses of
durables and output. Indeed, the black-rounded lines show that in the ab-
sence of IACs, at the trough, durables fall by almost 7% whereas output
falls by about 0.4%. Thus the maximum fall in durables is about 17.5 times
larger than the maximum fall of output, an implausible result according to
our SVAR estimates.
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Figure 2.27: Impulse responses to a 1% increase in the nominal interest rate
for different values of the income share of impatient households
2.12.1 The importance of the income share of patient
households
All the results reported above assume an income share of the patient house-
holds of 79%, as estimated by Iacoviello and Neri (2010). This is also in line
with estimates by Jappelli (1990), who reports a share of 80% for savers in
the U.S. economy. In this section, we use a calibrated version of the baseline
DSGE using the posterior mean of all parameters reported in Section 2.3.6
and alternative values for the income share of patient households to assess
the importance of this parameter for the dynamic responses of macroeco-
nomic variables to a monetary policy shock. Figure 2.27 shows the impulse
responses to an increase in the policy rate for different values of ψ˜. Qual-
itatively, the dynamic responses of the baseline DSGE are not affected by
changes in the income share of the two households. However, a quantita-
tive inspection yields interesting insights. Increasing the share of impatient
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households (blue-dashed and red-dotted lines) exacerbates the negative ef-
fects of the monetary policy shock. The simple reason is that a higher share of
households are credit constrained hence on aggregate, durables investment
and nondurables consumption fall more. Here, it is also evident that the
transmission channel of monetary policy through the collateral constraint is
in fact important and should not be neglected. Conversely, lowering the share
of impatient households mitigates the effects of a monetary policy shock.
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2.13 Posterior estimates of extended models
Parameter Prior Posterior Mean Posterior Mean
Distr. Mean Sd/df Baseline DSGE Housing DSGE
Structural
Inv. Frisch elasticity patients ϕ N 0.50 0.10 0.5262 [0.3807;0.6765] 0.4996 [0.6441;0.9352]
Inv. Frisch elasticity impatients ϕ′ N 0.50 0.10 0.6599 [0.5044;0.8172] 0.7803 [0.5300;0.8431]
Habits patients ζ B 0.70 0.10 0.6761 [0.6281;0.7238] 0.7022 [0.6532;0.7557]
Habits. impatients ζ′ B 0.70 0.10 0.9346 [0.9259;0.9443] 0.9487 [0.9445;0.9526]
Habit persist. patients ρc B 0.70 0.10 0.5226 [0.4143;0.6299] 0.5399 [0.4471;0.6339]
Habit persist. impatients ρ′c B 0.70 0.10 0.2135 [0.1500;0.2746] 0.2002 [0.1257;0.2695]
Labor mobility patients λ N 1.51 0.50 2.6036 [1.9900;3.2098] 0.8628 [0.6649;1.0884]
Labor mobility impatients λ′ N 1.03 0.50 1.6042 [0.9274;2.2777] 0.7500 [0.1084;1.3567]
Price stickiness nondurables ϑc G 15.0 5.00 25.72 [18.07;33.85] 51.08 [45.73;56.06]
Price stickiness durables ϑd G 15.0 5.00 27.02 [17.95;35.59] 0.72 [0.56;0.85]
Wage stickiness ϑW G 100.0 10.00 159.09 [145.64;176.10] 172.37 [166.50;177.30]
IAC durables patients φ N 1.5 0.50 3.0043 [2.3778;3.6516] 2.5507 [1.9744;3.1002]
IAC durables impatients φ′ N 1.5 0.50 1.6987 [0.9303;2.4394] 1.4886 [0.7305;2.2391]
Share of durables inflation τ B 0.20 0.10 0.2018 [0.1077;0.2887] 0.0534 [0.0359;0.0700]
Inflation -Taylor rule ρpi N 1.50 0.20 1.4099 [1.2523;1.5715] 1.7766 [1.5348;2.0045]
Output -Taylor rule ρy G 0.10 0.05 0.0187 [0.0063;0.0308] 0.0230 [0.0061;0.0393]
Interest rate smoothing ρr B 0.80 0.10 0.7052 [0.6656;0.7488] 0.7978 [0.7653;0.8323]
Averages
Trend growth rate γ N 0.49 0.10 0.3957 [0.3606;0.4315] 0.4127 [0.3881;0.4403]
Inflation rate nondurables p¯iC G 1.05 0.10 0.9872 [0.8885;1.0863] 0.9870 [0.9010;1.0775]
Inflation rate durables p¯iD G 0.37 0.10 0.4598 [0.3549;0.5616] 0.5627 [0.3860;0.7343]
Interest rate r¯ G 1.65 0.10 1.5989 [1.4788;1.7287] 1.6211 [1.5215;1.7221]
Exogenous processes
Technology ρeA B 0.50 0.20 0.9792 [0.9603;0.9973] 0.9255 [0.8722;0.9765]
σeA IG 0.10 2.0 0.7053 [0.6304;0.7743] 0.8059 [0.7240;0.8878]
Monetary Policy ρeR B 0.50 0.20 0.1052 [0.2592;0.3215] 0.0674 [0.0141;0.1151]
σeR IG 0.10 2.0 0.2908 [0.0252;0.1762] 0.2675 [0.2403;0.2930]
Investment Durables ρeI B 0.50 0.20 0.3021 [0.1457;0.4544] 0.9292 [0.8937;0.9658]
σeI IG 0.10 2.0 6.8359 [4.9939;8.6048] 7.4079 [6.6757;8.1498]
Preference ρeB B 0.50 0.20 0.7427 [0.6703;0.8182] 0.8251 [0.7745;0.8704]
σeB IG 0.10 2.0 1.9852 [1.6586;2.2950] 2.1079 [1.7502;2.4492]
Price mark-up nondurables ρeC B 0.50 0.20 0.9253 [0.8830;0.9689] 0.6328 [0.5220;0.7306]
θC B 0.50 0.20 0.5848 [0.4799;0.6900] 0.2710 [0.0815;0.4536]
σeC IG 0.10 2.0 2.2650 [1.7960;2.7354] 3.3818 [2.8232;3.9237]
Price mark-up durables ρeD B 0.50 0.20 0.9549 [0.9160;0.9930] 0.9932 [0.9874;0.9994]
θD B 0.50 0.20 0.3938 [0.2283 ;.5564] 0.0878 [0.0159;0.1547]
σeD IG 0.10 2.0 4.9463 [3.6282;6.2196] 1.6186 [1.4276;1.7981]
Wage mark-up ρeW B 0.50 0.20 0.9498 [0.9277;0.9705] 0.9310 [0.9069;0.9555]
θW B 0.50 0.20 0.5176 [0.4119;0.6326] 0.4728 [0.3568;0.5897]
σeW IG 0.10 2.0 5.0858 [4.2308;5.9569] 5.3314 [4.5073;6.1389]
Government spending ρeG B 0.50 0.20 0.9657 [0.9445;0.9882] 0.9544 [0.9265;0.9827]
σeG IG 0.10 2.0 3.5223 [3.1895;3.8490] 3.3398 [3.0394;3.6639]
Table 2.12: Prior and posterior distributions of estimated parameters: mod-
els with imperfect labor mobility (90% confidence bands in square brackets)
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Parameter Prior Posterior Mean Posterior Mean
Distr. Mean Sd/df Baseline DSGE Housing DSGE
Structural
Inv. Frisch elasticity patients ϕ N 0.50 0.10 0.5442 [0.3963;0.6916] 0.6321 [0.5278;0.8445]
Inv. Frisch elasticity impatients ϕ′ N 0.50 0.10 0.6436 [0.4867;0.7980] 0.6853 [0.5300;0.8431]
Habits patients ζ B 0.70 0.10 0.6532 [0.6281;0.7238] 0.6701 [0.6298;0.7050]
Habits impatients ζ′ B 0.70 0.10 0.9357 [0.9271;0.9452] 0.9411 [0.9353;0.9472]
Habit persist. patients ρc B 0.70 0.10 0.5102 [0.4013;0.6233] 0.6377 [0.5399;0.7388]
Habit persist. impatients ρ′c B 0.70 0.10 0.2249 [0.1635;0.2882] 0.3459 [0.2527;0.4370]
Price stickiness nondurables ϑc G 15.0 5.00 20.58 [13.63;27.65] 23.87 [16.55;31.31]
Price stickiness durables ϑd G 15.0 5.00 22.05 [13.77;30.25] 1.26 [0.69;1.79]
Price indexation nondurables ςC B 0.50 0.20 0.2084 [0.0414;0.3636] 0.1439 [0.0263;0.2550]
Price indexation durables ςD B 0.50 0.20 0.1167 [0.0158;0.2146] 0.2131 [0.0270 ;0.3994]
Wage stickiness ϑW G 100.0 10.00 155.98 [140.08;172.65] 168.02 [158.32;177.30]
IAC durables patients φ N 1.5 0.50 3.5149 [2.8751;4.1782] 3.7729 [3.2011;4.3405]
IAC durables impatients φ′ N 1.5 0.50 1.9209 [1.2333;2.6121] 1.7943 [1.0931;2.4844]
Share of durables inflation τ B 0.20 0.10 0.1535 [0.0646;0.2463] 0.0517 [0.0362;0.0671]
Inflation -Taylor rule ρpi N 1.50 0.20 1.3781 [1.2056;1.5351] 1.7361 [1.5127;1.9526]
Output -Taylor rule ρy G 0.10 0.05 0.0188 [0.0054;0.0307] 0.0247 [0.0076;0.0411]
Interest rate smoothing ρr B 0.80 0.10 0.7100 [0.6676;0.7514] 0.7707 [0.7337;0.8071]
Averages
Trend growth rate γ N 0.49 0.10 0.4075 [0.3749;0.4412] 0.4055 [0.3740;0.4364]
Inflation rate nondurables p¯iC G 1.05 0.10 1.0034 [0.9034;1.1051] 1.0419 [0.9393;1.1453]
Inflation rate durables p¯iD G 0.37 0.10 0.4345 [0.3189;0.5476] 0.3475 [0.2152;0.4830]
Interest rate r¯ G 1.65 0.10 1.6108 [1.4854;1.7334] 1.6450 [1.5027;1.7795]
Exogenous processes
Technology ρeA B 0.50 0.20 0.9789 [0.9601;0.9977] 0.9590 [0.9290;0.9910]
σeA IG 0.10 2.0 0.6889 [0.6169:0.7574] 0.7369 [0.6553;0.8163]
Monetary Policy ρeR B 0.50 0.20 0.1023 [0.0290;0.1769] 0.0811 [0.0189;0.1380]
σeR IG 0.10 2.0 0.2855 [0.2560;0.3150] 0.2796 [0.2494;0.3096]
Investment Durables ρeI B 0.50 0.20 0.4674 [0.2882;0.6544] 0.9216 [0.8881;0.9544]
σeI IG 0.10 2.0 6.4416 [4.3733;8.5367] 6.1710 [5.4138;6.9180]
Preference ρeB B 0.50 0.20 0.7467 [0.6784;0.8158] 0.8563 [0.8107;0.9026]
σeB IG 0.10 2.0 1.8816 [1.5636;2.1669] 2.2259 [1.8429;2.6158]
Price mark-up nondurables ρeC B 0.50 0.20 0.9193 [0.8704;0.9734] 0.9161 [0.8539;0.9806]
θC B 0.50 0.20 0.6332 [0.5236;0.7532] 0.6872 [0.5678;0.8114]
σeC IG 0.10 2.0 2.1614 [1.6924;2.5921] 2.3646 [1.8614;2.8512]
Price mark-up durables ρeD B 0.50 0.20 0.9867 [0.9771;0.9981] 0.9893 [0.9785;0.9994]
θD B 0.50 0.20 0.7158 [0.6188 0.8176] 0.8766 [0.8365;0.9195]
σeD IG 0.10 2.0 4.2377 [2.9814;5.4658] 22.506 [18.728;26.259]
Wage mark-up ρeW B 0.50 0.20 0.9462 [0.9176;0.9771] 0.9533 [0.9310;0.9766]
θW B 0.50 0.20 0.5483 [0.4430;0.6580] 0.5650 [0.4652;0.6710]
σeW IG 0.10 2.0 5.3348 [4.3919;6.2104] 5.6656 [4.7591;6.5676]
Government spending ρeG B 0.50 0.20 0.9671 [0.9469;0.9886] 0.9550 [0.9264;0.9857]
σeG IG 0.10 2.0 3.5031 [3.1815;3.8188] 3.3336 [3.0230;3.6309]
Table 2.13: Prior and posterior distributions of estimated parameters: mod-
els with price indexation (90% confidence bands in square brackets)
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Parameter Prior Posterior Mean
Distr. Mean Sd/df
Structural
Inv. Frisch elasticity patients ϕ N 0.50 0.10 0.8084 [0.6630;0.9509]
Inv. Frisch elasticity impatients ϕ′ N 0.50 0.10 0.8462 [0.6926;0.9956]
Habits patients ζ B 0.70 0.10 0.1676 [0.1127;0.2167]
Habits. impatients ζ′ B 0.70 0.10 0.8396 [0.7948;0.8915]
Habit persist. patients ρc B 0.70 0.10 0.6239 [0.4758;0.7678]
Habit persist. impatients ρ′c B 0.70 0.10 0.2135 [0.1500;0.2746]
Elast. sub. consumption ρ N 1.00 0.10 1.0642 [0.9082;1.2142]
Elast. sub. consumption ρ˜ N 1.00 0.10 0.9959 [0.8674;1.1187]
Price stickiness nondurables ϑc G 15.0 5.00 33.37 [24.07;42.82]
Price stickiness durables ϑd G 15.0 5.00 46.13 [34.99;57.06]
Price stickiness housing ϑh G 15.0 5.00 4.70 [2.34;7.09]
Wage stickiness ϑW G 100.0 10.00 160.88 [146.16;177.30]
IAC durables patients φ N 1.5 0.50 2.7309 [2.0306;3.4376]
IAC housing patients φH N 1.5 0.50 3.9123 [3.3607;4.4951]
IAC durables impatients φ′ N 1.5 0.50 1.2077 [0.5961;1.0816]
IAC housing impatients φ′H N 1.5 0.50 1.6676 [0.9285;2.4074]
Weight in inflation aggregator τ B 0.20 0.10 0.2308 [0.1464;0.3156]
Weight in inflation aggregator τ˜ B 0.20 0.10 0.0918 [0.0330;0.1476]
Inflation -Taylor rule ρpi N 1.50 0.20 1.5846 [1.4231;1.7410]
Output -Taylor rule ρy G 0.10 0.05 0.0142 [0.0043;0.0229]
Interest rate smoothing ρr B 0.80 0.10 0.6803 [0.6343 ;0.7297]
Averages
Trend growth rate γ N 0.49 0.10 0.3719 [0.3240;0.4190]
Inflation rate nondurables p¯iC G 1.05 0.10 1.0275 [0.9339;1.1163]
Inflation rate durables p¯iD G 0.37 0.10 0.4610 [0.3594;0.5624]
Inflation rate housing p¯iH G 0.22 0.10 0.1775 [0.1000;0.2567]
Interest rate r¯ G 1.65 0.10 1.6334 [1.5043;1.7641]
Table 2.14: Prior and posterior distributions of estimated parameters: three-
sector model (90% confidence bands in square brackets)
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Parameter Prior Posterior Mean
Distr. Mean Sd/df
Exogenous processes
Technology ρeA B 0.50 0.20 0.9729 [0.9467;0.9974]
σeA IG 0.10 2.0 0.8172 [0.7258;0.9015]
Monetary Policy ρeR B 0.50 0.20 0.1195 [0.0397;0.2006]
σeR IG 0.10 2.0 0.2971 [0.2642;0.3306]
Investment Durables ρeI B 0.50 0.20 0.2856 [0.0981;0.4679]
σeI IG 0.10 2.0 7.6195 [4.9130;10.502]
Investment Housing ρ
eI
H B 0.50 0.20 0.9354 [0.9051;0.9700]
σ
eI
H IG 0.10 2.0 7.2639 [6.3405;8.1975]
Preference ρeB B 0.50 0.20 0.8859 [0.8421;0.9303]
σeB IG 0.10 2.0 1.7621 [1.3200;2.2014]
Price mark-up nondurables ρeC B 0.50 0.20 0.7660 [0.6767;0.8559]
θC B 0.50 0.20 0.2986 [0.1224;0.4589
σeC IG 0.10 2.0 2.5294 [1.9320;3.1054]
Price mark-up durables ρeD B 0.50 0.20 0.9817 [0.9687;0.9950]
θD B 0.50 0.20 0.2274 [0.0623;0.3820]
σeD IG 0.10 2.0 2.1549 [1.7202;2.5783]
Price mark-up housing ρeH B 0.50 0.20 0.9984 [0.9970;0.9998]
θH B 0.50 0.20 0.6683 [0.5762;0.7592]
σeH IG 0.10 2.0 16.336 [12.201;20.351]
Wage mark-up ρeW B 0.50 0.20 0.9674 [0.9493;0.9856]
θW B 0.50 0.20 0.6874 [0.6134;0.7675]
σeW IG 0.10 2.0 5.7254 [4.7684;6.6728]
Government spending ρeG B 0.50 0.20 0.8977 [0.8589;0.9352]
σeG IG 0.10 2.0 3.5428 [3.2062;3.8989]
Table 2.15: Prior and posterior distributions of exogenous processes: three-
sector model (90% confidence bands in square brackets)
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Chapter 3
Sectoral Labor Mobility and
Optimal Monetary Policy
3.1 Introduction
What inflation measure should central banks target? This question naturally
arises when a New-Keynesian model is extended to include more than one
sector. In fact, with only one instrument available, the central bank has to
decide how much weight it has to assign to each sectoral inflation.
In a seminal paper, Aoki (2001) studies a two-sector economy with sticky-
and flexible-price sectors and finds that, subject only to a technology shock,
the central bank should assign zero weight to the flexible-price sector. A
similar result is attained by Benigno (2004) in a two-country New-Keynesian
model of a currency union which resembles a two-sector model. Here, more
weight is attached to inflation in the region displaying a higher degree of price
stickiness. Mankiw and Reis (2003) enrich these results by showing that, in
order to construct a price index that–if kept on target– stabilizes economic
activity, the sectoral weights should depend on the degree of price sticki-
ness, the responsiveness to business cycles and the tendency to experience
idiosyncratic shocks.
The optimal monetary policy literature has hitherto augmented a stan-
dard two-sectors New-Keynesian model by either characterizing the sectors
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by their durability as in Erceg and Levin (2006), by introducing input-output
interactions (I-O, henceforth) between intermediate and final goods firms as
in Huang and Liu (2005), or both as in Petrella and Santoro (2011) and
Petrella et al. (2017). Abstracting from heterogeneity in price stickiness,
Erceg and Levin (2006) show that goods durability plays an important role
for the conduct of monetary policy. As durable goods are more sensitive to
the interest rate than nondurables, the central bank faces a severe trade-off
in stabilizing output and prices across the two sectors. In their setting, with
symmetric sectoral price and wage rigidities, the central bank attains the
second-best policy by responding to both price and wage inflations.1 Con-
versely, I-O interactions imply that the two sectoral inflations reflect the
difference between a consumer price index (CPI) and a producer price index
(PPI). In such context, Huang and Liu (2005), Gerberding et al. (2012) and
Strum (2009) conclude that targeting hybrid measures of inflation delivers
desirable welfare results but the weight assigned to each sectoral inflation
reflects their size. Similar conclusions are drawn when, neglecting I-O in-
teractions, durable goods are used as collateral by households to borrow
(Monacelli, 2008), sectors differ by factor intensities (Jeske and Liu, 2013),
or the length of wage contracts differs across sectors (Kara, 2010).
All the above-mentioned contributions look at this important issue from
many angles, but overlook the role that the extent to which labor is allowed
to reallocate across sectors has for optimal monetary policy. Indeed, Petrella
et al. (2017) optimally find the weight attached to durables inflation in an
input-output economy with a given limited degree of labor mobility, but do
not isolate the impact that labor mobility has on the weight itself. We fill this
gap and show that the extent to which labor can freely move across sectors
is crucial in the determination of the optimal inflation composite, and it
intuitively interacts with price and nominal wage stickiness. In our model
the two sectors differ both in goods durability and degree of price stickiness,
given that durable goods also display less sticky prices in the data, and this
empirical regularity is employed in much of the theoretical literature.
1Consistently, in their empirical exercise, Mankiw and Reis (2003) conclude that sub-
stantial weight should be assigned to the level of nominal wages.
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We first use Bayesian methods to estimate the model. This embeds imper-
fect labor mobility, price and wage stickiness and a set of shocks conventional
in the monetary policy literature. Model estimates point at a limited degree
of labor mobility across sectors. Then, we use the estimated model to de-
sign optimized monetary policy rules and highlight a negative relationship
between labor mobility and the weight attached to inflation in the durables
sector.2
Consistently with the literature, a lower weight is assigned to the sector
in which prices are more flexible (durables) but, conditional on the degree of
price and wage stickiness, such weight is higher the less mobile labor is across
sectors. Intuitively, following a shock, the lower (higher) the friction in the
labor market the larger (smaller) is the reallocation of workers across sectors
hence the smaller (larger) is the adjustment through prices. It follows that
the central bank devotes more (less) attention to the stickier sector.
We furthermore show that wage stickiness plays an important role in set-
ting the optimal weight of sectoral inflations due to second-round effects on
marginal costs and explains why even with flexible durable prices, the central
bank still assigns a positive weight to inflation in the durables sector. Con-
sistently with Erceg and Levin (2006), we also find that key variables in the
durables sector are more volatile than in the nondurables sector, specifically
the variability of prices, wages and output is higher in the former than in the
latter. Finally, when optimizing the parameters of the interest rate rule, the
central bank actually chooses a price level rule to minimize the welfare loss
with respect to the first best policy, a result attained by Levine et al. (2008)
and Giannoni (2014), among others, in a one-sector economy. Our results
carry an important policy implication: the degree of labor mobility between
sectors is an aspect of the economy that central banks should not overlook
in setting the monetary policy stance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents
2Estimating the model prior to designing optimized monetary policy rules is crucial
since, as noted by Cantore et al. (2012), such rules heavily depend on the persistence and
the variance of shocks. Note we use the estimation for the purpose of calibration in the
optimal policy analysis while we do not seek a comparison between the estimated and the
optimized Taylor rule.
89
the two-sector New-Keynesian model. In Section 3.3 we report the results
of the Bayesian estimation, whereas Section 3.4 shows the outcomes of the
optimal monetary policy exercises. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes. More
details about the data, the model’s equilibrium conditions and the steady
state are provided in the Appendix.
3.2 Model
We construct a two-sector New-Keynesian model in the spirit of Barsky et al.
(2007), where consumers purchase both durable and nondurable goods. In
addition, there are several frictions now standard in the New-Keynesian lit-
erature, namely price and wage stickiness, investment adjustment costs in
durable goods (IAC, henceforth), habit formation in consumption of non-
durable goods. We also introduce imperfect labor mobility across sectors
and estimate the relevant parameter. Finally, the monetary authority sets
the nominal interest rate according to an interest rate rule.
3.2.1 Households
There is a continuum i ∈ [0, 1] of identical and infinitely-lived households
consuming both durable and nondurable goods and supplying labor, whose
lifetime utility is
E0
∞∑
t=0
eBt β
tU (Xi,t, N i,t) , (3.1)
where β ∈ [0, 1] is the subjective discount factor, eBt is a preference shock,
Xi,t = Z
1−α
i,t D
α
i,t is a Cobb-Douglas consumption aggregator of nondurable
(Zi,t) and durable goods (Di,t) with α ∈ [0, 1] representing the share of
durables consumption on total expenditure, and Ni,t being the household’s
labor supply. Nondurable consumption is subject to external habit formation
such that
Zi,t = Ci,t − ζSt−1, (3.2)
St = ρcSt−1 + (1− ρc)Ct, (3.3)
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where Ci,t is the level of the household’s nondurable consumption; St, ζ ∈
(0, 1) and ρc ∈ (0, 1) are the stock, the degree and the persistence of habit for-
mation, respectively, while Ct represents average consumption across house-
holds.3 Members of each household supply labor to firms in both sectors
according to:
Ni,t =
[(
χC
)− 1
λ
(
NCi,t
) 1+λ
λ +
(
1− χC)− 1λ (NDi,t) 1+λλ ] λ1+λ . (3.4)
Following Horvath (2000), Petrella and Santoro (2011) and Petrella et al.
(2017), this CES specification of aggregate labor captures different degrees
of labor mobility across sectors, governed by parameter λ > 0, i.e. the
intra-temporal elasticity of substitution: λ → 0 denotes the case of labor
immobility, while as λ → ∞ labor can be freely reallocated and all workers
earn the same wage at the margin. For λ <∞ the economy displays a limited
degree of labor mobility and sectoral wages are not equal.4 Moreover, χC ≡
NC/N represents the steady-state share of labor supply in the nondurables
sector. The stock of durables evolves according to law of motion
Di,t+1 = (1− δ)Di,t + eIt IDi,t
[
1− S
(
IDi,t
IDi,t−1
)]
, (3.5)
3As explained by Fuhrer (2000), the extra source of persistence in superficial habit
formation determined by ρc implies that the reference level for habit formation can either
be only the previous period consumption (for ρc = 0) or consumption further back in time
(for 0 < ρc ≤ 1). Fuhrer (2000) then demonstrated that this extra source of persistence is
key to fit the model to the data and produce plausible impulse responses of consumption
to macroeconomic shocks. The same specification of persistence has been proved to be
empirically relevant in estimated models with deep habits in consumption (see Ravn et al.,
2006, Cantore et al., 2014a and Zubairy, 2014). Moreover, Cantore et al. (2014b) show
that including the extra persistence in superficial habits makes a NK model fit the data
as well as a NK model with deep habits. Given that accounting for the plausible response
of consumption to a monetary policy shock is crucial in our paper, we included the extra
source of persistence in superficial habits.
4According to Horvath (2000), the CES aggregator allows us to capture labor mar-
ket mobility without deviating from the representative agent assumption. Di Pace and
Hertweck (2016) show that search and matching frictions improve the fit of a two-sector
model to the data but, although desirable, capturing sectoral labor market mobility in a
search and matching framework is not straightforward and would inevitably complicate
our analysis (e.g. it would require using sectoral and aggregate matching functions).
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where δ is the depreciation rate, IDi,t is investment in durable goods that is sub-
ject to adjustment costs, and eIt represents an investment-specific shock. The
adjustment costs function S (·) satisfies S (1) = S ′ (1) = 0 and S ′′ (1) > 0.
Each household consumes Ci,t, purchases nominal bonds Bi,t, receives profits
Ωt from firms and pays a lump-sum tax Tt. Finally, Qt ≡ PD,tPC,t denotes the
relative price of durables so that the period-by-period real budget constraint
reads as follows:
Ci,t +QtI
D
i,t + Φt +
Bi,t
PCt
=
Wi,t
PCt
Ni,t +Rt−1
Bi,t−1
PCt
+ Ωt − Tt, (3.6)
where the term Φt =
ϑW
2
(
wi,t
wi,t−1
ΠCt − ΠC
)2
wtNt accounts for nominal wage
adjustment costs as in Rotemberg (1982). Households choose Zi,t, Bi,t, Di,t+1,
IDi,t, wi,t, N
C
i,t, N
D
i,t to maximize (3.1) subject to (3.2), (3.3), (3.4), (3.5) and
(3.6).
At the symmetric equilibrium, the household’s optimality conditions are:
1 = Et
[
Λt,t+1
Rt
ΠCt+1
]
, (3.7)
Qtψt =
UD,t
UZ,t
+ (1− δ)Et [Λt,t+1Qt+1ψt+1] , (3.8)
1 = ψte
I
t
[
1− S
(
IDt
IDt−1
)
− S ′
(
IDt
IDt−1
)
IDt
IDt−1
]
+
+Et
{
Λt,t+1ψt+1
Qt+1
Qt
eIt+1
[
S
′
(
IDt+1
IDt
)(
IDt+1
IDt
)2]}
, (3.9)
NCt = χ
C
(
wCt
wt
)λ
Nt, (3.10)
NDt = χ
D
(
wDt
wt
)λ
Nt, (3.11)
0 =
[
1− eWt η
]
+
eWt η
µ˜t
− ϑW (ΠWt − ΠC)ΠWt +
+Et
[
Λt,t+1ϑ
W
(
ΠWt+1 − ΠC
)
ΠWt+1
wt+1Nt+1
wtNt
]
. (3.12)
92
Equation (3.7) is a standard Euler equation with Λt,t+1 ≡ β UZ,t+1UZ,t
eBt+1
eBt
repre-
senting the stochastic discount factor and UZ,t denoting the marginal utility
of habit-adjusted consumption of nondurable goods. Equation (3.8) repre-
sents the asset price of durables, where UD,t is the marginal utility of durables
consumption and ψt is the Lagrange multiplier attached to constraint (3.5).
Equation (3.9) is the optimality condition w.r.t. investment in durable goods.
Equations (3.10) and (3.11) are the household’s labor supplies in each sector,
whereas equation (3.12) is the wage setting equation in which µ˜t ≡ wtMRSt is
the wage markup, MRSt ≡ −UN,tUZ,t is the marginal rate of substitution be-
tween consumption and leisure, UN,t is the marginal disutility of work and
ΠWt is the gross wage inflation rate.
3.2.2 Firms
A continuum ω ∈ [0, 1] of firms in each sector j = C,D operates in monopolis-
tic competition and face quadratic costs of changing prices
ϑj
2
(
P jω,t
P jω,t−1
− 1
)2
Y jt ,
where ϑj is the parameter of sectoral price stickiness. Each firm produces
differentiated goods according to a linear production function,
Y jω,t = e
A
t N
j
ω,t, (3.13)
where eAt is a labor-augmenting productivity shock. Firms maximize the
present discounted value of profits,
Et

∞∑
t=0
Λt,t+1
P jω,t
P jt
Y jω,t −
Wωt
P jt
N jω,t −
ϑj
2
(
P jω,t
P jω,t−1
− 1
)2
Y jt
 , (3.14)
subject to production function (3.13) and a standard Dixit-Stiglitz demand
equation Y jω,t =
(
P jω,t
P jt
)−ejt j
Y jt , where j and e
j
t are the sectoral intratemporal
elasticity of substitution across goods and the sectoral price markup shock,
respectively. At the symmetric equilibrium, the price setting equations for
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the two sectors read as
(
1− eCt c
)
+ eCt cMC
C
t = ϑc
(
ΠCt − ΠC
)
ΠCt −
− ϑcEt
[
Λt,t+1
Y Ct+1
Y Ct
(
ΠCt+1 − ΠC
)
ΠCt+1
]
, (3.15)(
1− eDt d
)
+ eDt dMC
D
t = ϑd
(
ΠDt − ΠD
)
ΠDt −
− ϑdEt
[
Λt,t+1
Qt+1Y
D
t+1
QtY Dt
(
ΠDt+1 − ΠD
)
ΠDt+1
]
, (3.16)
where MCCt =
wt
eAt
and MCDt =
wt
eAt Qt
. When ϑj = 0 prices are fully flexible
and are set as constant markups over the marginal costs.
3.2.3 Fiscal and monetary policy
The government purchases nondurable goods as in Erceg and Levin (2006)
and runs a balanced budget by levying lump-sum taxes. Monetary policy
is conducted by an independent central bank via the following interest rate
rule:
log
(
Rt
R¯
)
= ρr log
(
Rt−1
R¯
)
+ (1− ρr)
{
ρpi log
(
Π˜t
Π˜
)
+ ρy log
(
Yt
Y ft
)
+ ρ∆y
[
log
(
Yt
Y ft
)
− log
(
Yt−1
Y ft−1
)]}
+ eRt . (3.17)
Equation (3.17) is that employed by Smets and Wouters (2007) and implies
that the central bank reacts to inflation, the output gap and the output gap
growth to an extent determined by parameters ρpi, ρy and ρ∆y, respectively.
The output gap is defined as the deviation of output from the level that would
prevail with flexible prices and wages, Y ft , and ρr is the degree of interest
rate smoothing. The aggregator of the gross rates of sectoral inflations is
Π˜t ≡
(
ΠCt
)1−τ (
ΠDt
)τ
, (3.18)
where Π˜ is its steady-state value, and τ ∈ [0, 1] represents the weight assigned
by the central bank to durables inflation.
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3.2.4 Market clearing conditions and exogenous pro-
cesses
In equilibrium all markets clear and the model is closed by the following
identities:
Y Ct = Ct + e
G
t +
ϑc
2
(
ΠCt − ΠC
)2
Y Ct , (3.19)
Y Dt = [Dt − (1− δ)Dt−1] +
ϑd
2
(
ΠDt − ΠD
)2
Y Dt , (3.20)
Yt = Y
C
t +QtY
D
t +
ϑW
2
(
wt
wt−1
ΠCt − ΠC
)2
wtNt. (3.21)
As in Smets and Wouters (2007), the wage markup and the price markup
shocks follow ARMA (1,1) processes:
log
(κt
κ¯
)
= ρκ log
(κt−1
κ¯
)
+ κt − θiκt−1, (3.22)
with κ =
[
eW , eC , eD
]
, i = [W,C,D], whereas all other shocks follow an AR
(1) process:
log
(κt
κ¯
)
= ρκ log
(κt−1
κ¯
)
+ κt , (3.23)
where κ =
[
eB, eI , eR, eA, eG
]
is a vector of exogenous variables, ρκ and ρκ
are the autoregressive parameters, θi are the moving average parameters, 
κ
t
and κt are i.i.d shocks with zero mean and standard deviations σκ and σκ.
3.2.5 Functional forms
The utility function is additively separable and logarithmic in consumption:
U (Xt, N t) = log (Xt) − νN
1+ϕ
t
1+ϕ
, where ν is a scaling parameter for hours
worked and ϕ is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Adjust-
ment costs in durables investment are quadratic: S
(
IDt
IDt−1
)
= φ
2
(
IDt
IDt−1
− 1
)2
,
φ > 0 as in Christiano et al. (2005).
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3.3 Bayesian estimation
The model is estimated with Bayesian methods. The Kalman filter is used
to evaluate the likelihood function that, combined with the prior distribu-
tion of the parameters, yields the posterior distribution. Then, the Monte-
Carlo-Markov-Chain Metropolis-Hastings (MCMC-MH) algorithm with two
parallel chains of 150,000 draws each is used to generate a sample from the
posterior distribution in order to perform inference. We estimate the model
over the sample 1969Q2-2007Q4 by using US data on: GDP, consumption of
durable goods, consumption of nondurable goods, real wage, hours worked,
inflation in the nondurables sector, inflation in the durables sector and the
nominal interest rate. The following measurement equations link the data to
the endogenous variables of the model:
∆Y ot = γ + Yˆt − Yˆt−1, (3.24)
∆IoD,t = γ + IˆD,t − IˆD,t−1, (3.25)
∆Cot = γ + Cˆt − Cˆt−1, (3.26)
∆W ot = γ + Wˆt − Wˆt−1, (3.27)
N ot = Nˆt, (3.28)
ΠoC,t = p¯iC + Πˆ
C
t , (3.29)
ΠoD,t = p¯iD + Πˆ
D
t , (3.30)
Rot = r¯ + Rˆt, (3.31)
where γ is the common quarterly trend growth rate of GDP, consumption
of durables, consumption of nondurables and the real wage; p¯iC and p¯iD are
the average quarterly inflation rates in nondurable and durable sectors re-
spectively; r¯ is the average quarterly Federal funds rate. Hours worked are
demeaned so no constant is required in the corresponding measurement equa-
tion (3.28). Variables with a ˆ are in log-deviations from their own steady
state.
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Parameter Value
Discount factor β 0.99
Durables depreciation rate δ 0.010
Durables share of total expenditure α 0.20
Elasticity of substitution nondurable goods c 6
Elasticity of substitution durable goods d 6
Elasticity of substitution in labor η 21
Preference parameter ν target N¯ = 0.33
Government share of output gy 0.20
Table 3.1: Calibrated parameters
3.3.1 Calibration and priors
Table 3.1 presents the structural parameters calibrated at a quarterly fre-
quency. The discount factor β is equal to the conventional value of 0.99,
implying an annual steady-state gross interest rate of 4%. Following Mona-
celli (2009), we calibrate the depreciation rate of durable goods δ at 0.010
amounting to an annual depreciation of 4%, and the durables share of total
expenditure α is set at 0.20. The sectoral elasticities of substitution across
different varieties c and d equal 6 in order to target a steady-state gross
mark-up of 1.20 in both sectors. We target a 5% steady-state gross wage
mark-up hence we set the elasticity of substitution in the labor market η
equal to 21 as in Zubairy (2014). The preference parameter ν is set to target
steady-state total hours of work of 0.33. The government-output ratio gy is
calibrated at 0.20, in line with the data.
Prior and posterior distributions of the parameters and the shocks are
reported in Table 3.2. We set the prior mean of the inverse Frisch elasticity
ϕ to 0.5, broadly in line with Smets and Wouters (2007, SW henceforth)
who estimate a Frisch elasticity of 1.92. We also follow SW in setting the
prior means of the habit parameter, ζ, to 0.7, the interest rate smoothing
parameter, ρr, to 0.80 and in assuming a stronger response of the central
bank to inflation than output. We set the prior means of the constants in
the measurement equations equal to the average values in the dataset. In
general, we use the Beta distribution for all parameters bounded between
0 and 1. We use the Inverse Gamma (IG) distribution for the standard
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deviation of the shocks for which we set a loose prior with 2 degrees of
freedom. We choose a Gamma distribution for the Rotemberg parameters for
both prices and wages, given that these are non-negative. The price stickiness
parameters are assigned the same prior distribution corresponding to firms
resetting prices around 1.5 quarters on average in a Calvo world. Finally, we
follow Iacoviello and Neri (2010) who choose a Normal distribution for the
intra-temporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply λ, with a prior mean
of 1 which implies a limited degree of labor mobility.
3.3.2 Estimation results
We report the posterior mean of the parameters together with the 90% prob-
ability intervals in square brackets in Table 3.2. We first devote our attention
to the parameters that will be crucial for remainder of the analysis. In line
with the literature, the labor mobility parameter λ is estimated to be 1.1769
implying a non-negligible degree of friction in the labor market. Indeed, Hor-
vath (2000) estimates a regression equation to find a value of 0.999 whereas
Iacoviello and Neri (2010) estimate values of 1.51 and 1.03 for savers and
borrowers, respectively.5 Typically, limited labor mobility is calibrated at a
value of λ = 1 (see Bouakez et al. 2009, Petrella and Santoro 2011 and Pe-
trella et al. 2017) except Bouakez et al. (2011) who explore values between
0.5 and 1.5. Figure 3.1 displays the prior and posterior distribution of λ to
confirm that the parameter is correctly identified as the posterior distribu-
tion is rather apart from the prior and that it includes the above-mentioned
values used in the literature.
Prices are estimated to be stickier in the nondurables sector, with a non-
negligible degree of stickiness in durable goods. In the literature there is no
decisive evidence that prices of nondurable goods are much stickier than those
of many durables (see Bils and Klenow, 2004 and Nakamura and Steinsson,
5Iacoviello and Neri (2010) specify the CES aggregator such that the labor mobility
parameter is the inverse of λ. They find values of 0.66 and 0.97 for savers and borrowers
respectively hence the values of 1/0.66=1.51 and 1/0.97=1.03 we reported to ease the
comparison.
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Parameter Prior Posterior Mean
Distrib. Mean Std/df
Structural
Labor mobility λ Normal 1.00 0.10 1.1769 [1.0327;1.3228]
Inverse Frisch elasticity ϕ Normal 0.50 0.10 0.572 [0.4137;0.7233]
Habit in nondurables consumption ζ Beta 0.70 0.10 0.7931 [0.7573;0.8293]
Habit persist. nondurables consumption ρc Beta 0.70 0.10 0.4306 [0.3315;0.5321]
Price stickiness nondurables ϑc Gamma 15.0 5.00 37.4735 [26.6634;47.5440]
Price stickiness durables ϑd Gamma 15.0 5.00 35.9731 [26.0116;45.6557]
Wage stickiness ϑW Gamma 100.0 10.00 102.6213 [86.5891;119.363]
Invest. adjust. costs durable goods φ Normal 1.5 0.50 2.2812 [1.6753;2.8612]
Share of durables inflation in aggregator τ Beta 0.20 0.10 0.2001 [0.1179;0.2838]
Inflation -Taylor rule ρpi Normal 1.50 0.20 1.6388 [1.4600;1.8302]
Output -Taylor rule ρy Gamma 0.10 0.05 0.0646 [0.0307;0.0953]
Output growth -Taylor rule ρ∆y Gamma 0.10 0.05 0.2904 [0.0867;0.4756]
Interest rate smoothing ρr Beta 0.80 0.10 0.7015 [0.6543;0.7481]
Averages
Trend growth rate γ Normal 0.49 0.10 0.3988 [0.3794;0.4192]
Inflation rate nondurables p¯iC Gamma 1.05 0.10 1.0298 [0.9396;1.1210]
Inflation rate durables p¯iD Gamma 0.55 0.10 0.5330 [0.4414;0.6288]
Interest rate r¯ Gamma 1.65 0.10 1.6225 [1.5002;1.7420]
Exogenous processes
Technology ρeA Beta 0.50 0.20 0.9258 [0.8943;0.9563]
σeA IG 0.10 2.0 0.0070 [0.0064;0.0077]
Monetary Policy ρeR Beta 0.50 0.20 0.1355 [0.0423;0.2217]
σeR IG 0.10 2.0 0.0029 [0.0025;0.0032]
Investment Durables ρeI Beta 0.50 0.20 0.2653 [0.1342;0.4042]
σeI IG 0.10 2.0 0.0585 [0.0413;0.0752]
Preference ρeB Beta 0.50 0.20 0.6450 [0.5536;0.7388]
σeB IG 0.10 2.0 0.0192 [0.0159;0.0222]
Price mark-up nondurables ρeC Beta 0.50 0.20 0.9454 [0.9091;0.9822]
θC Beta 0.50 0.20 0.4130 [0.2347;0.5897]
σeC IG 0.10 2.0 0.0201 [0.0151;0.0251]
Price mark-up durables ρeD Beta 0.50 0.20 0.9797 [0.9641;0.9951]
θD Beta 0.50 0.20 0.1650 [0.0392;0.2827]
σeD IG 0.10 2.0 0.0556 [0.0444;0.0657]
Wage mark-up ρeW Beta 0.50 0.20 0.9694 [0.9495;0.9922]
θW Beta 0.50 0.20 0.5414 [0.4313;0.6544]
σeW IG 0.10 2.0 0.0408 [0.0341;0.0477]
Government spending ρeG Beta 0.50 0.20 0.9398 [0.9077;0.9743]
σeG IG 0.10 2.0 0.0355 [0.0322;0.0387]
Log-marginal likelihood -1378.927
Table 3.2: Prior and posterior distributions of estimated parameters (90%
confidence bands in square brackets)
99
0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
0
1
2
3
4
5
Labor mobility λ
Prior density
Posterior density
Figure 3.1: Sectoral labor mobility parameter: prior and posterior densities
2008, among others).6
However, prices of new houses are generally rather flexible. Therefore,
given the importance of the degree of price stickiness of durable goods for
our results, in the remainder of the paper we use both the estimated value in
the baseline model and alternative calibrations. Similarly, wages are found
to be sticky but we also explore the effects of flexible wages.
The remaining parameters are broadly in line with the literature and
suggest a relevance of the real frictions (IAC in durable goods and habits in
consumption of nondurables) and a stronger response of monetary policy to
inflation with respect to output with a high degree of policy inertia. Overall,
our estimation delivers results consistent with both standard and two-sectors
New-Keynesian models estimated with Bayesian methods and serves as the
starting point for our analysis of optimal monetary policy.
3.4 Optimal monetary policy
3.4.1 The monetary policy rule
To design the optimal monetary policy, we follow Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2007) and write the interest rate rule (3.17) as
6Bouakez et al. (2014), Cantelmo and Melina (2018) and the references therein provide
a more detailed discussion about the macro and micro evidence of sectoral price stickiness.
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log
(
Rt
R¯
)
= ρr log
(
Rt−1
R¯
)
+ αpi log
(
Π˜t
Π˜
)
+
+ αy log
(
Yt
Y ft
)
+ α∆y
[
log
(
Yt
Y ft
)
− log
(
Yt−1
Y ft−1
)]
,(3.32)
to include the case of price-level rules in the spirit of Woodford (2003), Gi-
annoni (2014) and Cantore et al. (2012) when ρr = 1.
7 In Section 3.4.4 we
assess also the robustness of our results to a superinertial rule in which ρr > 1
and to an alternative rule that responds only to inflation and deviations of
output from its steady state.
3.4.2 Welfare measure
The optimal monetary policy analysis serves two purposes: (i) determining
the optimal weights the central bank should assign to sectoral inflations sub-
ject to given degrees of labor mobility, and (ii) seeking parameter values for
interest rate rule (3.32) to mimic the first best allocation, i.e. that mini-
mize the welfare loss with respect to the Ramsey policy. The social planner
maximizes the present value of households’ utility,
Υt = Et
[ ∞∑
s=0
eBs β
sU (Xt+s, N t+s)− wr (Rt+s −R)2
]
, (3.33)
subject to the equilibrium conditions of the model. As established by Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2007), while more stylized models allow for a first-order
approximation to the equilibrium conditions to be sufficient to accurately
approximate welfare up to a second order, the presence of numerous fric-
tions requires taking a second-order approximation both of the mean of Υt
and of the model’s equilibrium conditions around the deterministic steady
state. In particular, we take the approximation around the steady state of
the Ramsey equilibrium. Similarly to many other NK models in the literature
7For the remainder of the optimal monetary policy analysis we shut down stochastic
monetary policy innovations, that is why no random term is included in (3.32).
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(see e.g. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2007; Levine et al., 2008, among others),
the steady-state value of the gross inflation rate in the Ramsey equilibrium
turns out to be very close to unity, which implies an almost zero-inflation
steady state.8 Since it is not straightforward to account for the zero-lower-
bound (ZLB, henceforth) on the nominal interest rate when using perturba-
tion methods, we follow Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) and Levine et al.
(2008) and introduce a term in (3.33) that penalizes large deviations of the
nominal interest rate from its steady state. Hence, the imposition of this ap-
proximate ZLB constraint translates into appropriately choosing the weight
wr to achieve an arbitrarily low per-period probability of hitting the ZLB,
Pr (ZLB) ≡ Pr (Rnt < 1), which we set at less than 0.01 for each calibration,
and corresponds to a value of the penalty parameter wr = 80. We optimize
the interest rate rule (3.32) by numerically searching for the combination of
the policy parameters and the weight on durables inflation τ ∈ [0, 1] that
maximizes the present value of households’ utility (3.33). In doing so, the
support of ρr is [0, 1] whereas the support of αpi, αy and α∆y is [0, 5]. Then,
we assess the role of labor mobility by considering three cases: (i) λ = 0.25
represents the case of quasi labor immobility, (ii) λ =∞ the case of perfect
labor mobility and (iii) λ = 1.1769, the imperfect labor mobility estimated
in Section 3.3. Then we compare the welfare losses in terms of steady-state
consumption-equivalent, ω, with respect to the Ramsey policy, as in Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2007). In particular, for a regime associated to a given
Taylor-type interest rate rule A, the welfare loss is implicitly defined as
E0
{ ∞∑
t=0
βt
[
U
(
(1− ω)XRt , NRt
)]}
= E0
{ ∞∑
t=0
βt
[
U
(
XAt , N
A
t
)]}
, (3.34)
8Nistico` (2007) demonstrates that with zero steady state inflation and an undistorted
steady state, the policy trade-offs the central bank faces are the same under the Calvo
and Rotemberg models. In all our simulations, steady state inflation is at the most 0.5%
in annual terms, hence almost zero at quarterly frequency. Moreover, the steady state
is undistorted as we employ pruning methods (see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2007 and
Andreasen et al., 2013). Thus assuming Calvo pricing scheme would yield very similar
results.
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where ω × 100 represents the percent permanent loss in consumption that
should occur in the Ramsey regime (R) in order for agents to be as well off
in regime R as they are in regime A.
3.4.3 Results
3.4.3.1 Impulse responses to an inflation shock: Ramsey policy
We first graphically explore how different degrees of labor mobility alter the
optimal responses to structural shocks. Figure 3.2 shows the responses to
an inflation shock (namely a shock to the price mark-up) under the Ramsey
policy and sticky durables prices. Higher mark-ups in the durables sector
increase inflation and decrease investment and employment in durables for
any degree of labor mobility. However, when labor is prevented from moving
across sectors, output and employment fall also in nondurables. Indeed,
although households would substitute durables with nondurables, firms in
the nondurables sector are not able to hire workers from the durables sector
and increase production. It follows that output in both sectors decreases and
aggregate output is persistently below the steady-state.
Conversely, when labor is mobile, consumption in nondurables increases
since labor can flow from the durables sector. Output in the two sectors dis-
plays a negative comovement and the response of durables is more gradual.
This makes aggregate output increase in the first seven quarters, i.e. when the
positive effect on nondurables output outweighs the fall in durables. Later
on, the stronger decline of durables takes over and aggregate output falls.
Moreover, the optimal response of the nominal interest rate is significantly
different when labor is perfectly mobile: i.e. it accommodates the increase
in inflation, while it is almost constant for lower degrees of labor mobility.9
The intuition is that a fall in the nominal interest rate stimulates consump-
tion in nondurables and, since more workers can flow from the durable to
the nondurable sector, supply will be able to catch up with demand and
avoid a recession, at least in the first seven quarters after the shock. This
9The procyclical behavior of the nominal interest rate will be important in our analysis
as explained in the next section.
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Figure 3.2: Responses to a durables price markup shock: Ramsey policy
suggests that labor mobility has important implications for the transmission
mechanism of structural shocks and optimal monetary policy.
3.4.3.2 Optimized interest-rate rules
Turning to the welfare properties of the interest rate rule (3.32), Table 3.3
reports its optimized parameters together with the associated welfare costs
ω. The top panel displays the optimized parameters in the baseline model
in which all the parameters (except λ and those that are optimally set), are
calibrated at the posterior means reported in Section 3.3.
We first notice that regardless of the degree of labor mobility, the central
bank response to the output gap and output gap growth is absent whereas
a stronger reaction is devoted to inflation, a result in line with the findings
of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) in a one-sector model. Moreover, the in-
terest rate smoothing parameter systematically hits the upper bound of one,
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λ ρr αpi αy α∆y τ 100× ω
Sticky durables prices
0.25 1 0.0633 0.0000 0.0109 0.4831 0.0716
1.1769 1 0.1104 0.0000 0.0191 0.1612 0.0846
∞ 1 0.4611 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5947
Flexible durables prices
0.25 1 0.0404 0.0000 0.0135 0.1581 0.0791
1.1769 1 0.1000 0.0000 0.0187 0.0000 0.0920
∞ 1 0.5055 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9572
Table 3.3: Optimized monetary policy rule: Sticky vs Flexible Durables
Prices
thus characterizing (3.32) as a price-level rule. As discussed by Giannoni
(2014), price-level rules deliver better welfare results than Taylor-type rules
by introducing a sufficient amount of history dependence in an otherwise en-
tirely forward-looking behavior of price setters, thus reducing the volatility
of inflation. It is therefore not surprising that the optimal value of ρr equals
1.10 Moreover, the coefficient attached to inflation (αpi) in the interest-rate
rule is smaller than one for any degree of labor mobility. However, indeter-
minacy is not an issue since, as demonstrated by Giannoni (2014), any price
level rule with positive coefficients yields a determinate equilibrium.11
Along these results, here the novel finding concerns the inverse relation-
ship that arises between the optimal weight placed on durables inflation τ
and sectoral labor mobility. Uniformly, the higher weight in the inflation
composite is assigned to nondurables (τ < 0.5), as this is the sector with the
higher price stickiness. However, an inverse relationship between sectoral la-
bor mobility and the optimal weight placed on durables inflation arises. As
10Similar results hold in other contexts, such as the New-Keynesian model with financial
frictions studied by Melina and Villa (2018).
11Giannoni (2014) further demonstrates that price level rules are somewhat insensitive
to the persistence of the shocks.
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Figure 3.3: Durables price stickiness and optimal weight on durables infla-
tion: flexible vs. sticky wages
labor becomes more mobile (i.e. λ increases) the central bank finds it opti-
mal to place even less weight on durables inflation (i.e. optimal τ decreases).
Indeed, when labor is perfectly mobile (λ = ∞), no weight is assigned at
all. The intuition is that, with more mobile labor, adjustments to shocks
easily occur through quantities (via the reallocation of labor itself) rather
than prices, and the central bank finds it optimal to focus more on the sector
with the higher price stickiness.
The lower panel of Table 3.3 shows that these results hold also when prices
of durables are assumed to be flexible (ϑd = 0). Interestingly, for a sufficiently
limited degree of labor mobility, τ is still nonzero. This result is driven
by nominal wage stickiness. In fact, wage stickiness affects firms’ marginal
costs and their price setting behavior. The pass-through of sticky wages
to the durables sector marginal cost induces the central bank to place some
weight on inflation in this sector despite price flexibility. Figure 3.3 shows the
relationship between the optimal τ and durables price stickiness, ϑd, under
sticky and flexible wages.12 We notice that τ is a strictly increasing function
of ϑd when wages are sticky. Even when durables prices are very flexible
(ϑd approaches zero), the optimal weight on durables inflation is positive.13
12Labor mobility is limited at the estimated value of λ = 1.1769.
13As sectoral labor mobility decreases, this result is exacerbated. Indeed, the lower panel
of Table 3.3 shows that with low mobility and fully flexible durables prices the optimal
weight on durables inflation is substantially positive.
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Figure 3.4: Responses to a durables price markup shock: optimized interest
rate rule
Conversely, with flexible wages a sufficiently high degree of durables price
stickiness is needed for the central bank to place a positive weight on durables
inflation.
Comparing the welfare losses with respect to the Ramsey policy (Table
3.3), we notice that when labor becomes perfectly mobile, the welfare loss
is higher than in the cases of limited labor mobility. This is due to the
procyclical optimal behavior of the nominal interest rate under the Ramsey
policy and perfect labor mobility, which by construction cannot be replicated
by the simple interest rate rules.14 Indeed, Figure 3.4 shows the impulse
responses to a durables inflation shock under the optimized interest-rate rule
14Figure 3.2 is an example of the optimal procyclicality of the nominal interest rate.
Under perfect labor mobility, the social planner decreases the nominal interest rate despite
the increase in inflation. Such behavior holds under the other structural shocks of the
model and impulse responses are available upon request.
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λ ∆Π ∆W ∆Y
0.25 1.9089 6.4104 1.6591
1.1769 1.9611 4.7002 4.3077
∞ 6.6898 1 22.2308
Table 3.4: Relative standard deviations of inflation, wages and output
(3.32). By comparing them with those under the Ramsey policy (Figure 3.2)
it is noticeable that, in the free mobility case, the responses of the nominal
interest rate are dramatically different, thus yielding large welfare losses. In
addition, with limited labor mobility, the response of the nominal interest
rate under the Ramsey policy is almost constant, whereas it is positive under
the optimized simple rule in order to bring inflation back to the target.
Implied relative volatilities in these exercises confirm existing findings in
the literature and add further insights. In particular, Table 3.4 reports the
standard deviation of durables inflation, wages and output relative to non-
durables in the baseline model and under different degrees of labor mobility.
In all cases the volatility of sectoral prices, wages and output in the durables
sector is larger than in nondurables, which extends the results that Erceg and
Levin (2006) obtain in a model with no sectoral labor mobility to a model
with limited or perfect mobility. Obviously, under perfect labor mobility
wages are the same in the two sectors, hence there is no difference in their
volatility. In contrast, under limited labor mobility, the standard deviation
of wages in durables is always larger than nondurables (about 4.7 times un-
der the estimated degree of labor mobility) with this difference increasing
as labor mobility decreases and adjustments to shocks occur predominantly
through wages rather than the reallocation of labor. Conversely, the relative
volatilities of prices and output in the two sectors are increasing functions of
the degree of labor mobility (variables in the durables sector become much
more volatile than in nondurables).
All in all, our results reveal that the degree at which workers are able to
reallocate across sectors is crucial for the optimal design of monetary policy,
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and an inverse relationship exists between sectoral labor mobility and the
importance of the sector which displays relatively more flexible prices. Wage
stickiness, via its substantial pass-through onto marginal costs, leads to a
non-zero optimal weight on durables inflation even if durables prices were
fully flexible.
3.4.4 Robustness to alternative calibrations and inter-
est rate rules
In this section we perform two types of robustness checks. We first look at
the implications of two alternative calibrations of price and wage stickiness.
Then, we replace the monetary policy rule (3.32) with two alternative rules
and compare the results with the baseline model.
The top panel of Table 3.5 shows the case of flexible wages (ϑW = 0)
whereas in the lower panel both durables prices and wages are flexible (ϑd =
ϑW = 0). As shown in Figure 3.3, at the estimated limited degree of labor
mobility the optimal weight on durables inflation drops as wages become
flexible (τ falls from 0.1612 to 0.0214) and becomes zero as both frictions are
removed. The main conclusions drawn in the previous section are carried over
these two alternative calibrations: i) τ and λ are negatively related hence a
lower weight is assigned to durables inflation as labor becomes mobile; ii) the
central bank finds it optimal to implement a price-level rule (ρr = 1).
As the optimal degree of interest rate inertia systematically hits the upper
bound, it is natural to ask what would happen should we allow ρr to be
larger than 1. Interest rate rules as equation (3.32) with ρr > 1 are usually
referred to as superinertial rules and have the desirable feature of adding
further history dependence in policy as explained by Giannoni and Woodford
(2003) and Giannoni (2014). The top panel of table 3.6 reports the optimized
parameters of the baseline model when rule (3.32) can be superinertial, with
ρr ∈ [0, 5]. It is noteworthy that for any degree of labor mobility: i) the
central bank optimally chooses a superinertial rule, with ρr hitting the upper
bound as labor becomes more mobile; ii) the welfare losses with respect to the
Ramsey policy are smaller with respect to the price-level rules; iii) crucially,
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λ ρr αpi αy α∆y τ 100× ω
Flexible wages
0.25 1 0.1570 0.0000 0.0000 0.1765 0.0274
1.1769 1 0.2254 0.0000 0.0000 0.0214 0.0095
∞ 1 0.4829 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0593
Flexible durables prices and wages
0.25 1 0.1298 0.0000 0.0000 0.0216 0.0286
1.1769 1 0.2426 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0101
∞ 1 0.4962 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1104
Table 3.5: Optimized monetary policy rules: robustness to alternative cali-
brations
the negative relationship between labor mobility and the optimal weight on
durables inflation survives. We then replace rule (3.32) with an interest rate
rule that responds only to inflation and the deviation of output from its
steady state. Following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) this type of interest
rate rule is typically labeled implementable rule and, after the appropriate
reparametrization, reads as follows:
log
(
Rt
R¯
)
= ρr log
(
Rt−1
R¯
)
+ αpi log
(
Π˜t
Π˜
)
+ αy log
(
Yt
Y¯
)
. (3.35)
The lower panel of Table 3.6 demonstrates that despite these modifications,
the choice towards a price-level rule and the inverse relationship between
labor mobility and the optimal weight on durables inflation still hold true.
In addition, the implied welfare losses are similar to the baseline model.
3.5 Conclusion
As the New-Keynesian literature on two-sector models has demonstrated,
setting the appropriate weights to sectoral inflations is a crucial task for a
central bank in order to achieve its objectives. We look at this issue from
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λ ρr αpi αy α∆y τ 100× ω
Superinertial rule
0.25 1.2987 0.0313 0.0022 0.0166 0.3405 0.0491
1.1769 5 1.5372 0.0150 0.9426 0.0700 0.0196
∞ 5 4.1027 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4024
Implementable rule
0.25 1 0.0595 0.0000 \ 0.5590 0.0727
1.1769 1 0.1177 0.0000 \ 0.2248 0.0857
∞ 1 0.4618 0.0000 \ 0.0000 0.5945
Table 3.6: Robustness to alternative optimized monetary policy rule
an angle the literature has so far overlooked. In particular, we study the re-
lation between the degree of sectoral labor mobility and the optimal weight
the central bank should assign to inflation in the sector with relatively more
flexible prices (durables). We first estimate the model with Bayesian meth-
ods and find evidence of a limited sectoral labor mobility. Then, we exploit
the estimated model to perform optimal monetary policy analysis. Under the
Ramsey policy, the optimal responses to structural shocks are significantly
altered by different degrees of sectoral labor mobility. Preventing labor from
moving freely between sectors dramatically changes the optimal path of the
policy rate, thus leading to different effects on sectoral and aggregate vari-
ables, as well as on welfare. We then let the central bank optimize the pa-
rameters of a simple monetary policy rule along with the weight on inflation
in the durables sector for different degrees of labor mobility. Our main result
is that conditional on the intensity of price stickiness in the durables sector,
an inverse relationship between labor mobility and the optimal weight on the
sector with relatively more flexible prices arises: a lower weight is assigned
to durables inflation as the degree of labor mobility increases. Intuitively,
with more mobile labor, adjustments to shocks easily occur through quan-
tities (via the reallocation of labor itself) rather than prices, and the the
central bank finds it optimal to focus more on the sector with the higher
price stickiness. Wage stickiness also plays an important role on the optimal
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weight of durables inflation. Via the pass-through on marginal costs it al-
ways implies a higher weight on durables inflation with respect to the case of
flexible wages. In the design of optimal monetary policy, we also find that the
central bank chooses to implement a price-level rule by introducing desirable
history dependence in the model to reduce the volatility of prices, thus con-
firming results the literature has found in one-sector models. These results
are confirmed by various robustness checks and point to a non-negligible role
of sectoral labor mobility for the conduct of monetary policy.
Appendix
3.6 Data
We define the durables sector as the a composite of durable goods and res-
idential investments whereas the nondurables sector comprises nondurables
goods and services.
Series Definition Source Mnemonic
DURN Nominal Durable Goods BEA Table 2.3.5 Line 3
RIN Nominal Residential Investment BEA Table 1.1.5 Line 13
NDN Nominal Nondurable Goods BEA Table 2.3.5 Line 8
SN Nominal Services BEA Table 2.3.5 Line 13
PDUR Price Deflator, Durable Goods BEA Table 1.1.9 Line 4
PRI Price Deflator, Residential Investment BEA Table 1.1.9 Line 13
PND Price Deflator, Nondurable Goods BEA Table 1.1.9 Line 5
PS Price Deflator, Services BEA Table 1.1.9 Line 6
Y N Nominal GDP BEA Table 1.1.5 Line 1
PY Price Deflator, GDP BEA Table 1.1.9 Line 1
FFR Effective Federal Funds Rate FRED FEDFUNDS
N Nonfarm Business Sector: Average Weekly Hours FRED PRS85006023
W Nonfarm Business Sector: Compensation Per Hour FRED COMPNFB
POP Civilian Non-institutional Population, over 16 FRED CNP16OV
CE Civilian Employment, 16 over FRED CE16OV
Table 3.7: Data Sources
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3.6.1 Durables and Residential Investments
1. Sum nominal series: DURN +RIN = DRN
2. Calculate sectoral weights of deflators: ωD = DUR
N
DRN
; ωRI = RI
N
DRN
3. Calculate Deflator: PD = ω
DPDUR + ω
RIPRI
4. Calculate Real Durable Consumption: D = DUR
N+RIN
PD
3.6.2 Nondurables and Services
1. Sum nominal series: NDN + SN = NSN
2. Calculate sectoral weights of deflators: ωND = ND
N
NSN
; ωS = S
N
NSN
3. Calculate Deflator: PC = ω
NDPND + ω
SPS
4. Calculate Real Nondurable Consumption: C = ND
N+SN
PC
3.6.3 Data transformation for Bayesian estimation
Variable Description Construction
POPindex Population index POPPOP2009:1
CEindex Employment index CECE2009:1
Y o Real per capita GDP ln
 YNPYPOPindex
 100
IoD Real per capita consumption: durables ln
(
D
POPindex
)
100
Co Real per capita consumption: nondurables ln
(
C
POPindex
)
100
W o Real wage ln
(
W
PY
)
100
N o Hours worked per capita ln
(
H×CEindex
POPindex
)
100
ΠoC Inflation: nondurables sector ∆ (lnPC) 100
ΠoD Inflation: durables sector ∆ (lnPD) 100
Ro Quarterly Federal Funds Rate FFR
4
Table 3.8: Data transformation - Observables
113
3.7 Symmetric equilibrium
Xt = Z
1−α
t D
α
t (3.36)
Zt = Ct − ζSt−1 (3.37)
St = ρcSt−1 + (1− ρc)Ct (3.38)
U (Xt, Nt) = log (Xt)− νN
1+ϕ
t
1 + ϕ
(3.39)
UZ,t =
(1− α)
Zt
(3.40)
UD,t =
α
Dt
(3.41)
UN,t = −νNϕt (3.42)
Nt =
[(
χC
)− 1
λ
(
NCt
) 1+λ
λ +
(
1− χC)− 1λ (NDt ) 1+λλ ] λ1+λ (3.43)
NCt = χ
C
(
wCt
wt
)λ
Nt (3.44)
NDt = χ
D
(
wDt
wt
)λ
Nt (3.45)
Λt,t+1 ≡ βUZ,t+1
UZ,t
eBt+1
eBt
(3.46)
eWt η
µ˜t
=
[
eWt η − 1
]
+ ϑW
(
ΠWt − ΠC
)
ΠWt +
+ Et
[
Λt,t+1ϑ
W
(
ΠWt+1 − ΠC
)
ΠWt+1
wt+1Nt+1
wtNt
]
(3.47)
µ˜t = −UZ,t
UN,t
wt (3.48)
Qtψt =
UD,t
UZ,t
+ (1− δ)Et [Λt,t+1Qt+1ψt+1] (3.49)
1 = Et
{
Λt,t+1ψt+1
Qt+1
Qt
eIt+1
[
S
′
(
IDt+1
IDt
)(
IDt+1
IDt
)2]}
+
+ ψte
I
t
[
1− S
(
IDt
IDt−1
)
− S ′
(
IDt
IDt−1
)
IDt
IDt−1
]
(3.50)
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S(
IDt
IDt−1
)
=
φ
2
(
IDt
IDt−1
− 1
)2
(3.51)
S
′
(
IDt
IDt−1
)
= φ
(
IDt
IDt−1
− 1
)
(3.52)
1 = Et
[
Λt,t+1
Rt
ΠCt+1
]
(3.53)
ΠDt = Π
C
t
Qt
Qt−1
(3.54)
ΠWt =
wt
wt−1
Π˜t (3.55)
Y Ct = e
A
t N
C
t (3.56)
Y Dt = e
A
t N
D
t (3.57)
eCt cMC
C
t =
(
eCt c − 1
)
+ ϑc
(
ΠCt − ΠC
)
ΠCt −
− ϑcEt
[
Λt,t+1
Y Ct+1
Y Ct
(
ΠCt+1 − ΠC
)
ΠCt+1
]
(3.58)
MCCt =
wt
eAt
(3.59)
eDt dMC
D
t =
(
eDt d − 1
)
+ ϑd
(
ΠDt − ΠD
)
ΠDt −
− ϑdEt
[
Λt,t+1
Qt+1
Qt
Y Dt+1
Y Dt
(
ΠDt+1 − ΠD
)
ΠDt+1
]
(3.60)
MCDt =
wt
eAt Qt
(3.61)
Π˜t =
(
ΠCt
)1−τ (
ΠDt
)τ
(3.62)
log
(
Rt
R¯
)
= ρr log
(
Rt−1
R¯
)
+ αpi log
(
Π˜t
Π˜
)
+ αy log
(
Yt
Y ft
)
+
+ α∆y
[
log
(
Yt
Y ft
)
− log
(
Yt−1
Y ft−1
)]
, (3.63)
Y Ct = Ct + e
G
t +
ϑc
2
(
ΠCt − ΠC
)2
Y Ct (3.64)
Y Dt = I
D
t +
ϑd
2
(
ΠDt − ΠD
)2
Y Dt (3.65)
Yt = Y
C
t +QtY
D
t +
ϑW
2
(
ΠWt − ΠC
)2
wtNt (3.66)
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3.8 Steady state
In the deterministic steady state all expectation operators are removed and
for each variable it holds that xt = xt+1 = x. Moreover, the stochastic shocks
are absent. The steady-state inflation rate in the nondurables sector is the
optimal under the Ramsey policy and is denoted by ΠCopt . C solves equation
(3.64) whereas all other variables can be found recursively from the following
relationships:
ΠD = ΠCopt (3.67)
Π˜ = ΠCopt (3.68)
ΠW = ΠCopt (3.69)
Λ = β (3.70)
R =
1
β
(3.71)
MCCt =
c − 1
c
(3.72)
wC = MCCeA (3.73)
wD = wC (3.74)
w = wD (3.75)
MCDt =
d − 1
d
(3.76)
Q =
wD
MCDeA
(3.77)
S = 0 (3.78)
S
′
= 0 (3.79)
ψ = 1 (3.80)
µ˜ =
η
η − 1 (3.81)
S = C (3.82)
Z = (1− ζ)C (3.83)
UZ =
(1− α)
Z
(3.84)
UD = UzQψ [1− (1− δ) β] (3.85)
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D =
α
UD
(3.86)
UN = −UZ
µ˜
w (3.87)
N = −
(
UN
ν
) 1
ϕ
(3.88)
Y D = δD (3.89)
ND = Y D (3.90)
NC = N −ND (3.91)
χC =
NC
N
(3.92)
eG = gyY (3.93)
Y C = NC (3.94)
X = Z1−αDα (3.95)
3.8.1 Alternative calibration of steady state hours
Throughout the paper, and following the relevant literature, we have defined
U (Xt, N t) = log (Xt)− νN
1+ϕ
t
1+ϕ
such that hours worked enter the utility func-
tion in a separable fashion. We then normalized steady state hours to 1/3
and found the value of the scale parameter ν consistent with this normaliza-
tion. However, defining hours as Nt rather than the complement to one of
leisure (i.e. 1−Lt) implies that hours are dimensionless so targeting a steady
state value of 1/3 is arbitrary and the parameter ν has merely the effect of
scaling the steady state values of the other variables. Moreover, ν does not
have any effect in the log-linearized model hence the dynamic properties of
the model are not affected by either targeting steady state hours to be 1/3
or by calibrating ν = 1 and calculating the resulting steady state value of
hours. Indeed, consider the labor supply of the patient households (the same
applies to impatients):
νNϕt = Uz,twt. (3.96)
Log-linearizing it around the steady-state yields:
Nˆt =
1
ϕ
(
Uˆz,t + wˆt
)
, (3.97)
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where vairables withˆare expressed in log-deviations from the steady-state.
It is clear that the log-deviations of hours from steady state do not depend
on the constant ν whose value does have any effect on the dynamics of hours.
3.9 Estimation diagnostics
In this section we report some estimation diagnostics to verify that the model
is correctly estimated. Figure 3.5 plots the prior and posterior distributions
of all the estimated parameters. Overall, the posterior distributions are quite
apart from the prior thus implying that the data is informative to identify the
parameters. Then, we verify that the two parallel chains of the Monte-Carlo-
Markov-Chain Metropolis-Hastings (MCMC-MH) algorithm have actually
converged. Figure 3.6 plots the multivariate convergence diagnostic for the
Brooks and Gelman (1998) diagnostics (upper panel) and for the second and
third central moments (middle and lower panels, respectively). The fact that
the red and blue lines are very close to each other implies that the two chains
have almost certainly converged. To sum up, estimation diagnostics reveal
that the model is correctly estimated.
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Figure 3.5: Prior and posterior distributions of estimated parameters. Prior:
black-dashed line; Posterior: blue-solid line.
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Figure 3.6: Prior and posterior distributions of estimated parameters. Prior:
black-dashed line; Posterior: blue-solid line.
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Chapter 4
Shocks and Policy Stance in
the Euro Area
4.1 Introduction
Since its establishment in 1999, the Euro Area (EA) experienced two large
crises. Like the US and all major economies in the world, the region was hit
first by the 2008-2009 financial crisis but, differently from the US, it soon
afterwards experienced a sovereign debt crisis that challenged the solvency of
some of its member countries. Both crises required bold policy responses and
triggered a lively debate both in policymaking and academia on the design
and effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policies in the eurozone.
On the monetary policy side, following the financial crisis, the European
Central Bank (ECB) reacted by lowering the nominal interest rate to provide
stimulus and fight the recession. In contrast, many fiscal policymakers faced
a trade-off between providing fiscal stimulus and dealing with the public
debt overhang that manifested itself in the years 2009-2011, starting with
the Greek crisis and then spreading to the rest of the EA, in particular to
Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal.
The situation became even more challenging in 2012 when the ECB’s
policy rate reached its effective zero-lower-bound (ZLB), leaving the conven-
tional monetary policy without firepower to stimulate the economy and fight
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deflation. Thus, the ECB started to implement a series of unconventional
monetary policy measures, often labeled as Quantitative Easing (QE), that
became part of the so-called Asset Purchase Programme (APP). The APP
expanded the ECB’s balance sheet, via the purchase of both public and pri-
vate securities the former of which fell under the Public Sector Purchase
Programme (PSPP). This represented the largest portion of the program.1
In the meantime, in response to the sovereign debt crisis, several countries
engaged in austerity measures aimed at keeping public debt under control
and restoring confidence in financial markets.
This picture suggests that in addition to the usual macroeconomic and
financial shocks, contrasting types of policy shocks–expansionary and con-
tractionary–hit the eurozone in its recent past. Disentangling exogenous
shocks, notably credit and demand shocks, from policy shocks due to fiscal
and monetary actions is thus key to understand recent cyclical developments
in the area, and can shed light on the appropriateness of the current pol-
icy stance in the area relative to the state of the credit cycle and economic
confidence.
To this end, this paper attempts to shed light precisely on which shocks
are the main drivers of the EA business cycle since its establishment, and
what role fiscal and monetary policies have had in shaping economic out-
comes. The paper also seeks to measure the current level of policy stance,
and discuss its role in supporting the strength of the euro area and global
recovery, and in helping recover stronger inflation dynamics in line with the
area’s definition of mid-term price stability.
Our analytical tool is an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium (DSGE) model of the EA augmented with specific features crucial for
the analysis. First, we account for households’ limited asset market par-
ticipation, as in related studies on the EA (see, Forni et al., 2009 , Ratto
et al., 2009, Coenen et al. 2012; 2013 and Albonico et al., 2016, among
others). This feature is key to introduce New-Keynesian effects of fiscal poli-
1ECB’s holdings of public securities account, on average, for 76%
of the total asset holdings under the APP since March 2015 (source:
ECB’s History of cumulative purchase breakdowns under the APP, see
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/index.en.html).
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cies, which would otherwise be absent, as explained by Mankiw (2000) and
Gal´ı et al. (2007). Second, we introduce a financial sector in which financial
intermediaries (FIs, henceforth) purchase long-term private and government
bonds, as in Carlstrom et al. (2017). This modeling block is important for
two reasons. On one hand, FIs provide funds for private investment financed
by collecting short-term deposits and accumulating net worth. This ma-
turity transformation performed by FIs introduces a transmission channel
for credit shocks, which had a prominent role during the Global Financial
Crisis (GFC). On the other hand, the fact that FIs hold long-term govern-
ment debt implies that QE, by impacting the banks’ balance sheets, has real
effect on the economy. FIs have been introduced in DSGE models of the
EA also by Gerali et al. (2010) and Kollmann et al. (2013). These papers,
however, do not allow FIs to hold government debt, hence they do not take
this important transmission channel of unconventional monetary policy into
account.2 Third, we specify a detailed government sector whereby govern-
ment debt is long-term and, as already anticipated, can also be purchased by
the central bank. The fiscal authority levies distortionary taxes to finance
expenditures and stabilize government debt, via fiscal rules that allow also
for automatic stabilizers. Fourth, the central bank conducts both conven-
tional and unconventional monetary policy by setting the short-term interest
rate and purchasing long-term government debt, respectively, in the spirit of
Chen et al. (2012) and Gertler and Karadi (2013), among others.3
Our estimates suggest that preference and price markup shocks have been
important drivers of the EA business cycle. Interestingly, in accordance
with the findings of Gerali et al. (2010) and Kollmann et al. (2013), we find
evidence for a substantial contribution of expansionary credit shocks to the
cyclical component of EA’s output before the financial crisis, followed by a
large negative contribution after its outburst.4
2Gerali et al. (2010) highlight the role of credit supply factors in the build-up of the
financial crisis whereas Kollmann et al. (2013) conclude that government support for banks
dampened the effects of the financial crisis on the EA economy.
3The same modeling of QE has been employed by Carlstrom et al. (2017) and Hohberger
et al. (2017).
4Kollmann et al. (2016) also make the same argument in a model without financial
intermediaries, where the financial shock is proxied by a shock to the discount factor
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As far as monetary and fiscal policies are concerned, we focus on the their
historical joint and individual contributions on EA output. In general, we
refer to policies as contractionary (expansionary) whenever their contribution
to output is negative (positive). Moreover, we label policies as countercyclical
(procyclical) whenever their contribution has the opposite (same) sign as the
output deviation from trend.
Our main findings regarding the role of monetary and fiscal shocks are
as follows. First, we find that fiscal policy has generally played a counter-
cyclical role during the sample of estimation. One exception is represented
by the last part of our sample, when monetary policy was constrained by the
ZLB, in which we estimate that discretionary fiscal shocks had a negative
contribution to output fluctuations despite output being below trend. Here,
the austerity measures implemented in the EA to fight the sovereign debt
crisis are estimated to have caused the negative contribution of fiscal policy
on output. Second, we estimate a larger contribution of monetary policy
in the overall discretionary policy stance. This was expansionary until the
ZLB started binding in 2012, while it was contractionary afterwards. Third,
with the interest rate stuck at the ZLB and a tight fiscal policy, the imple-
mentation of QE since 2015 has helped stabilize EA GDP although it has
not been countercyclical enough to undo the procyclical impact of EA fiscal
policy over that period. Taken together, these results lead to the conclusion
that a more expansionary fiscal policy in countries with fiscal space could
have facilitated the recovery of the EA from the financial and sovereign debt
crises.
Recent studies have assessed the role of fiscal policy on the EA. Forni
et al. (2009) make the argument that tax cuts are more expansionary than
expenditure increases. Along these lines, Coenen et al. (2013) conclude that
the fiscal stimulus package implemented in the EA, known as the European
Economic Recovery Plan, generated a fiscal multiplier smaller than one since
it comprised both revenues and expenditure measures. Moreover, while Ratto
of intermediate firms which affects their investment decisions. However, by specifying a
financial sector, as we do, it is possible to disentangle the role of investment-specific shocks
from that of credit shocks.
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et al. (2009) find a general countercyclical role of fiscal policy before the
financial crisis, Kollmann et al. (2016) argue that austerity measures weighed
on the EA recovery until the end of 2014, whereas Albonico et al. (2016) find
evidence of muted fiscal policy.
Our results add to this literature along two dimensions. First, we as-
sess the joint contribution of both fiscal and monetary policies to determine
the overall fiscal policy stance of the EA. Second, we bring unconventional
monetary policy into the picture.5
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes
the DSGE model. Section 4.3 presents the Bayesian estimation and the
results while Section 4.4 concludes. The Appendix provides details about
the dataset, the theoretical model, and complementary results.
4.2 Model
The core of the model is a quite standard New-Keynesian setting with the
usual nominal and real frictions, as in Smets and Wouters (2007). These are
price and wage stickiness, investment adjustment costs (IAC, henceforth)
and habit formation in consumption. The model is further augmented with
(i) two types of households–optimizers (or Ricardian) and rule-of-thumbers
(or non-ricardian)–as in Gal´ı et al. (2007); (ii) financial intermediaries ac-
cumulating net worth and short-term liabilities to finance the purchase of
long-term private investment and government bonds as in Carlstrom et al.
(2017); (iii) a central bank conducting quantitative easing beside a conven-
tional interest rate policy; (iv) a detailed fiscal policy whereby the govern-
ment purchases goods and services, provides transfers and finances the bud-
get with a mixture of debt of different maturities and distortionary taxes.
This section outlines the details of the model. The full set of equilibrium
conditions and the deterministic steady state are reported in appendices 4.6
and 4.7, respectively.
5Hohberger et al. (2017) instead focus only on the effects of QE on the EA GDP growth
neglecting any role for fiscal policies.
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4.2.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum i ∈ [0, 1] of households, a fraction
ω of which is optimizer (o), while the remaining fraction 1 − ω is rule-of-
thumb (r). Optimizing households have access to financial markets hence
they smooth consumption via the purchase of short-term deposits whereas
rule-of-thumb households do not have access to saving or borrowing, hence
each period they consume their entire disposable income. As common in the
literature, preferences are assumed to be identical across the two types of
households.
4.2.1.1 Optimizing households
Optimizing households derive utility from consumption, Cot and disutility
from providing labor services, Hot , in a monopolistically competitive labor
market. The intertemporal utility function is given by
Et
{ ∞∑
s=0
ebtβ
t+s
[
ln
(
Cot+s − hCot+s−1
)− B
1 + η
(
Hot+s
)1+η]}
, (4.1)
where Et is the expectation operator at time t, e
b
t is a preference shock to
the discount factor β ∈ (0, 1), h ∈ (0, 1) is the internal habit formation
parameter, B > 0 is the disutility weight of labor, η > 0 is the inverse of
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of the labor supply. Optimizing
households have access to two assets: short-term deposits (Dot ) in financial
intermediaries (FIs henceforth) and physical capital (Kot ). They may also
hold short-term government bonds (T-bills) and short-term debt issued by
the central bank to finance its QE programme, but since these are perfect
substitute with deposits and move endogenously to hit the central bank’s
short term interest rate target, Dot can be treated as the households’ net
resource flow into FIs. The need for financial intermediation arises because all
the investment, Iot , needs to be financed by issuing long-term bonds purchased
by FIs.6 As in Carlstrom et al. (2017), these are assumed to be perpetual
6This assumption is needed to make FIs relevant in the model.
126
bonds with cash flows 1, κ, κ2, ... (see, e.g. Woodford, 2001). In other
words, if Qt is the time-t price of a new issue, κQt is the time-t price of the
perpetuity issued in period t− 1 and so on. The duration of these bonds is
defined by (1− κ)−1 and their gross yield to maturity by Q−1 +κ. Define CIt
as the number of perpetuities issued at time t to finance investment, then
the representative household’s overall nominal liability is:
F ot = CIt + κCIt−1 + κ
2CIt−2 + ..., (4.2)
with the time-t new issue of perpetuities defined as
CIt = F
o
t − κF ot−1. (4.3)
In maximizing life-time utility (4.1), optimizing households face three con-
straints:
(1 + τ ct )C
o
t +
Dot
Pt
+ P kt I
o
t +
F ot−1
Pt
≤ (1− τwt )WtHot +
Rt−1Dot−1
Pt
+
(
1− τ kt
)
RktK
o
t + δP
k
t τ
k
t K
o
t +
Qt
(
F ot − κF ot−1
)
Pt
+ τ lt − Φt + Pt, (4.4)
Kot+1 ≤ (1− δ)Kot + Iot , (4.5)
P kt I
o
t ≤
Qt
(
F ot − κF ot−1
)
Pt
=
QtCIt
Pt
. (4.6)
The consumption good is the numeraire of the economy hence Pt is the price
level. P kt is the real price of capital while R
k
t is its real rental rate; Rt−1 is
the gross nominal interest rate on deposits; Wt is the real wage; δ ∈ (0, 1)
is the capital depreciation rate; τ ct , τ
w
t and τ
k
t are distortionary tax rates on
consumption, labor income and the return on capital, respectively; δP kt τ
k
t K
o
t
is a depreciation allowance for tax purposes; τ lt is a lump-sum transfers; Φt
is a labor union membership fee; and Pt are profits from all financial and
non-financial firms. Equation (4.4) is the households’ budget constraint,
equation (4.5) represents the capital accumulation equation, while equation
(4.6) is a “loan-in-advance” constraint, which increases the cost of purchasing
investment goods, i.e. all investment projects must be financed by issuing
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perpetuities purchased by FIs, therefore the total expenditure on investment
cannot exceed the total value of perpetuities.
Assuming that constraints hold with equality, substituting for (4.5) into
(4.4) and (4.6), and taking first-order conditions with respect to Cot , D
o
t , K
o
t+1
and F ot yields:
(1 + τ ct ) Λ
o
t =
ebt
Cot − hCot−1
− hβEt
[
ebt+1
Cot+1 − hCot
]
, (4.7)
Λot = βEt
[
Λot+1
Rt
Πt+1
]
, (4.8)
ΛotP
k
t Mt = βEt
{
Λot+1
[(
1− τ kt+1
)
Rkt+1 +
+ δP kt+1τ
k
t+1 + (1− δ)P kt+1Mt+1
]}
, (4.9)
ΛotQtMt = βEt
[
Λot+1
1 + κQt+1Mt+1
Πt+1
]
, (4.10)
where Λot is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget constraint (4.4),
Πt+1 ≡ Pt+1Pt is the gross inflation rate, and Mt ≡ 1 + ϑtΛot is a dynamic dis-
tortion caused by market segmentation, where ϑt is in turn the multiplier
associated to the loan-in-advance constraint (4.6). As shown by Carlstrom
et al. (2017), the distortion Mt arises because of financial market segmen-
tation (to be explained in further detail below) and is approximated by the
discounted sum of the spread between the one-period loan and the deposit
rates. Equation (4.7) is the marginal utility of consumption which, together
with equation (4.8), determines the usual Euler equation of consumption.
Equations (4.9) and (4.10) are asset price equations for capital and invest-
ment bonds, respectively.
4.2.1.2 Rule-of-thumb households
Rule-of-thumb households have the same instantaneous utility function as
that of intertemporal optimizing consumers:
Et
{ ∞∑
s=0
ebtβ
t+s
[
ln
(
Crt+s − hCrt+s−1
)− B
1 + η
(
Hrt+s
)1+η]}
. (4.11)
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They do not have access to financial markets hence they cannot smooth
consumption by saving and borrowing. It follows that their consumption is
entirely determined by their budget constraint:
(1 + τ ct )C
r
t = (1− τwt )WtHrt + τ lt − Φt, (4.12)
while their marginal utility of consumption, useful to derive the wage-setting
equation in Section 4.2.1.3 is:
(1 + τ ct ) Λ
r
t =
ebt
Crt − hCrt−1
− hβEt
[
ebt+1
Crt+1 − hCrt
]
. (4.13)
The presence of rule-of-thumb households helps capturing Keynesian effects
of fiscal policy as the economy is thus populated also by agents for which
the Ricardian equivalence does not hold. Intuitively, the Keynesian effect of
fiscal policy is larger the larger the share of rule-of-thumbers in the economy,
i.e. the larger 1− ω.
4.2.1.3 Wage setting
Each type of household provides labor to a continuum of labor unions z ∈
[0, 1]. Each union sets the wage rate for its members and aggregates labor
services according to a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator such that labor demanded by
firms from each union is Hzt =
(
W zt
Wt
)−ewt εw
Ht, where ε
w is the intratemporal
elasticity of substitution between labor services and ewt is a wage markup
shock. As in Colciago (2011) and Furlanetto and Seneca (2012), among
others, each period the union z chooses the wage rate W zt to maximize a
weighted average utility of its members:
max
W zt
Et
∞∑
k=0
βt+k
[
ωU ot+k + (1− ω)U rt+k
]
, (4.14)
subject to the labor demand functions and the households’ budget constraints
(4.4) and (4.12). Each union is subject to quadratic adjustment costs of wages
as in Rotemberg (1982), which are ultimately paid by its members through
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a membership fee,
Φt =
θw
2
[
W zt
Πιwt−1W
z
t−1
Πt − Π1−ιw
]2
WtHt, (4.15)
where θw governs the degree of nominal wages stickiness while ιw ∈ [0, 1] de-
notes the degree of wage indexation to past inflation.7 Firms do not discrim-
inate between optimizing and rule-of-thumb households, hence labor supply
is identical across households, that is Hot = H
r
t = Ht.
8 The wage schedule
thus reads as
0 =
{
(1− τwt ) (1− ewt εw)− θw
[
Πwt
Πιwt−1
− Π1−ιw
]
Πwt
Πιwt−1
}
+
B (Ht)
η
Λ¯tWt
ewt ε
w
+ βEt
{
Λ¯t+1
Λ¯t
θw
[
Πwt+1
Πιwt
− Π1−ιw
]
Πwt+1Wt+1Ht+1
Πιwt WtHt
}
, (4.16)
where Πwt =
Wt
Wt−1
Πt denotes the nominal wage inflation, Λ¯t = ωΛ
o
t +
(1− ω) Λrt represents a weighted average of the marginal utilities of con-
sumption across types of households, and the term B(Ht)
η
Λ¯tWt
is the (inverse of
the) wage markup, that is the marginal rate of substitution between con-
sumption and leisure divided by the nominal wage.9 Setting θw = 0 implies
that nominal wages are flexible and set as a constant markup of the marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and leisure.
4.2.1.4 Aggregation
Aggregate consumption is given by a weighted average of consumption of
each type of consumers. Rule-of-thumb consumers do not hold any assets
or liabilities, therefore aggregate deposits, liabilities, investment and capital
7Steady-state inflation Π is raised to the power 1− ιw to ensure that wage adjustment
costs are zero in steady-state. A similar specification applies to price adjustment costs,
see Section 4.2.3.
8This is a standard assumption in models with rule-of-thumbers and nominal wage
stickiness, see e.g. Colciago (2011), Furlanetto and Seneca (2012), Coenen et al. (2012)
and Albonico et al. (2017), among many others.
9The detailed derivation of the wage setting equation is in Appendix 4.8.
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reflect this feature:
Ct = ωC
o
t + (1− ω)Crt , (4.17)
Dt = ωD
o
t , (4.18)
Ft = ωF
o
t , (4.19)
It = ωI
o
t , (4.20)
Kt = ωK
o
t . (4.21)
4.2.2 Financial intermediaries
Financial intermediaries are modeled as in Carlstrom et al. (2017). They
are the sole buyers of investment bonds Ft and long-term government bonds
BFIt , which are perfect substitutes, and hence are sold at the same price of a
time-t issue Qt.
10 The FI’s portfolio is financed by collecting deposits Dt from
optimizing households and by accumulating net worth Nt. Let F¯t =
Ft
Pt
Qt and
B¯FIt =
BFIt
Pt
Qt denote the real values of investment and long-term government
bonds, respectively. Then, the FI’s balance sheet reads as:
B¯FIt + F¯t =
Dt
Pt
+Nt = LtNt, (4.22)
where Lt is leverage which is assumed to be taken as given by FIs while
long-term investment and government bonds constitute the asset side of the
FI’s balance sheet (4.22). Each period, FIs raise profits determined by the
spread between the lending and borrowing rates. In particular, let proft ≡(
B¯FIt + F¯t
)
RLt − DtPtRt−1, then use (4.22) to define profits as:
proft ≡
[(
RLt −Rt−1
)
Lt−1 +Rt−1
] Nt−1
Πt
, (4.23)
where RLt ≡
(
1+κQt
Qt−1
)
denotes the return on FIs’ assets.11 A share of the
profits are then distributed to households as dividends (divt), while the rest
10Long-term government bonds have exactly the same structure as investment bonds,
hence they are modeled as perpetuities with maturity (1− κ)−1.
11The interest rate paid on deposits, Rdt , equals the risk free (policy) rate hence we
directly use Rt in the FIs’ profit function.
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is retained as net worth.12 It follows that each FI chooses dividends and net
worth to solve:
Vt ≡ max
Ntdivt
Et
∞∑
j=0
(βζ)j Λot+jdivt+j, (4.24)
subject to the following budget constraint
divt +Nt [1 + f(Nt)] ≤ proft, (4.25)
which states that dividends are limited by the amount of profits not devoted
to net worth. The discount factor βζ < β < 1 implies that FIs discount
future profits at a lower rate than optimizing households discount future
utility, i.e. the former are more impatient than the latter.13 The portfolio
adjustment cost function f (Nt) =
ψn
2
(
Nt−N¯
N¯
)2
prevents the FI from fully
adjusting its assets side of the balance sheet in response to shocks, as gov-
erned by parameter ψn ∈ [0,∞).14 Financial frictions are introduced via a
simple hold-up problem. Each period, before aggregate shocks realize, FIs
can default on their debt towards depositors and retain a fraction Θt < 1 of
the assets. It follows that, in order for optimizing households to be willing
to lend to FIs, the following incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) must
hold:
EtVt+1 ≥ ΘtLtNtEtΛ
o
t+1
Πt+1
RLt+1, (4.26)
according to which net worth limits the amount FIs can borrow from opti-
mizing households, i.e. the expected value of the FI, Vt+1, needs to be at least
as great as the amount it can divert. Variable Θt determines the extent of
12As noted by Carlstrom et al. (2017), this assumption differs from Gertler and Karadi
(2011; 2013), who assume that dividends are paid only upon the FIs’ exogenous death.
However, this mechanism delivers the same implication as the one designed by Gertler
and Karadi (2011; 2013), namely that FIs are not able to infinitely accumulate net worth
hence they have to borrow in order to purchase investment and government bonds.
13This assumption is necessary to induce FIs to borrow in equilibrium from households
and is in the same spirit of the one employed by Iacoviello (2005) between patient and
impatient households.
14Note that Vt is increasing in the spread between the return on assets R
L
t+1 and the
interest rate on deposits Rt, while it is decreasing in f (Nt).
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the financial friction and depends negatively on Nt and positively on an ex-
ogenous credit shock eφt . Unexpected increases in e
φ
t exacerbate the financial
friction thus lowering real activity, with larger effects the larger the portfolio
adjustment costs. Assuming that the ICC is binding, equation (4.26) can be
explicitly defined as
Lt =
Et
(
Λot+1
Πt+1
)
Et
(
Λot+1
Πt+1
)
+
(
eφt − 1
)
Et
(
Λot+1
Πt+1
)
RLt+1
Rt
. (4.27)
It is evident that leverage depends only on aggregate variables and not on
each FI’s net worth, hence only aggregate net worth is required to analyze
the model’s dynamics.15 Aggregate net worth is chosen to maximize the
representative FI’s value (4.24) subject to (4.25) and (4.27) thus yielding the
following optimal accumulation of net worth:
Λot [1 +Ntf
′ (Nt) + f (Nt)] = Et
Λot+1βζ
Πt+1
[
Rt + Lt
(
RLt+1 −Rt
)]
. (4.28)
The main channel through which the financial friction affects real activity
is a limit to arbitrage between the return on long-term bonds RLt+1 and the
deposit rate Rt. The leverage constraint (4.27) poses a limit on the ability
of the FI to collect deposits, which can be alleviated by a higher net worth.
However, adjustments in net worth are lumpy thus limiting arbitrage. In-
deed, increases in net worth allow the FI to collect deposits at a lower rate
and exploit arbitrage opportunities with respect to the lending rate. A slow
increase in net worth due to adjustment costs prevents the FI from taking
advantage of these arbitrage opportunities. Given that investments are feasi-
ble only through financial intermediation, the FI’s inability to quickly adjust
its net worth implies that central bank purchases of long-term government
bonds alter the supply of those bonds, hence the composition of the FI’s
portfolio and, ultimately, affect the real economy. Indeed, an increase in the
central bank holdings of long-term government bonds decreases the amount
held by FIs, which utilize the spare net worth to purchase investment bonds
15This is the reason why the single FI takes leverage as given in maximizing its value.
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causing an increase in private investment.
4.2.3 Non-financial firms
A continuum of monopolistically competitive firms indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] buys
capital, Kit−1 and hires labor, Hit, to produce differentiated goods, Yit, with
convex technology F (Hit, Kit−1), sold at price Pit, and faces a Dixit-Stiglitz
firm-specific demand:
Yit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−ept εp
Yt, (4.29)
where εp is the elasticity of substitution across goods varieties and ept is a
price mark-up shock. At the end of period t − 1 firms acquire capital from
capital producers for use in production in period t. Firms also face quadratic
price adjustment costs θp
2
(
Pit
Π
ιp
t−1Pit−1
− Π1−ιp
)2
Yt, as in Rotemberg (1982) –
where parameters θp ∈ [0,∞] and ιp ∈ [0, 1] measure the degree of price
stickiness and price indexation, respectively – and maximize the following
flow of discounted profits:
Jit = Et
{ ∞∑
s=0
βt+s
Λot+s
Λot+s−1
[
Pit+s
Pt+s
Yit+s − P kt+sRKt+sKit−1+s−
− wt+sHit+s − θp
2
(
Pit+s
Π
ιp
t+s−1Pit+s−1
− Π1−ιp
)2
Yt
]}
, (4.30)
with respect to Kit+s, Hit+s, and Pit+s, subject to the firm’s resource con-
straint
Yit = F (e
a
t , Hit, Kit−1), (4.31)
where F (eat , Hit, Kit−1) = e
a
tK
α
it−1H
1−α
it , with α being the labor share of in-
come and eat being a total factor productivity shock. The corresponding
first-order conditions for this problem are
Rkt = MCtMPKt, (4.32)
Wt = MCtMPLt, (4.33)
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0 = 1 + ePt ε
p (MCt − 1)− θp
(
Πt
Π
ιp
t−1
− Π1−ιp
)
Πt
Π
ιp
t−1
+
+ θpEt
[
β
Λot+1
Λot
(
Πt+1
Π
ιp
t
− Π1−ιp
)
Πt+1
Π
ιp
t
Yt+1
Yt
]
, (4.34)
where MCt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with resource constraint
(4.31). In particular, MCt is the shadow value of output and represents
the firm’s real marginal cost, while MPKt = αe
a
tH
1−α
t K
α−1
t−1 , and MPLt =
(1− α) eatKαt−1H−αt are the marginal products of capital and labor, respec-
tively. When prices are flexible (θp = 0), equation (4.34) implies that prices
are set as a constant markup over the marginal cost.
4.2.4 New capital producers
New capital is produced by firms that take investment goods It and converts
them into P kt e
µ
t
[
1− S
(
It
It−1
)]
It units of new capital goods. These firms are
owned by optimizing households and maximize the following profit function:
P kt e
µ
t
[
1− S
(
It
It−1
)]
It − It, (4.35)
where S
(
It
It−1
)
≡ ψi
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
represents the investment adjustment costs
as governed by parameter ψi, while e
µ
t is an investment-specific shock.
16 Max-
imizing (4.35) with respect to It yields the following asset price equation for
investment:
P kt e
µ
t
[
1− S
(
It
It−1
)
− S ′
(
It
It−1
)
It
It−1
]
= 1− Et
[
β
Λot+1
Λot
eµt+1P
k
t+1S
′
(
It+1
It
)(
It+1
It
)2]
. (4.36)
16As in Christiano et al. (2005), the adjustment costs function S (·) satisfies S (1) =
S
′
(1) = 0 and S
′′
(1) > 0.
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4.2.5 Policymakers
4.2.5.1 Central bank
The central bank conducts both conventional and unconventional monetary
policies. Conventional monetary policy is set according to the following
Taylor-type interest-rate rule, which determines the nominal interest rate:
log
(
Rt
R
)
= ρr log
(
Rt−1
R
)
+
+ (1− ρr)
{
ρpi log
(
Πt
Π
)
+ ρy log
(
Yt
Y
)}
+ emt , (4.37)
where ρr is the interest rate smoothing parameter, ρpi and ρy are the monetary
responses to inflation and output, and emt is a AR(1) monetary policy shock.
Unconventional monetary policy (or QE) refers to the purchase of long-
term government bonds at the market price to alleviate periods of economic
distress, financed by issuance of riskless short-term debt B¯St at the interest
rate Rt, as in Gertler and Karadi (2013). This implies that the central bank
borrows from households at the riskless rate and lends to the government
at the rate RLt+1 thus earning profits from the spread between the two. Let
B¯t ≡ QtBtPt be the real value of long-term government debt. The central
bank holds a fraction B¯CBt = ψtB¯t, where ψt ∈ [0, 1), while the remaining
fraction B¯FIt = (1− ψt) B¯t is held by FIs. Following Gertler and Karadi
(2011, 2013), Chen et al. (2012) and Carlstrom et al. (2017), among others,
the central bank sets unconventional monetary policy by varying ψt, which
follows an AR(1) process.17 Each period, the central bank’s balance sheet
implies that assets B¯CBt are fully covered by liabilities B
s
t and profits from
QE are transferred to the government.18
The introduction of long-term bonds entails the presence of a term pre-
17We follow Chen et al. (2012), Gertler and Karadi (2013), Quint and Rabanal (2017),
Carlstrom et al. (2017) and Hohberger et al. (2017) in setting an exogenous process for the
central bank’s asset purchases because we want it to be active only in those quarters when
purchases by the ECB took place. Conversely, Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Ellison and
Tischbirek (2014) employ feedback rules.
18See Section 4.2.5.2 and Appendix 4.9 for details about the consolidated government
budget constraint and its derivation, which mimics Gertler and Karadi (2013).
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mium in the economy. Consider a ten-year bond, then the term premium is
defined as the difference between the observed yield on the this bond and the
corresponding yield calculated by applying the expectation hypothesis (EH)
of the term structure to the series of short rates (see Carlstrom et al., 2017).
Let the yield on the ten-year bond under EH be
R10,EHt = κ+
1
QEHt
, (4.38)
with its price satisfying
Rt =
1 + κQEHt+1
QEHt
. (4.39)
Then, in gross terms, the term premium is defined as
TPt = 1 +R
10
t −R10,EHt . (4.40)
A QE policy shock alters the supply of long-term government bonds, hence
their price Qt, their yield R
10
t , and ultimately the term premium. An increase
in the fraction of long-term government bonds held by the central bank will
reduce their supply, increasing the price Qt, lowering the yield R
10
t and the
term-premium. The joint effects of asset purchases on the term premium and
the FI’s balance sheet stimulates investment and real activity.
4.2.5.2 Fiscal authority
The government finances government spending, Gt and lump-sum transfers
τ lt , via long-term debt and a mix of distortionary taxes Tt. In addition, it
receives profits from the central bank’s asset purchases hence the consolidated
budget constraint reads as:
B¯t =
RLt
Πt
B¯t−1 + G¯t − Tt − R
L
t −Rt−1
Πt
B¯CBt−1, (4.41)
where G¯t = Gt+τ
l
t denotes total government expenditure while the last term
on the right-hand side are the central bank’s profits which depend on the
spread between the long-term and short-term rates. Total real tax revenues,
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Tt are given by:
Tt = τ
C
t Ct + τ
W
t WtHt + τ
k
t
(
Rkt − δP kt
)
Kt. (4.42)
In order to reduce the number of tax instruments to two, we follow Cantore
et al. (2017) and assume that distortionary taxes τCt , τ
W
t and τ
k
t as well
as the two types of government expenditure deviate from their respective
steady state by the same proportion, i.e. τCt = τtτ
C , τWt = τtτ
W , τ kt = τtτ
k,
Gt = gtG, and τ
l
t = gtτ
l. The government uses the following fiscal rules to
stabilize debt and react to deviations of output from steady state:
log
(τt
τ
)
= ρτ log
(τt−1
τ
)
+ ρτb log
(
B¯t−1
B¯
)
+ ρτy log
(
Yt
Y
)
+
+ ϑτ
τ
t + (1− ϑτ ) τt−1, (4.43)
log
(
gt
g
)
= ρg log
(
gt−1
g
)
− ρgb log
(
B¯t−1
B¯
)
− ρgy log
(
Yt
Y
)
+
+ ϑg
g
t + (1− ϑg) gt−1, (4.44)
where ρg and ρτ govern the persistence of the fiscal policy instruments, while
ρτb and ρgb define their responsiveness to deviations of government debt from
steady state, and ρτy and ρgy determine their reaction to deviations of output
from steady state, to introduce an automatic stabilizer component. Finally,
gt and 
τ
t are i.i.d. government spending and tax shocks, respectively. Fol-
lowing Leeper et al. (2013), we allow for pre-announcement effects of fiscal
policy via the parameters ϑτ , ϑg ∈ [0, 1]. Such a specification of the fiscal
rules is important to account for anticipated effects of discretionary fiscal
policies and avoid biased estimates. If ϑi = 0, with i ∈ {τ, g}, then agents
have perfect foresight of discretionary innovations in fiscal policies as, at time
t, they can perfectly observe gt+1 and τt+1. Conversely, if ϑi = 1 agents have
no foresight of the discretionary component of fiscal policies and receive news
only about contemporaneous government spending and tax rates, in addition
to those determined by their endogenous responses to debt and output de-
viations from steady state. Finally, values of ϑi between 0 and 1 imply a
limited degree of discretionary fiscal foresight by private agents.
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4.2.6 Equilibrium and exogenous processes
In equilibrium all markets clear and the model is closed by the resource
constraint:
Yt = Ct + It +Gt +
θp
2
(
Πt
Π
ιp
t−1
− Π1−ιp
)2
Yt +
θw
2
[
Πwt
Πιwt−1
− Π1−ιw
]2
WtHt.
(4.45)
As in Smets and Wouters (2007), the wage markup and the price markup
shocks follow ARMA(1,1) processes:
log
(
eκt
eκ
)
= ρκ log
(
eκt−1
eκ
)
+ κt − ϑκeκt−1, (4.46)
with κ = [p, w], whereas all other shocks follow an AR(1) process:
log
(
eκt
eκ
)
= ρκ log
(
eκt−1
eκ
)
+ κt , (4.47)
where κ = [a,m, ψ, φ, µ, b, ]; ρκ and ρκ are autoregressive parameters; ϑi are
the moving average parameters; κt and 
κ
t are i.i.d shocks with zero mean
and standard deviations σκ and σκ.
4.3 Bayesian estimation
The model is estimated with Bayesian methods. The Kalman filter is used
to evaluate the likelihood function, which combined with the prior distribu-
tion of the parameters yields the posterior distribution. Then, the Monte-
Carlo-Markov-Chain Metropolis-Hastings (MCMC-MH) algorithm with two
parallel chains of 200,000 draws each is used to generate a sample from the
posterior distribution in order to perform inference. We estimate the model
on the EA starting from the introduction of the currency union in 1999 until
2017. In particular, our sample is 1999Q1-2017Q2. We therefore account
for crucial episodes of the EA business cycle, namely the Great Recession,
the Sovereign Debt Crisis and the implementation of the PSPP started by
the ECB in March 2015. The model features 10 structural shocks, hence
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we use 10 observables: real GDP, real private consumption, real private in-
vestment, real wage, real government spending (which includes government
consumption, investment and transfers), real tax revenues, inflation, nominal
interest rate, term premium and the purchase of public sector securities by
the ECB. We use data on eleven countries of the EA, namely Austria, Bel-
gium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Portugal and Spain; and aggregate them weighting by nominal GDP. This
choice is dictated by the fact that these countries are the founding members
of the currency union hence data is available for the entire sample selected.19
Finally, we follow related studies on the EA by detrending the real variables
before the estimation with a linear trend, and demeaning inflation and in-
terest rates (see, Gerali et al., 2010, and Coenen et al. 2012; 2013).20 The
following measurement equations link the data to the endogenous variables
of the model: 
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=
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0
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0
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, (4.48)
Variables with a ˆ are in log-deviations from their own steady state, while
b¯CBt =
B¯CBt
Yt
denotes the stock of government debt held by the central bank
as a fraction of GDP. Our set of observables include the real variables for
each term of the resource constraint (4.45), thus posing an issue of stochastic
singularity. Indeed, the resource constraint imposes an exact linear restric-
19We excluded Greece because it adopted the euro in 2001 and due to the incomplete
availability of quarterly fiscal data.
20Details about data sources and transformations are provided in Appendix 4.5.
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tion between the observables that has a zero probability of being observed
which prevents the estimation. We therefore follow Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2012) and overcome this issue by introducing a i.i.d. measurement error met
in one of the observables.21
Our sample includes a period in which the Euro Interbank Offered Rate
(EONIA), which we use as a proxy for the ECB policy rate, approached the
ZLB (2012Q1) and then turned negative (2014Q4), thus posing potential
issues in the estimation of the model.
One way to deal with the ZLB is to estimate the model up to period before
it started binding and then use non-linear techniques to simulate it with
a binding ZLB. However, there is little agreement about which non-linear
method is more appropriate. Moreover, Kollmann et al. (2016) estimate a
DSGE model of the Euro Area up to 2016Q4 without accounting for the ZLB
and then, as a robustness, re-estimate the model using the method developed
by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015). They find only marginal changes in their
results and argue that the ZLB was not a significant constraint on monetary
policy, in line with the conclusions of Fratto and Uhlig (2014) and Linde
et al. (2016).
Alternatively, one could estimate the DSGE model replacing the policy
rate with a shadow rate, as Mouabbi and Sahuc (2017) do for the Euro
Area. However, using the shadow rate comes at the cost of shutting down
the explicit unconventional monetary policy channel in our model. Indeed,
UMP is captured by the shadow rate and we will not be able to disentangle
the effects of conventional vs unconventional monetary policies (see Section
4.13.1 of the Appendix for a more detailed discussion on the issues posed by
the ZLB and the robustness of our results to using the shadow rate).
We therefore follow Kollmann et al. (2016) in estimating the model with-
out explicitly modeling the ZLB. I Section 4.13.1 of the Appendix we then
verify that our results are robust to the use of the shadow rate as the ob-
21Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012) add the measurement error to output while we add
it to consumption. This choice has no material implications for the estimation but in this
way we avoid a potential bias in the historical decomposition of output which is one of the
main focus of the paper. The results are robust to alternatively adding the measurement
error to output or investment, see Appendix 4.13.2.
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servable for the monetary policy rate.
4.3.1 Calibration and priors
Structural parameters and steady state values presented in Table 4.1 are cal-
ibrated at a quarterly frequency. The calibration of the households’ discount
factor (β = 0.99, which yields an annual steady state interest rate of 4%),
the capital depreciation rate (δ = 0.025, which implies a 10% annual capital
depreciation rate) and the capital share of income α = 0.33 are standard
in quarterly DSGE models and have been used in other studies on the EA
(see, Smets and Wouters 2003, 2005, among others). The elasticities of sub-
stitution in goods and labor markets εp and εw equal 6 in order to target
a steady-state gross mark-up of 20%, as in Gerali et al. (2010). The ratios
of government spending and government debt to GDP are set to 23% and
68%, respectively, in line with the data. Steady state tax rates are borrowed
from Forni et al. (2009).22 At the steady state, the stock of government
bonds held by the ECB is calibrated at 0.7% to match the ratio of general
government debt denominated in euros in the asset side of the consolidated
balance sheet of the Eurosystem to the EA GDP over the period 1999-2014
(before the start of the PSPP). We calibrate κ such that the duration of the
long-term bonds is set to 10 years. The scale parameter of the disutility of
labor B is set to match steady state hours equal to 1, whereas the additional
discount factor of the FIs is set to match a steady state leverage of 6, as in
Villa (2016).
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 summarize the prior and posterior distributions of the
parameters and the shocks, respectively. The choice of priors corresponds to
a large extent to those in previous studies of the EA. We generally follow
Smets and Wouters (2003; 2005) in choosing the prior distribution of the
structural parameters and the parameters governing the shock processes.
We set the prior mean of the inverse Frisch elasticity η to 0.5. Estimated
DSGE models of the EA largely agree in setting the prior mean of the habit
22Christiano et al. (2010) set the same steady-state tax rate on labor income at 0.45,
while the steady-state tax rates on consumption and capital are very similar to ours and
set at 0.20 and 0.28, respectively.
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parameter h to 0.70. Turning to the share of optimizing households, we
start from a prior whereby their share equals that of rule-of-thumbers, as
common in the literature. We follow Gerali et al. (2010) by setting the
prior distributions of the IAC ψi and price and wages stickiness parameters,
including indexation. In particular, prices are a priori assumed to last 3.7
quarters while wages last 2.5 quarters. Given the lack of previous estimates
for the parameter of FIs’ net worth adjustment for the EA, we center our
prior on the estimate of Carlstrom et al. (2017) for the US economy. In
particular, we assume that ψn takes a Normal prior distribution with mean
0.785 and standard deviation 0.10. This prior distribution is sufficiently
loose to include cases of low and high degrees of financial frictions. The
priors of the tax rules coefficients are taken from Zubairy (2014) and are
broadly consistent with EA studies,e.g. Forni et al. (2009) and Kollmann
et al. (2013). It is important to note that we remain agnostic about the
countercyclicality of government spending. Indeed, we set a Normal prior
distribution for ρgy with mean 0.10 and standard deviation 0.10 thus not
excluding the case of procyclical government spending should the parameter
take negative values. Finally, the prior distributions of the parameters of the
Taylor rule are fairly standard, with the interest rate smoothing parameter,
ρr, set to have a prior mean 0.80 and with a stronger response of the central
bank to inflation than output. In general, we use the Beta (B) distribution
for all parameters bounded between 0 and 1. We use the Inverse Gamma
(IG) distribution for the standard deviation of the shocks for which we set a
loose prior with 2 degrees of freedom.
4.3.2 Posterior estimates
There is evidence of preference parameters η and h in line with values com-
mon to the literature, while the fraction of optimizing households is rather
high–0.90. This implies that about 10% of EA households do not have access
to financial markets. The posterior mean of ω is relatively close to Coenen
et al. (2012; 2013), who estimate a fraction of rule-of-thumbers of 18%,
but farther from Forni et al. (2009), Ratto et al. (2009) and Albonico et al.
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Parameter Value/target
Discount factor β 0.99
Capital depreciation rate δ 0.025
Capital share of income α 0.33
Elasticity of substitution goods εp 6
Elasticity of substitution labor εw 6
Government spending to GDP gy 0.23
Government debt to GDP by 0.68
Steady state Tax rate consumption τ c 0.16
Steady state Tax rate capital τ k 0.19
Steady state Tax rate labor income τw 0.45
Steady state CB holdings to gov. debt ψ 0.007
Duration of long-term bonds (1− κ)−1 40
Disutility of labor B H = 1
FI additional discount ζ L = 6
Table 4.1: Calibrated parameters
(2016), who estimate in different models and and with different datasets that
around 35% of EA households are completely prevented from participating
in financial markets. We estimate sizable investment adjustment costs with
ψi = 5.52, a value close to e.g. Smets and Wouters (2005), Forni et al. (2009)
and Villa (2016). Turning to the posterior estimate of ψn, we find a value of
0.63 which implies a non-negligible degree of financial frictions, lower than
the US estimate of 0.79 by Carlstrom et al. (2017). Consistently with Villa
(2016), the US estimated degree of financial frictions is larger than that in
the EA. In line with EA studies and differently from the US economy, prices
are stickier than wages.23 Indeed, prices are estimated to be reset every 6.5
quarters (θp = 173 which corresponds to a 15.25% probability of resetting
the price in a Calvo world), while wages last almost 4 quarters (θw = 109
which implies a probability of 29.15% of resetting wages in a Calvo world).
Moreover, wages display a higher degree of indexation than prices (ιw = 0.33,
ιp = 0.15). Estimates of the fiscal rules reveal slightly stronger responses of
government spending than taxes to government debt and output deviations
23Smets and Wouters (2003, 2005), Forni et al. (2009), Coenen et al. (2012; 2013),
Kollmann et al. (2016) and Villa (2016), all estimate that in the EA prices are stickier
than wages.
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Parameter Prior Posterior Mean
Distr. Mean Sd/df
Structural
Inv. Frisch elasticity η N 0.50 0.10 0.2795 [0.1044;0.4380]
Habits in consumption h B 0.70 0.10 0.8551 [0.8045;0.9021]
Fraction of optimizing households ω B 0.50 0.10 0.9021 [0.8559;0.9473]
Investment adjustment cost ψi N 2.50 1.00 5.5202 [4.2326;6.9571]
Net worth adjustment costs ψn N 0.785 0.10 0.6362 [0.4104;0.8575]
Price stickiness θp G 50 20.0 172.92 [137.19;199.99]
Price indexation ιp B 0.50 0.15 0.1535 [0.0366;0.2774]
Wage stickiness θw G 50 20.0 108.98 [66.861;154.22]
Wage indexation ιw B 0.50 0.15 0.3253 [0.1102;0.5573]
Tax smoothing ρτ B 0.70 0.20 0.8649 [0.8012;0.9280]
Tax reaction to debt ρτb G 0.50 0.25 0.0849 [0.0536;0.1180]
Tax reaction to output ρτy G 0.15 0.10 0.0454 [0.0046;0.0941]
Government spending smoothing ρg B 0.70 0.20 0.9191 [0.8962;0.9418]
Government spending reaction to debt ρgb G 0.50 0.25 0.1063 [0.0852;0.1291]
Government spending reaction to output ρgy N 0.10 0.10 0.1057 [0.0583;0.1551]
Inflation -Taylor rule ρpi N 1.70 0.10 1.7243 [1.5324;1.9277]
Output -Taylor rule ρy G 0.125 0.05 0.0839 [0.0263;0.1496]
Interest rate smoothing ρr B 0.80 0.10 0.9615 [0.9480;0.9739]
Table 4.2: Prior and posterior distributions of estimated structural parame-
ters (90% confidence bands in square brackets).
from steady state. Government spending is estimated to be countercyclical
given the positive value of ρgy, while both tax rules display a high degree of in-
ertia. Estimates of the parameters governing the degree of fiscal foresight re-
veal that agent foresee part of these shocks, with stronger pre-announcement
effects of taxes (ϑτ = 0.49) than government spending (ϑg = 0.29). Finally,
the Taylor rule parameters and the parameters of the shock processes take
standard values. The QE shock is very persistent (ρψ = 0.99), which is
consistent with the ongoing PSPP programme by the ECB.24
24Indeed, on October 26th 2017, the ECB announced “...to continue the Asset Purchase
Programme (APP) at a pace of 60 billion until the end of December 2017. From January
2018 the net asset purchases are intended to continue at a monthly pace of 30 billion until
the end of September 2018, or beyond, if necessary...”.
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Parameter Prior Posterior Mean
Distr. Mean Sd/df
Exogenous processes
Technology ρa B 0.50 0.20 0.9897 [0.9752;0.9992]
σa IG 0.10 2.0 1.2241 [0.9757;1.4902]
Monetary Policy ρm B 0.50 0.20 0.4271 [0.2901;0.5606]
σm IG 0.10 2.0 0.0779 [0.0649;0.0918]
Unconventional Monetary Policy ρψ B 0.50 0.20 0.9883 [0.9747;0.9990]
σψ IG 0.10 2.0 8.2419 [6.9245;9.6487]
Preference ρb B 0.50 0.20 0.8855 [0.8380;0.9319]
σb IG 0.10 2.0 9.4757 [6.7653;12.404]
Investment specific ρµ B 0.50 0.20 0.9326 [0.8931;0.9667]
σµ IG 0.10 2.0 5.5580 [4.3906;6.8157]
Price mark-up ρp B 0.50 0.20 0.3529 [0.0392;0.7358]
ϑp B 0.50 0.20 0.5730 [0.2737;0.8760]
σp IG 0.10 2.0 7.1733 [4.7746;9.6108]
Wage mark-up ρw B 0.50 0.20 0.8781 [0.8254;0.9277]
ϑw B 0.50 0.20 0.2072 [0.0279;0.3968]
σw IG 0.10 2.0 8.7530 [5.2035;12.847]
Government spending ϑg B 0.50 0.20 0.2945 [0.1982;0.3851]
σg IG 0.10 2.0 1.8469 [1.3720;2.3855]
Tax ϑτ B 0.50 0.20 0.4933 [0.3268;0.6651]
στ IG 0.10 2.0 2.8638 [2.2236;3.5395]
Credit ρφ B 0.50 0.20 0.9690 [0.9480;0.9891]
σφ IG 0.10 2.0 4.9494 [3.5285;6.5436]
Measurement error σme IG 0.10 2.0 2.2781 [1.9745;2.5868]
Table 4.3: Prior and posterior distributions of estimated shock processes
(90% confidence bands in square brackets).
4.3.3 Dynamic properties of the estimated model
Before studying the role of the structural shocks, we assess the dynamic
properties of the estimated model by plotting the Bayesian impulse responses
(at the posterior mean) of the main macroeconomic variables to the ten
shocks that perturb the economy. All shocks are expansionary, i.e. they
generate a positive response of output. Overall, the selected macroeconomic
variables display standard responses to each shock.
Figure 4.1 reports the response to monetary policy, government spending
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and tax shocks. An expansionary monetary policy (first column of Figure
4.1) increases output, investment, consumption and inflation. Government
spending is muted in the first five quarters due to the opposite effects of
higher output and lower public debt. Then, the latter outweighs the former
and government spending increases. In response to lower debt and higher
output, tax rates are reduces. Finally, the term premium decreases thus
stimulating investment.
An increase in government spending (second column of Figure 4.1) stim-
ulates output via its positive effect on consumption. Indeed, the presence of
rule-of-thumb consumers helps avoiding a crowding out of private consump-
tion. Nevertheless, private investment is crowded out while the nominal
interest rate reacts to the increase in inflation. Tax rates increase in reaction
to the higher public debt while the term premium decreases.
A fiscal stimulus in the form of lower tax rates (third column of Figure
4.1) causes an initial rise in output. Higher government debt reduces the
fiscal space so that the government cuts spending and output is lower than
the steady state after four quarters. Note also that pre-announcement effects
mitigate the impact responses of the real variables which reach their peak
only in the following periods.
When the economy is perturbed with standard supply and demand shocks
(technology, price and wage markups, preference and investment shocks, re-
spectively), variables follow a path consistent with standard DSGE models
(see Figures 4.9 and 4.10 in Appendix 4.10).
Two shocks are peculiar to the model. A QE shock entails an increase in
the stock of long-term government debt held by the central bank financed by
issuance of short-term liabilities. The first column of Figure 4.2 shows that
this shock has clearly expansionary effects on the economy. The shock is
transmitted through the economy, via investment, by reducing the available
quantity of long-term government bonds thus driving up their price and re-
ducing their yield and the term premium. Investment is therefore stimulated,
hence its expansionary effect on output. Inflation exceeds its steady state,
which is why the central bank reacts by increasing the nominal interest rate.25
25In the historical decomposition of the business cycle presented in the following section,
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Figure 4.1: Mean Bayesian impulse responses of selected macroeconomic
variables to standard policy shocks. Rows are variables, columns are shocks.
All shocks are expansionary.
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Figure 4.2: Mean Bayesian impulse responses of selected macroeconomic
variables to QE and credit shocks. Rows are variables, columns are shocks.
All shocks are expansionary.
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Moreover, profits earned by the central bank during the QE programme are
transferred to the government, therefore they reduce government debt which
allows higher government spending and lower taxes, which in turn further
increases output.
The other shock peculiar in our model is the credit shock (second column
of Figure 4.2). An expansionary shock perturbs the economy via an exoge-
nous decrease in the term premium, as a result of which the hold-up problem
becomes less severe. FIs then increase their leverage because they can adjust
their net worth only gradually. Investment is thus stimulated hence causing
an expansion. The reduction in public debt allows more government spend-
ing and lower tax rates. A contractionary version of this shock (in which
impulse responses have the reversed sign) proxies the financial crisis erupted
in 2008 and will prove important for the historical analysis of the EA business
cycle.
4.3.4 The role of non-policy structural shocks
In this section we assess the role of all non-policy structural shocks of the
model in explaining the dynamics of output and inflation in the EA, while
we assess the role of monetary and fiscal policy shocks in the next section.
During this period of time, the EA has been impacted by two major events,
namely the financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis
that hit Greece in 2009 and then propagated to other European countries in
the following years.26 The historical decomposition of output (Figure 4.3)
shows a large contribution of the preference shock over the sample, with re-
markable negative effects during financial and sovereign debt crises. Interest-
ingly, the years before the 2008 financial crisis, the credit shock had a positive
effect on output, which reveals an important role of leverage build-up leading
to the crisis itself. After the crisis erupted, FIs engaged in substantial delever-
aging which is captured by the the negative contributions of the credit shock
the ZLB is captured as the model-implied short-term interest rate is matched to the
observable via exogenous shocks that keep the interest rate at its effective lower bound.
26Recall that our set of countries does not include Greece. However, we do include
countries that experienced sovereign debt distress starting from 2011.
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during the years 2009-2010. The missed recovery has been driven mainly by
weak demand, with the large negative contribution of the preference shock
lasting until 2015. At the same time, FIs engaged in rebuilding their balance
sheets hence the positive effect of the credit shock on output. Supply shocks,
especially total factor productivity and price markup shocks, play a role but
display larger effects on the dynamics of inflation. Indeed, Figure 4.4 reveals
larger effects of wage and price markup shocks although the decomposition
is similar to output. In particular, the wage markup shock seems to explain
the bulk of the missed inflation from 2014, a period in which the ECB has
increasingly loosened its policy.27 Overall, structural shocks other than pol-
icy shocks, explain a substantial portion of the dynamics of EA output and
inflation. Moreover, they help us identify key episodes of the EA business
cycle.
4.3.5 Policy stance in the Euro Area
We now turn to the analysis of the role of discretionary policy shocks in
shaping the EA business cycle since the currency union. Given that in our
model policymakers have four policy instruments available, our ultimate goal
is to infer whether the EA policy stance, defined as the joint effect of all
policies, has been contractionary or expansive, especially in the aftermath of
the financial and sovereign debt crises.28 Moreover, we want to determine
which policy, if any, contributes the most to the overall stance and what
is the role of the remaining policies. To do so, we proceed in two steps.
First, we look at the joint contribution of all policies and determine the EA
policy stance. Then we disentangle the role of each policy by studying the
historical decompositions of output and inflation when each policy is treated
separately.29
27The forecast error variance decomposition reported in Appendix 4.11 largely confirms
these results at different horizons.
28Recall that we design the unconventional monetary policy shock such that this policy
is active only from the third quarter of 2015, when the ECB started the purchase of
long-term government bonds under the PSPP.
29Sections 4.13.6 and 4.13.10 of the appendix reports also the historical decompositions
of output and inflation to the monetary and fiscal policies stances, i.e. when we treat
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Figure 4.3: Historical decomposition of cyclical deviations of output from
trend to all shocks. Bold line represents the data, bars represent the contri-
bution of each shock.
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 report the historical decomposition of output and
inflation to the joint effect of all the available policy instruments whereas
Figures 4.7 and 4.8 plot the historical contribution of the four policy instru-
ments to the evolution of output and inflation, respectively.30
Key findings emerge. First, with the exception of the period 2001-2003
and up to 2013, the overall policy stance has been generally countercyclical.
For most of the EA existence, policies display negative (positive) contribu-
tions to output when its deviations from trend are positive (negative).
Figure 4.7 sheds more light on the 2001-2003 period: there was a positive
contribution of government spending and monetary policy, whereas tax policy
had a muted effect. Conversely, the historical decomposition of inflation
the monetary (interest rate and QE) and fiscal (government spending and taxes) policies
separately.
30In Figures 4.5-4.8 the gaps between the bars and the actual values of the variables
arise because we only plot the policy shocks.
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Figure 4.4: Historical decomposition of inflation to all shocks. Bold line
represents the data, bars represent the contribution of each shock.
(Figure 4.6) shows that the policy stance counteracts inflation, where the
lion’s share belongs of course to monetary policy (see Figure 4.8).
Turning our attention to the build up, explosion and aftermath of the fi-
nancial crisis, we notice that the years between 2004 and 2008 saw a large ex-
pansion of output while the policy stance was overall contractionary, mainly
due to the monetary policy stance. The joint policy stance witnessed a neg-
ative effect on inflation which was prevented from further increasing. How-
ever, as financial turmoils hit the EA in 2008, GDP and inflation contracted
sharply, therefore the policy stance became expansionary to fight the reces-
sion. Looking more in detail, the major role was played by the ECB, which
immediately reacted by lowering the interest rate. The two fiscal policies
show opposite contributions, thus adding very little to output and inflation.
However, the overall fiscal stance remained expansionary during the 2009-
2010 drop in output as found by Coenen et al. (2012).31
31Kollmann et al. (2013) argue that the non-systematic components of government ex-
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Figure 4.5: Historical decomposition of cyclical deviations of output from
trend to joint monetary and fiscal policies shocks. Bold line represents the
data, bars represent the contribution of each shock.
However, after an initial sharp reaction, the EA policy stance has grad-
ually decreased its expansionary role and, from mid 2013, it turned con-
tractionary on output and less powerful on inflation. Two crucial factors
might have contributed to this outcome. First, EA was hit by the sovereign
debt crisis which exerted most of its effects from 2011 onward. In addition,
in 2012 monetary policy started to be constrained by the zero-lower-bound
on the policy rate.32 While monetary policy started loosing power (see the
smaller contributions to output in Figure 4.7), fiscal adjustments entailed op-
posite effects of discretionary government spending and taxes which almost
penditures rose sharply during the crisis thus concluding that the EA fiscal stance has
clearly been expansionary. However, they keep all tax rates fixed during the estimation,
thus ruling out the role of taxes in determining the fiscal stance. In addition, in their
environment public debt is only short term.
32The Euro Interbank Offered Rate (EONIA), which we use as a proxy for the ECB
policy rate in our analysis, approached the ZLB in June 2012. At the ZLB the policy rate
is higher than it should be and this effect shows up as a negative contribution of monetary
policy on output in the historical decomposition.
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Figure 4.6: Historical decomposition of inflation to joint monetary and fiscal
policies shocks. Bold line represents the data, bars represent the contribution
of each shock.
neutralized each other.
At the end of 2014, all policies started being contractionary on output
due to the joint effect of fiscal adjustments and the zero-lower-bound. Ab-
sent strong non-policy structural shocks, this is the main likely cause of the
sluggish EA recovery after 2014.
In March 2015, the ECB started implementing its QE programme to
stimulate the economy, as evident from the historical decomposition of output
in Figure 4.7. QE displayed an increasingly larger positive effect on output
and inflation, being the only expansionary policy on the former. QE helped
counteract, but was never strong enough to undo the other contractionary
policies, due to the joint drag caused by fiscal policies and the zero-lower-
bound.
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Figure 4.7: Historical decomposition of cyclical deviations of output from
trend to policy shocks. Bold line represents the data, bars represent the
contribution of each shock.
4.4 Concluding remarks
The Global Financial Crisis and the subsequent Sovereign Debt Crisis trig-
gered a lively debate about the appropriate policy reactions policymakers
should take in the EA. To accomplish this difficult task, on one hand, it is
crucial to understand what drives the EA business cycle and which shocks
contributed the most to its dynamics. On the other hand, it is vital to assess
the role of fiscal and monetary policies in affecting economic fluctuations.
Our analysis contributes to the current debate and the literature along a
number of dimensions. First, we estimate a crucial role of credit and demand
shocks in generating the deep recession experienced in 2008-2009. Second, we
disentangle the role of the overall policy stance in the EA, thus accounting
for the joint effects of fiscal and monetary policies. We find that the overall
EA policy stance was expansionary after the onset of the financial crisis
mainly due to a loosening of monetary policy. However, it started loosing
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Figure 4.8: Historical decomposition of inflation to policy shocks. Bold line
represents the data, bars represent the contribution of each shock.
its power due to the almost contemporaneous effects of the ZLB and the
Sovereign Debt Crisis. The former made monetary policy unable to provide
further stimulus via conventional measures, while the latter implied a muted,
if not contractionary, fiscal policy. The QE program that the ECB started
in March 2015 is estimated to have positively contributed to the EA policy
stance which overall has remained contractionary, due to the joint negative
contributions of fiscal policies and the zero-lower-bound constraint.
Our results carry the policy implication that, having the ECB exploited
most of its instruments to stimulate the economy, a more expansionary fiscal
policy in countries with fiscal space could boost the EA economic activity
and also accelerate public debt consolidation.
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Appendix
4.5 Data
We collect data on the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. For
each country we collect data from Eurostat and IMF International Financial
Statistics (IFS). Nominal data are then transformed to real series by dividing
for the respective country’s GDP deflator. All series are seasonally adjusted.
The EONIA rate is taken from the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse. Quar-
terly 10-years government bond yields are downloaded from IFS. The Term
premium is constructed as the spread between the 10-years government bond
yields and the EONIA rate. Euro-Area variables are created by aggregating
countries series weighted by countries’ Nominal GDP. Inflation and inter-
est rates are demeaned before the estimation while all other variables are
detrended using a linear trend.
4.6 Equilibrium conditions
Optimizing households
(1 + τ ct ) Λ
o
t =
ebt
Cot − hCot−1
− hβEt
[
ebt+1
Cot+1 − hCot
]
(4.49)
Λot = βEt
[
Λot+1
Rt
Πt+1
]
(4.50)
ΛotP
k
t Mt = βEt
{
Λot+1
[(
1− τ kt+1
)
Rkt+1 + δP
k
t+1τ
k
t+1 + (1− δ)P kt+1Mt+1
]}
(4.51)
ΛotQtMt = βEt
[
Λot+1
1 + κQt+1Mt+1
Πt+1
]
(4.52)
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Rule-Of-Thumb households
(1 + τ ct )C
r
t = (1− τwt )WtHt + τ lt (4.53)
(1 + τ ct ) Λ
r
t =
ebt
Crt − hCrt−1
− hβEt
[
ebt+1
Crt+1 − hCrt
]
(4.54)
Wage setting
0 =
{
(1− τwt ) (1− ewt εw)− θw
[
Πwt
Πιwt−1
− Π1−ιw
]
Πwt
Πιwt−1
}
+
B (Ht)
η
Λ¯tWt
ewt ε
w
+ βEt
{
Λ¯t+1
Λ¯t
θw
[
Πwt+1
Πιwt
− Π1−ιw
]
Πwt+1Wt+1Ht+1
Πιwt WtHt
}
, (4.55)
Λ¯t = ωΛ
o
t + (1− ω) Λrt (4.56)
Πwt =
Wt
Wt−1
Πt (4.57)
Aggregation
Ct = ωC
o
t + (1− ω)Crt (4.58)
F¯t = ωF¯
o
t (4.59)
It = ωI
o
t (4.60)
Kt = ωK
o
t (4.61)
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Financial intermediaries
B¯FIt + F¯ t = NtLt (4.62)
Lt =
Et
(
Λot+1
Πt+1
)
Λot+1
Πt+1
+
(
eφt − 1
)
Et
(
Λot+1
Πt+1
)
RLt+1
Rt
(4.63)
P kt It = F¯ t −
κF¯ t−1
Πt
Qt
Qt−1
(4.64)
Λot [1 +Ntf
′ (Nt) + f (Nt)] =
Λot+1βζ
Πt+1
[
Rt + Lt
(
RLt+1 −Rt
)]
(4.65)
f (Nt) =
ψn
2
(
Nt − N¯
N¯
)2
(4.66)
f ′ (Nt) = ψn
(
Nt − N¯
) ( 1
N¯
)2
(4.67)
RLt+1 =
1 + κQt+1
Qt
(4.68)
R10t = κ+
1
Qt
(4.69)
Rt =
1 + κQEHt+1
QEHt
(4.70)
R10,EHt = κ+
1
QEHt
(4.71)
TPt = 1 +R
10
t −R10,EHt (4.72)
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Intermediate goods producers
Yt = e
a
tK
α
t−1H
1−α
t (4.73)
MPKt = αe
a
tH
1−α
t K
α−1
t−1 (4.74)
MPLt = (1− α) eatKαt−1H−αt (4.75)
Rkt = MCtMPKt (4.76)
Wt = MCtMPLt (4.77)
ePt ε
p (1−MCt)− 1 = −θp
(
Πt
Π
ιp
t−1
− Π1−ιp
)
Πt
Π
ιp
t−1
+
+ θpEt
[
β
Λot+1
Λot
(
Πt+1
Π
ιp
t
− Π1−ιp
)
Πt+1
Π
ιp
t
Yt+1
Yt
]
(4.78)
Capital producers
P kt e
µ
t
[
1− S
(
It
It−1
)
− S ′
(
It
It−1
)
It
It−1
]
=
1−Et
[
β
Λot+1
Λot
eµt+1P
k
t+1S
′
(
It+1
It
)(
It+1
It
)2]
(4.79)
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + Iteµt
[
1− St
(
It
It−1
)]
(4.80)
St =
ψi
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
(4.81)
S ′t = ψi
(
It
It−1
− 1
)
(4.82)
Government
B¯t =
RLt
Πt
B¯t−1 + G¯t − Tt − R
L
t −Rt−1
Πt
B¯CBt−1 (4.83)
Tt = τ
c
tCt + τ
w
t WtHt + τ
k
t
[(
Rkt − δP kt
)
Kt
]
(4.84)
G¯t = Gt + τ
l
t (4.85)
log
(τt
τ
)
= ρτ log
(τt−1
τ
)
+ ρτb log
(
B¯t−1
B¯
)
+ (4.86)
+ ρτy log
(
Yt
Y
)
+ ϑτ
τ
t + (1− ϑτ ) τt−1 (4.87)
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log
(
gt
g
)
= ρg log
(
gt−1
g
)
− ρgb log
(
B¯t−1
B¯
)
−
− ρgy log
(
Yt
Y
)
+ ϑg
g
t + (1− ϑg) gt (4.88)
τ ct = τtτ
c (4.89)
τ kt = τtτ
k (4.90)
τwt = τtτ
w (4.91)
Gt = gtG (4.92)
τ lt = gtτ
l (4.93)
Central bank
log
(
Rt
R
)
= ρr log
(
Rt−1
R
)
+
+ (1− ρr)
{
ρpi log
(
Πt
Π
)
+ ρy log
(
Y ut
Y u
)}
+ mt , (4.94)
B¯t
CB
= ψtB¯t (4.95)
B¯t
FI
= (1− ψt) B¯t (4.96)
Equilibrium
Yt = Ct+It+Gt+
θp
2
(
Πt
Π
ιp
t−1
− Π1−ιp
)2
Yt+
θw
2
[
Πwt
Πιwt−1
− Π1−ιw
]2
WtHt (4.97)
Shocks processes
log
(
eκt
eκ
)
= ρκ log
(
eκt−1
eκ
)
+ κt − ϑκeκt−1, κ = [p, w] (4.98)
log
(
eκt
eκ
)
= ρκ log
(
eκt−1
eκ
)
+ κt , κ = [a,m, ψ, φ, µ, b, ] (4.99)
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4.7 Steady state
In the deterministic steady state all expectation operators are removed and
for each variable it holds that xt = xt+1 = x. Moreover, the stochastic
shocks are absent. The variables Λo and Cr solve equations (4.49) and (4.53)
respectively. The remaining variables are found recursively as follows:
R =
1
β
(4.100)
P kt = 1 (4.101)
S = 0 (4.102)
S ′ = 0 (4.103)
RL = R + ς (4.104)
R10 = RL (4.105)
Q =
(
RL − κ)−1 (4.106)
M = β [Q (1− βκ)]−1 (4.107)
Rk =
P kM [1− β (1− δ)]− βδP kτ k
β (1− τ k) (4.108)
MC =
εp − 1
εp
(4.109)
Πw = Π (4.110)
K
Y
= α
MC
Rk
(4.111)
K =
(
K
Y
) 1
1−α
(4.112)
Y = Kα (4.113)
I = δK (4.114)
G = gyY (4.115)
C = Y − I −G (4.116)
MPK = αH1−α
Kα−1
γ
(4.117)
MPL = (1− α) K
α
γ
H−α (4.118)
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W = MC MPL (4.119)
Λr =
[(1− h)Cr]−1 − hβ [(1− h)Cr]−1
(1 + τ c)
(4.120)
B =
{
[ωΛo + (1− ω) Λr] (1− τw)
(
εw − 1
εw
)
W
Hη
}
(4.121)
Co =
C − (1− ω)Cr
ω
(4.122)
Io =
I
ω
(4.123)
Ko =
K
ω
(4.124)
F¯ = P kI (1− κ)−1 (4.125)
F¯ o =
F¯
ω
(4.126)
B¯ = by4Y (4.127)
B¯CB = ψB¯ (4.128)
B¯FI = (1− ψ) B¯ (4.129)
L = l (4.130)
eφ = 1 + (1− L)
(
RL
R
L
)−1
(4.131)
N =
B¯FI + F¯
L
(4.132)
QEH = (R− κ)−1 (4.133)
R10,EH = κ+
1
QEH
(4.134)
TP = 1 +R10 −R10,EH (4.135)
f (N) = 0 (4.136)
f ′ (N) = 0 (4.137)
ζ =
1
β
[
R + L
(
RL −R)]−1 (4.138)
T = τ cC + τwWH + τ k
[(
Rk − δP k)K] (4.139)
τ l = T −G+ (1−RL) B¯ + (RL −R) B¯CB (4.140)
G¯ = G+ τ l (4.141)
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4.8 Detailed derivation of the wage setting
equation
Remember that the union objective is to:
max
W zt
Et
∞∑
k=0
βt+k
[
ωU ot+k + (1− ω)U rt+k
]
subject to the labor demand functions Hzt =
[
W zt
Wt
]−ewt εw
Ht and the budget
constraints (4.4) and (4.12). Notice also that U it = f (C
i
t , N
z
t ) and C
i
t =
g (W zt , N
z
t ), whit i = o, r. Then the first-order condition of the union with
respect to W zt reads as:
0 = ω
∂U ot
∂Cot
∂Cot
∂W zt
+ (1− ω) ∂U
r
t
∂Crt
∂Crt
∂W zt
+ ω
∂U ot
∂Hzt
∂Hzt
∂W zt
+ (1− ω) ∂U
r
t
∂Hzt
∂Hzt
∂W zt
+ βEt
[
ω
∂U ot+1
∂Cot+1
∂Cot+1
∂W zt
+ (1− ω) ∂U
r
t+1
∂Crt+1
∂Crt+1
∂W zt
]
(4.142)
Given the demand function Hzt =
[
W zt
Wt
]−ewt εw
Ht, we have
∂U ot
∂Hzt
= −B (Hzt )η ,
∂U rt
∂Hzt
= −B (Hzt )η ,
∂Hzt
∂W zt
= −ewt εw
Hzt
W zt
.
The derivatives from the households budget constraints read as
∂Cit
∂W zt
=
∂ {(1− τwt )W zt N zt }
∂W zt
− ∂Φt
∂W zt
,
∂Cit+1
∂W zt
=
∂Φt+1
∂W zt
,
with
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∂ {W zt N zt }
∂W zt
=
∂
{
(1− τwt )W zt
[
W zt
Wt
]−ewt η
Ht
}
∂W zt
= (1− τwt )
[
W zt
Wt
]−ewt εw
Ht − (1− τwt ) ewt εw
[
W zt
Wt
]−ewt εw−1 W zt
Wt
Ht
= (1− τwt )
[
W zt
Wt
]−ewt εw
Ht − (1− τwt ) ewt εw
[
W zt
Wt
]−ewt εw
Ht
= (1− τwt ) (1− ewt εw)
[
W zt
Wt
]−ewt εw
Ht
= (1− τwt ) (1− ewt εw)Hzt .
and
∂Φt
∂W zt
= θw
[
W zt
Πιwt−1W
z
t−1
Πt − Π1−ιw
]
W zt
Πιwt−1W
z
t−1
ΠtHt,
∂Φt+1
∂W zt
= θw
[
W zt+1
Πιwt W
z
t
Πt+1 − Π1−ιw
]
W zt+1
Πιwt (W
z
t )
2 Πt+1W
z
t+1Ht+1.
Finally, remember that
∂U ot
∂Cot
= Λot and
∂U rt
∂Crt
= Λrt . Then, substituting all
the derivatives into (4.142) and assuming symmetry so that W zt = Wt and
Hzt = Ht , yields
0 = ωΛot
{
(1− τwt ) (1− ewt εw)− θw
[
Wt
Πιwt−1Wt−1
Πt − Π1−ιw
]
Wt
Πιwt−1Wt−1
Πt
}
Ht
+ (1− ω) Λrt
{
(1− τwt ) (1− εwewt )− θw
[
Wt
Πιwt−1Wt−1
Πt − Π1−ιw
]
Wt
Πιwt−1Wt−1
Πt
}
Ht
+B (Ht)
η ewt ε
wHt
Wt
+ βEt
{
ωΛot+1θw
[
Wt+1
Πιwt Wt
Πt+1 − Π1−ιw
]
Wt+1
Πιwt W
2
t
Πt+1Ht+1
+ (1− ω) Λrt+1θw
[
Wt+1
Πιwt Wt
Πt+1 − Π1−ιw
]
Wt+1
Πιwt W
2
t
Πt+1Wt+1Ht+1
}
.
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Multiply by
Wt
Ht
and define the nominal wage inflation as Πwt =
Wt
Wt−1
Πt:
0 = ωΛot
{
(1− τwt ) (1− ewt εw)− θw
[
Πwt
Πιwt−1
− Π1−ιw
]
Πwt
Πιwt−1
}
Wt
+ (1− ω) Λrt
{
(1− τwt ) (1− ewt εw)− θw
[
Πwt
Πιwt−1
− Π1−ιw
]
Πwt
Πιwt−1
}
Wt
+B (Ht)
η ewt ε
w
+ βEt
{
ωΛot+1θw
[
Πwt+1
Πιwt
− Π1−ιw
]
Πwt+1Ht+1
Πιwt Ht
+ (1− ω) Λrt+1θw
[
Πwt+1
Πιwt
− Π1−ιw
]
Πwt+1Ht+1
Πιwt Ht
Wt+1
}
.
Factorizing the terms in the curly brackets yields:
0 = [ωΛot + (1− ω) Λrt ]
{
(1− τwt ) (1− ewt εw)− θw
[
Πwt
Πιwt−1
− Π1−ιw
]
Πwt
Πιwt−1
}
Wt
+B (Ht)
η ewt ε
w
+ βEt
{[
ωΛot+1 + (1− ω) Λrt+1
]
θw
[
Πwt+1
Πιwt
− Π1−ιw
]
Πwt+1Ht+1
Πιwt Ht
Wt+1
}
.
Finally, dividing by [ωΛot + (1− ω) Λrt ]Wt and defining Λ¯t = ωΛot+(1− ω) Λrt
yields the wage schedule (4.16).
4.9 The consolidated government budget con-
straint
Following Gertler and Karadi (2013), in order to conduct its asset purchase
programme, the central bank issues short-term debt to households at the
riskless interest rate. In particular, let B¯CBt =
QtBCBt
Pt
be the real value of
long-term government debt purchased by the central bank and let B¯St =
BSt
Pt
be the real value of short term debt issued by the central bank. The central
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bank balance sheet reads as:
B¯CBt = B¯
S
t , (4.143)
which states that the purchases of long-term debt (assets of the CB) are
financed by short-term liabilities. The central bank lends at the long-term
rate RLt+1 and borrows at the riskless rate Rt.. At time t, the central bank
earns the return from the stock of government bonds carried from the previ-
ous period and pays the interest on the short-term liabilities issued in t− 1.
It follows that the central bank’s profits are determined by:
Ξt =
(
RLt
Πt
− 1
)
B¯CBt−1 −
(
Rt−1
Πt
− 1
)
B¯St−1. (4.144)
Substituting the CB’s balance sheet (4.143) into it’s profits function (4.144)
yields:
Ξt =
(
RLt
Πt
− 1
)
B¯CBt−1 −
(
Rt−1
Πt
− 1
)
B¯CBt−1
=
RLt −Rt−1
Πt
B¯CBt−1, (4.145)
which enters the consolidated government budget constraint (4.41) since we
assume that profits from QE are returned to the Treasury.
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4.10 Bayesian impulse response to standard
shocks
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Figure 4.9: Mean Bayesian impulse responses of selected macroeconomic
variables to standard supply shocks. Rows are variables, columns are shocks.
All shocks are expansionary.
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Figure 4.10: Mean Bayesian impulse responses of selected macroeconomic
variables to standard demand shocks. Rows are variables, columns are
shocks. All shocks are expansionary.
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4.11 Variance decomposition of the estimated
model
Structural shocks
Mon. Gov. Investment Price Wage
Horizon policy QE spending Tax TFP specific Preference Credit markup markup
Output
1 11.28 0.062 4.12 0.10 1.22 26.07 42.04 14.87 0.049 0.18
4 11.63 0.071 0.97 0.037 2.58 26.31 41.56 16.73 0.034 0.075
8 11.53 0.083 0.30 0.065 3.72 25.36 40.13 18.71 0.029 0.059
20 10.39 0.11 0.25 0.17 7.92 21.50 37.17 22.14 0.023 0.33
40 8.70 0.13 0.25 0.22 15.69 18.78 33.02 22.45 0.020 0.74
Uncond. 7.01 0.26 0.20 0.19 29.19 16.21 26.12 20.17 0.016 0.62
Inflation
1 23.17 0.051 0.50 0.37 13.16 7.82 11.31 8.44 16.61 18.56
4 29.04 0.062 0.40 0.59 9.19 7.85 13.42 9.94 7.07 22.44
8 31.48 0.065 0.35 0.70 7.80 7.00 13.30 9.60 5.75 23.96
20 25.78 0.062 0.29 0.65 6.41 16.98 13.47 12.33 4.55 19.47
40 24.31 0.064 0.28 0.67 6.93 18.09 13.80 13.54 4.21 18.10
Uncond. 24.10 0.065 0.29 0.68 7.40 17.97 13.78 13.47 4.15 18.09
Investment
1 14.48 0.12 0.037 0.21 0.75 46.58 8.02 28.85 0.028 0.92
4 14.21 0.13 0.072 0.19 1.26 44.46 8.19 30.91 0.031 0.55
8 13.50 0.15 0.12 0.15 2.09 41.80 8.23 33.66 0.030 0.27
20 11.45 0.21 0.16 0.16 4.69 36.30 7.49 38.94 0.023 0.58
40 11.16 0.23 0.21 0.30 5.15 35.63 8.53 37.94 0.036 0.81
Uncond. 10.97 0.33 0.21 0.35 6.27 34.86 8.47 37.54 0.036 0.97
Consumption
1 2.90 0.014 0.14 1.53 1.31 1.38 92.10 0.31 0.055 0.28
4 2.86 0.015 0.023 0.99 4.03 1.53 89.63 0.35 0.029 0.55
8 3.00 0.024 0.059 0.55 6.26 2.23 86.39 0.58 0.025 0.90
20 3.99 0.016 0.22 0.23 12.84 7.28 70.73 3.25 0.023 1.42
40 3.71 0.037 0.22 0.21 23.05 12.15 51.90 7.07 0.018 1.63
Uncond. 2.71 0.13 0.15 0.16 41.03 11.49 35.04 8.14 0.013 1.13
Table 4.4: Variance decomposition
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4.12 Estimation diagnostics
In this section we report some estimation diagnostics to verify that the model
is correctly estimated. Figure 4.11 plots the prior and posterior distributions
of all the estimated parameters. Overall, the posterior distributions are quite
apart from the prior thus implying that the data is informative to identify the
parameters. Then, we verify that the two parallel chains of the Monte-Carlo-
Markov-Chain Metropolis-Hastings (MCMC-MH) algorithm have actually
converged. Figure 4.12 plots the multivariate convergence diagnostic for the
Brooks and Gelman (1998) diagnostics (upper panel) and for the second and
third central moments (middle and lower panels, respectively). The fact that
the red and blue lines are very close to each other implies that the two chains
have almost certainly converged. To sum up, estimation diagnostics reveal
that the model is correctly estimated.
4.13 Bayesian estimation and historical de-
compositions: robustness checks
In this section we assess the robustness of the Bayesian estimation and the
following historical decompositions of output and inflation. We first check
whether our results are affected by the ZLB constraint on the policy rate.
Then, we assess the role of imposing the measurement error on the measure-
ment equation of consumption.
We report the posterior estimates of the alternative models along with
the estimates of the baseline model estimated in Section 4.3 in Tables 4.5
and 4.6.
We furthermore plot the historical decompositions of output and inflation,
along with those of the baseline model, in Sections 4.13.3-4.13.10. All the
main results survive the robustness checks and the conclusions about the
policy stance in the Euro Area carry over the alternative models.
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Figure 4.11: Prior and posterior distributions of estimated parameters. Prior:
black-dashed line; Posterior: blue-solid line.
173
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
105
5
10
15
Interval
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
105
10
20
30
m2
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
105
0
100
200
m3
Figure 4.12: Prior and posterior distributions of estimated parameters. Prior:
black-dashed line; Posterior: blue-solid line.
4.13.1 The role of the ZLB
In the main text we estimate the model including a period in which the EO-
NIA rate hit the ZLB (2012Q1) and then turned negative (2014Q4). How-
ever, using standard log-linear approximation methods to estimate the DSGE
model does not allow for the imposition of the ZLB. It follows that the dif-
ference between the observed variable and the corresponding variable in the
model is picked up by the exogenous shock to the interest rate whenever the
ZLB constraint binds (see also footnotes 25 and 32).
One way to circumvent this issue is to estimate the model up to period
before the ZLB started binding and then use non-linear techniques to sim-
ulate it with the ZLB, see i.e. Chen et al. (2012), Drautzburg and Uhlig
(2015), Del Negro et al. (2015), Hirose and Inoue (2016), Linde et al. (2016),
Anzoategui et al. (2016) and Gust et al. (2017). However, these papers have
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to rely on different methods to simulate the model, i.e. either by using a
perfect foresight solution and/or by using a non-linear solution only for the
ZLB constraint or for the entire system of equations, with little agreement
about which method is actually more appropriate.
Moreover, Kollmann et al. (2016) estimate a DSGE model of the Euro
Area up to 2016Q4 without accounting for the ZLB and then, as a robustness,
re-estimate the model using the method developed by Guerrieri and Iacoviello
(2015). They find only marginal changes in their results and argue that the
ZLB was not a significant constraint on monetary policy, in line with the
conclusions of Fratto and Uhlig (2014) and Linde et al. (2016).33
Alternatively, one could estimate the DSGE model replacing the policy
rate with a shadow rate, as Mouabbi and Sahuc (2017) do for the Euro
Area. The shadow rate is a counterfactual policy rate that takes into account
the effects of all the unconventional monetary policies implemented by the
central bank and is free to move in negative territory, thus circumventing the
estimation issues posed by the ZLB.
To check the robustness of our results we will opt for the latter since it
is more directly comparable to our main analysis. We therefore re-estimate
the model using the Eonia shadow rate constructed by Wu and Xia (2017).34
Figure 4.13 plots the actual Eonia rate against the shadow Eonia rate
computed by Wu and Xia (2017) from 2004Q4 to 2017Q2.35 By construction
the shadow rate equals the actual rate until unconventional policies are imple-
mented at the ZLB. Indeed, the two rates are very close to each other (with
a correlation of 98% from 2004Q4 to 2008Q4, when they start diverging)
until 2011Q4 when the Eonia rate approached the ZLB and unconventional
measures started to be implemented by the ECB. Even if the Eonia was not
actually prevented from turning negative from 2014Q4, the shadow rate fell
more due to the implementation of unconventional monetary policies (still
33Studies that estimate DSGE models of the US economy during the ZLB period using
standard methods are Albonico et al. (2017) and Quint and Rabanal (2017).
34Mouabbi and Sahuc (2017) construct their own shadow rate which is similar to the
one constructed by Wu and Xia (2017) but it is not publicly available. The main difference
between the two is that the latter allows for a time-varying lower bound of the interest
rate.
35Interest rates are expressed at quarterly frequency.
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Figure 4.13: Wu and Xia (2017) shadow Eonia rate (red-dashed line) against
actual Eonia rate (black-solid line). Sample: 2004Q4-2017Q2.
the two rates display a correlation of 90% throughout the entire sample).
It must be said that using the shadow rate in place of the Eonia rate comes
at the cost of shutting down the explicit unconventional monetary policy
channel in our model. Indeed, UMP is captured by the shadow rate and we
will not be able to disentangle the effects of conventional vs unconventional
monetary policies.36
To estimate the model, we first eliminate the ECB government bonds
purchase from our observables and the corresponding measurement equation.
We then assume that the central bank does not hold any government debt
in steady state and prevent it from buying newly issued debt, which results
in shutting down the UMP channel by eliminating the exogenous shock Ψt .
Finally, we replace the Eonia rate with the shadow rate as the observable
36This shortcoming actually dictated the choice of using the Eonia rate despite the ZLB
in the main analysis.
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of the policy rate. The series constructed by Wu and Xia (2017) starts in
2004Q4 hence we extend it back to 1999Q1 using the Eonia rate given that
the two coincide in normal times and the high correlation displayed from
2004Q4 onwards.
The fourth column of Tables 4.5 and 4.6 report the posterior means of
the parameters estimated using the shadow rate as the observable for the
policy rate. The estimated values are virtually unchanged with respect to
the baseline model estimated using the Eonia rate (third column of Tables
4.5 and 4.6).
The historical decompositions of output and inflation are likewise ex-
tremely similar with respect to the baseline model with a slight exception for
inflation (compare the first two figures of Sections 4.13.3 to 4.13.6 for output,
and the first two figures of Sections 4.13.7 to 4.13.10 for inflation). Indeed,
in the last part of the sample, the contribution of monetary policy, which
embeds both conventional and unconventional measures, is overall negative
on inflation while it is positive in the baseline model. Therefore, not explic-
itly modeling the UMP channel might bias the results for inflation. Overall,
the ZLB constraint does not seem to be a binding constraint on the Eonia
rate, as argued by Kollmann et al. (2016).
It must be said that the majority of papers studying the issues that the
ZLB poses on the estimation of DSGE models (and cited above) focus on the
US economy. However, the Federal Funds (FFR) and the Eonia rates display
different behaviors. First, the FFR reached the ZLB much earlier (2008Q1)
than the Eonia (2012Q1). Then, the FFR was effectively prevented from
turning negative while the Eonia rate became negative in 2014Q4, although
with a much higher inertia.
We therefore conclude that the path followed by the Eonia rate implied
a binding ZLB constraint only to some extent, thus resulting in very similar
results when estimating the model using the actual Eonia or the shadow rate.
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4.13.2 The role of the measurement error
In estimating the main model, we follow Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012) by
introducing a measurement error in one of the measurement equations since
we observe all the variables in the resource constraint. Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2012) assume that the measurement error applies to output while we
added it to consumption. Our choice is dictated by the fact that output is
our main variable of interest hence adding the measurement error to it might
lead to a potential bias in the historical decomposition.
Nevertheless, in this section we check whether our results are robust to
adding the measurement error first to output and then to investment instead
of adding it to consumption.
The fifth and sixth columns of Tables 4.5 and 4.6 report the posterior
means of the parameters for the models estimated with the measurement
error on output and investment, respectively. The posterior estimates are
very similar across the three specifications, with the exception for the frac-
tion of optimizing households in the model with the measurement error on
investment, which declines from 90% to 76%.
Historical decompositions of output and inflation are very similar across
the three specifications (compare first, third and fourth figures of Sections
4.13.3 to 4.13.10), with a slightly stronger effect of fiscal policies in the
model with the measurement error on investment due to the higher esti-
mated fraction of rule-of-thumbers. Overall, the results are robust to adding
the measurement error to one of the main three observables of the resource
constraint.37
37We also tried to estimate the model by removing consumption from our observables
and the measurement error. However, the estimation was severely impaired since we have
not accounted for the main component of GDP.
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4.13.3 Output historical decompositions: Policy stance
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Figure 4.14: Historical decomposition of cyclical deviations of output from
trend to joint monetary and fiscal policies shocks: baseline model. Bold line
represents the data, bars represent the contribution of each shock.
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Figure 4.15: Historical decomposition of cyclical deviations of output from
trend to joint monetary and fiscal policies shocks: model with shadow Eonia.
Bold line represents the data, bars represent the contribution of each shock.
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Figure 4.16: Historical decomposition of cyclical deviations of output from
trend to joint monetary and fiscal policies shocks: model with measurement
error on output. Bold line represents the data, bars represent the contribution
of each shock.
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Figure 4.17: Historical decomposition of cyclical deviations of output from
trend to joint monetary and fiscal policies shocks: model with measurement
error on investment. Bold line represents the data, bars represent the con-
tribution of each shock.
182
4.13.4 Output historical decompositions: all shocks
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Figure 4.18: Historical decomposition of cyclical deviations of output from
trend to all shocks: baseline model. Bold line represents the data, bars
represent the contribution of each shock.
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Figure 4.19: Historical decomposition of cyclical deviations of output from
trend to all shocks: model with shadow Eonia. Bold line represents the data,
bars represent the contribution of each shock.
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Figure 4.20: Historical decomposition of cyclical deviations of output from
trend to all shocks: model with measurement error on output. Bold line
represents the data, bars represent the contribution of each shock.
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Figure 4.21: Historical decomposition of cyclical deviations of output from
trend to all shocks: model with measurement error on investment. Bold line
represents the data, bars represent the contribution of each shock.
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4.13.5 Output historical decompositions: all policies
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Figure 4.22: Historical decomposition of cyclical deviations of output from
trend to policy shocks: baseline model. Bold line represents the data, bars
represent the contribution of each shock.
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Figure 4.23: Historical decomposition of cyclical deviations of output from
trend to policy shocks: model with shadow Eonia. Bold line represents the
data, bars represent the contribution of each shock.
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Figure 4.24: Historical decomposition of cyclical deviations of output from
trend to joint monetary and fiscal policies shocks: model with measurement
error on output. Bold line represents the data, bars represent the contribution
of each shock.
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Figure 4.25: Historical decomposition of cyclical deviations of output from
trend to joint monetary and fiscal policies shocks: model with measurement
error on investment. Bold line represents the data, bars represent the con-
tribution of each shock.
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4.13.6 Output historical decompositions: Monetary vs
Fiscal policies
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Figure 4.26: Historical decomposition of cyclical deviations of output from
trend to monetary and fiscal policies shocks: baseline model. Bold line rep-
resents the data, bars represent the contribution of each shock.
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Figure 4.27: Historical decomposition of cyclical deviations of output from
trend to monetary and fiscal policies shocks: model with shadow Eonia. Bold
line represents the data, bars represent the contribution of each shock.
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Figure 4.28: Historical decomposition of cyclical deviations of output from
trend to monetary and fiscal policies shocks: model with measurement error
on output. Bold line represents the data, bars represent the contribution of
each shock.
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Figure 4.29: Historical decomposition of cyclical deviations of output from
trend to joint monetary and fiscal policies shocks: model with measurement
error on investment. Bold line represents the data, bars represent the con-
tribution of each shock.
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4.13.7 Inflation historical decompositions: Policy stance
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Figure 4.30: Historical decomposition of inflation to joint monetary and fiscal
policies shocks. Bold line represents the data, bars represent the contribution
of each shock.
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Figure 4.31: Historical decomposition of inflation to joint monetary and fiscal
policies shocks: model with shadow Eonia. Bold line represents the data, bars
represent the contribution of each shock.
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Figure 4.32: Historical decomposition of inflation to joint monetary and fis-
cal policies shocks: model with measurement error on output. Bold line
represents the data, bars represent the contribution of each shock.
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Figure 4.33: Historical decomposition of inflation to joint monetary and fiscal
policies shocks: model with measurement error on investment. Bold line
represents the data, bars represent the contribution of each shock.
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4.13.8 Inflation historical decompositions: all shocks
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Figure 4.34: Historical decomposition of inflation to all shocks: baseline
model. Bold line represents the data, bars represent the contribution of each
shock.
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Figure 4.35: Historical decomposition of inflation to all shocks: model with
shadow Eonia. Bold line represents the data, bars represent the contribution
of each shock.
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Figure 4.36: Historical decomposition of inflation to all shocks: model with
measurement error on output. Bold line represents the data, bars represent
the contribution of each shock.
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Figure 4.37: Historical decomposition of inflation to all shocks: model with
measurement error on investment. Bold line represents the data, bars repre-
sent the contribution of each shock.
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4.13.9 Inflation historical decompositions: all policies
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Figure 4.38: Historical decomposition of inflation to policy shocks: baseline
model. Bold line represents the data, bars represent the contribution of each
shock.
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Time
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Co
ntr
ibu
tio
n
Figure 4.39: Historical decomposition of inflation to policy shocks: model
with shadow Eonia. Bold line represents the data, bars represent the contri-
bution of each shock.
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Figure 4.40: Historical decomposition of inflation to joint monetary and fis-
cal policies shocks: model with measurement error on output. Bold line
represents the data, bars represent the contribution of each shock.
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Figure 4.41: Historical decomposition of inflation to joint monetary and fiscal
policies shocks: model with measurement error on investment. Bold line
represents the data, bars represent the contribution of each shock.
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4.13.10 Inflation historical decompositions: Monetary
vs Fiscal policies
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Figure 4.42: Historical decomposition of inflation to monetary and fiscal
policies shocks: baseline model. Bold line represents the data, bars represent
the contribution of each shock.
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Figure 4.43: Historical decomposition of inflation to monetary and fiscal
policies shocks: model with shadow Eonia. Bold line represents the data,
bars represent the contribution of each shock.
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Figure 4.44: Historical decomposition of inflation to monetary and fiscal poli-
cies shocks: model with measurement error on output. Bold line represents
the data, bars represent the contribution of each shock.
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Figure 4.45: Historical decomposition of inflation to joint monetary and fiscal
policies shocks: model with measurement error on investment. Bold line
represents the data, bars represent the contribution of each shock.
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Chapter 5
Thesis conclusions
This doctoral thesis is a collection of three papers in macroeconomics study-
ing multi-sector models suitable for policy analysis. It sheds light on the
importance of accounting for a multi-sector environment and draws conclu-
sions about the conduct of macroeconomic policies.
The first chapter of the thesis builds on the literature of two-sector New-
Keynesian models with a distinction between durable and nondurable goods.
The aim of the paper is to challenge a typical assumption made in the litera-
ture about the degree of price stickiness in the durables sector. While prices
of durables have been usually assumed to be flexible, the paper shows that
this assumption is consistent with a definition of the durables sector com-
prising only housing durables. Conversely, when the durables sector includes
both housing and non-housing goods, prices of durables are estimated to be
as sticky as nondurables. To reach these conclusions, the paper estimates
both Structural Vector Autoregressive and New-Keynesian two-sector mod-
els. Moreover, we further extend the analysis of the New-Keynesian model to
a three-sector economy, thus accounting for realistic features of housing and
non-housing durable goods. We confirm that prices of non-housing durables
and nondurables display a similar degree of price stickiness whereas prices
of housing durables are dramatically more flexible. These results carry the
important implications that when building a multi-sector New-Keynesian
model, prices of non-housing durables should be assumed to be sticky while
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housing durables are consistent with a notion of flexible prices. From a policy
point-of-view, we use both models to estimate the responses of the relative
price of durables to a monetary contraction and find that monetary pol-
icy is non-distortive in the allocation between nondurables and non-housing
durables, whereas it can potentially create allocative distortions between
nondurables and housing durables.
The second chapter of this thesis performs optimal monetary policy anal-
ysis in a two-sector New-Keynesian model, similar to the one studied in the
first chapter. The ultimate aim is to determine how the central bank assigns
weights to sectoral inflation rates in constructing the inflation measure to
target, and how such a choice is affected by the degree of labor mobility
across sectors. Indeed, we allow workers to be reallocated across sectors and
estimate the model together with the parameter governing the degree of sec-
toral labor mobility. We estimate a rather limited degree of labor mobility
and show that this feature is crucial for the conduct of monetary policy. Our
novel finding is that an inverse relationship between sectoral labor mobility
and the optimal weight the central bank should attach to durables inflation
arises. The paper finally argues that the degree of segmentation in the labor
market is a crucial aspect central bankers should consider in the conduct of
monetary policy.
The final chapter of the thesis focuses on the role of shocks and poli-
cies on the Euro Area business cycle. A standard New-Keynesian model is
enriched with three crucial features, namely a financial sector, long-term gov-
ernment debt and unconventional monetary policy. The model studied thus
accounts for the recent global financial crisis, the subsequent sovereign debt
crisis experienced in the eurozone, and the unconventional monetary policy
implemented by the European Central Bank. The ultimate goal of this chap-
ter and its novel contribution is to assess the joint monetary and fiscal policy
stance in the eurozone. As far as the importance of the shocks are concerned,
the model estimates a crucial role of the credit shock in generating the 2008
financial crisis. The joint policy stance in the Euro Area is estimated to have
been expansionary in the aftermath of the crisis. However, as countries in
the eurozone experienced a sovereign debt distress that forced governments
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to implement austerity measures, and conventional monetary policy started
being constrained by the zero-lower-bound, the policy stance turned to be
contractionary on the Euro Area output. The implementation of unconven-
tional monetary policy by the European Central Bank helped counteract the
negative contribution of the other policies but the overall stance remained
contractionary, due to the joint drag caused by fiscal policies and the zero-
lower-bound. Our results carry the important policy implication that more
expansionary fiscal policies could be designed to help the Euro Area recover
faster from the financial and sovereign debt crises.
To conclude, this thesis contributes to the macroeconomic literature along
several dimensions. First, it demonstrates that multi-sector macroeconomic
models uncover features of the economy and relative policy implications that
are overlooked in standard one-sector DSGE models. By questioning one of
the typical assumption made in the literature of two-sector New-Keynesian
models with durable goods, it provides future research with a better un-
derstanding of sectoral heterogeneity and establishes which are the crucial
features such a models should include. This thesis further sheds light on the
importance of sectoral labor mobility for the optimal conduct of monetary
policy. Central banks should consider the degree at which workers can be
reallocated across sectors when constructing the inflation measure to target.
Finally, the thesis demonstrates that it is vital to account for a financial sector
when studying the Euro Area business cycle. By using a multi-sector model
the thesis provides a thorough assessment of the Euro Area policy stance
that highlights crucial interactions between monetary and fiscal policies.
Overall, the thesis provides a thorough assessment of multi-sector macroe-
conomic models that contributes to both academic and policy debates.
199
200
Bibliography
Albonico, A., Paccagnini, A., and Tirelli, P. (2016). In search of the Euro
area fiscal stance. Journal of Empirical Finance, 39(PB):254–264.
Albonico, A., Paccagnini, A., and Tirelli, P. (2017). Great recession, slow re-
covery and muted fiscal policies in the US. Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control, 81(C):140–161.
Andreasen, M. M., Fernandez-Villaverde, J., and Rubio-Ramirez, J. (2013).
The Pruned State-Space System for Non-Linear DSGE Models: Theory
and Empirical Applications. NBER Working Papers 18983, National Bu-
reau of Economic Research, Inc.
Anzoategui, D., Comin, D., Gertler, M., and Martinez, J. (2016). Endogenous
Technology Adoption and R&D as Sources of Business Cycle Persistence.
NBER Working Papers 22005, National Bureau of Economic Research,
Inc.
Aoki, K. (2001). Optimal monetary policy responses to relative-price changes.
Journal of Monetary Economics, 48(1):55–80.
Ascari, G., Castelnuovo, E., and Rossi, L. (2011). Calvo vs. Rotemberg in
a trend inflation world: An empirical investigation. Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control, 35(11):1852–1867.
Auray, S., Gomme, P., and Guo, S. (2013). Nominal rigidities, monetary
policy and pigou cycles. Economic Journal, 123:455–473.
201
Barsky, R., Boehm, C. E., House, C. L., and Kimball, M. (2016). Monetary
Policy and Durable Goods. Working Paper Series WP-2016-18, Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago.
Barsky, R., House, C., and Kimball, M. (2003). Do flexible durable goods
prices undermine sticky price models? Macroeconomics 0302003, Econ-
WPA.
Barsky, R. B., House, C. L., and Kimball, M. S. (2007). Sticky-price models
and durable goods. American Economic Review, 97(3):984–998.
Beck, G. W., Hubrich, K., and Marcellino, M. (2016). On the importance of
sectoral and regional shocks for price-setting. Journal of Applied Econo-
metrics, 31(7):1234–1253. jae.2490.
Benati, L. (2008). Investigating Inflation Persistence Across Monetary
Regimes. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(3):1005–1060.
Benigno, P. (2004). Optimal monetary policy in a currency area. Journal of
International Economics, 63(2):293–320.
Bermperoglu, D., Pappa, E., and Vella, E. (2013). Spending-based austerity
measures and their effects on output and unemployment. CEPR Discussion
Papers 9383, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
Bernanke, B. S. and Gertler, M. (1995). Inside the black box: The credit
channel of monetary policy transmission. Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives, 9(4):27–48.
Bernanke, B. S. and Mihov, I. (1998). Measuring monetary policy. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(3):869–902.
Bils, M. and Klenow, P. J. (2004). Some evidence on the importance of sticky
prices. Journal of Political Economy, 112(5):947–985.
Boivin, J., Giannoni, M. P., and Mihov, I. (2009). Sticky Prices and Mone-
tary Policy: Evidence from Disaggregated US Data. American Economic
Review, 99(1):350–384.
202
Bouakez, H., Cardia, E., and Ruge-Murcia, F. (2014). Sectoral price rigidity
and aggregate dynamics. European Economic Review, 65(C):1–22.
Bouakez, H., Cardia, E., and Ruge-Murcia, F. J. (2009). The transmission of
monetary policy in a multisector economy. International Economic Review,
50(4):1243–1266.
Bouakez, H., Cardia, E., and Ruge-Murcia, F. J. (2011). Durable goods,
inter-sectoral linkages and monetary policy. Journal of Economic Dynam-
ics and Control, 35(5):730–745.
Brooks, S. P. and Gelman, A. (1998). General methods for monitoring con-
vergence of iterative simulations. Journal of Computational and Graphical
Statistics, 7(4):434–455.
Canova, F. (2002). Validating monetary DSGE models through VARs. CEPR
Discussion Papers 3442, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
Cantelmo, A. and Melina, G. (2015). Monetary policy and the relative price
of durable goods. CESifo Working Paper Series, 5328.
Cantelmo, A. and Melina, G. (2018). Monetary policy and the relative price
of durable goods. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 86(Supple-
ment C):1 – 48.
Cantore, C., Levine, P., and Melina, G. (2014a). A Fiscal Stimulus and
Jobless Recovery. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 116(3):669–701.
Cantore, C., Levine, P., and Melina, G. (2014b). Deep versus superficial
habit: It’s all in the persistence. School of Economics Discussion Papers
0714, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
Cantore, C., Levine, P., Melina, G., and Pearlman, J. (2017). Optimal fis-
cal and monetary policy, debt crisis, and management. Macroeconomic
Dynamics, pages 1–39.
203
Cantore, C., Levine, P., Melina, G., and Yang, B. (2012). A fiscal stim-
ulus with deep habits and optimal monetary policy. Economics Letters,
117(1):348–353.
Carlstrom, C. T. and Fuerst, T. S. (2006). Co-movement in sticky price
models with durable goods. Working Paper 0614, Federal Reserve Bank
of Cleveland.
Carlstrom, C. T. and Fuerst, T. S. (2010). Nominal rigidities, residential
investment, and adjustment costs. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 14(01):136–
148.
Carlstrom, C. T., Fuerst, T. S., and Paustian, M. (2017). Targeting long
rates in a model with segmented markets. American Economic Journal:
Macroeconomics, 9(1):205–242.
Chen, B.-L. and Liao, S.-Y. (2014). Capital, credit constraints and the co-
movement between consumer durables and nondurables. Journal of Eco-
nomic Dynamics and Control, 39(C):127–139.
Chen, H., Cu´rdia, V., and Ferrero, A. (2012). The Macroeconomic Effects
of Large[U+2010]scale Asset Purchase Programmes. Economic Journal,
122(564):289–315.
Christiano, L., Motto, R., and Rostagno, M. (2010). Financial factors in
economic fluctuations. ECB Working Paper Series, 1192.
Christiano, L. J., Eichenbaum, M., and Evans, C. L. (2005). Nominal rigidi-
ties and the dynamic effects of a shock to monetary policy. Journal of
Political Economy, 113(1):1–45.
Cloyne, J. and Hurtgen, P. (2016). The Macroeconomic Effects of Monetary
Policy: A New Measure for the United Kingdom. American Economic
Journal: Macroeconomics, 8(4):75–102.
Coenen, G., Straub, R., and Trabandt, M. (2012). Fiscal policy and the great
recession in the euro area. American Economic Review, 102(3):71–76.
204
Coenen, G., Straub, R., and Trabandt, M. (2013). Gauging the effects of
fiscal stimulus packages in the euro area. Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control, 37(2):367–386.
Coibion, O. (2012). Are the Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks Big or Small?
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 4(2):1–32.
Coibion, O., Gorodnichenko, Y., Silvia, J., and Kueng, L. (2012). Innocent
bystanders? monetary policy and inequality in the U.S. IMF Working
Papers 12/199, International Monetary Fund.
Colciago, A. (2011). Rule of Thumb Consumers Meet Sticky Wages. Journal
of Money, Credit and Banking, 43:325–353.
Dedola, L. and Neri, S. (2007). What does a technology shock do? A VAR
analysis with model-based sign restrictions. Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, 54(2):512–549.
Del Negro, M., Giannoni, M. P., and Schorfheide, F. (2015). Inflation in the
Great Recession and New Keynesian Models. American Economic Journal:
Macroeconomics, 7(1):168–196.
Di Pace, F. and Hertweck, M. (2016). Labour market frictions, monetary
policy and durable goods. Bank of England working papers 623, Bank of
England.
DiCecio, R. (2009). Sticky wages and sectoral labor comovement. Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control, 33(3):538–553.
Drautzburg, T. and Uhlig, H. (2015). Fiscal Stimulus and Distortionary
Taxation. Review of Economic Dynamics, 18(4):894–920.
Ellison, M. and Tischbirek, A. (2014). Unconventional government debt
purchases as a supplement to conventional monetary policy. Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control, 43(C):199–217.
Erceg, C. and Levin, A. (2006). Optimal monetary policy with durable
consumption goods. Journal of Monetary Economics, 53(7):1341–1359.
205
Forni, L., Monteforte, L., and Sessa, L. (2009). The general equilibrium
effects of fiscal policy: Estimates for the euro area. Journal of Public
Economics, 93(3):559 – 585.
Fratto, C. and Uhlig, H. (2014). Accounting for Post-Crisis Inflation and
Employment: A Retro Analysis. NBER Working Papers 20707, National
Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Fraumeni, B. (1997). The Measurement of Depreciation in the U.S. National
Income and Product Accounts. Survey of Current Business, 77:7–23.
Fry, R. and Pagan, A. (2011). Sign restrictions in structural vector autore-
gressions: A critical review. Journal of Economic Literature, 49(4):938–60.
Fuhrer, J. C. (2000). Habit formation in consumption and its implications
for monetary-policy models. American Economic Review, 90(3):367–390.
Furlanetto, F. and Seneca, M. (2012). Rule-of-Thumb Consumers, Produc-
tivity, and Hours. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 114(2):658–679.
Gal´ı, J., Lo´pez-Salido, J. D., and Valle´s, J. (2007). Understanding the ef-
fects of government spending on consumption. Journal of the European
Economic Association, 5(1):227–270.
Gerali, A., Neri, S., Sessa, L., and Signoretti, F. M. (2010). Credit and
banking in a DSGE model of the euro area. Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking, 42(s1):107–141.
Gerberding, C., Gerke, R., and Hammermann, F. (2012). Price-level target-
ing when there is price-level drift. Journal of Macroeconomics, 34(3):757–
768.
Gertler, M. and Karadi, P. (2011). A model of unconventional monetary
policy. Journal of Monetary Economics, 58(1):17–34.
Gertler, M. and Karadi, P. (2013). QE 1 vs. 2 vs. 3. . . : A Framework
for Analyzing Large-Scale Asset Purchases as a Monetary Policy Tool.
International Journal of Central Banking, 9(1):5–53.
206
Gertler, M. and Karadi, P. (2015). Monetary Policy Surprises, Credit Costs,
and Economic Activity. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics,
7(1):44–76.
Giannoni, M. P. (2014). Optimal interest-rate rules and inflation stabiliza-
tion versus price-level stabilization. Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control, 41(C):110–129.
Giannoni, M. P. and Woodford, M. (2003). Optimal Interest-Rate Rules: I.
General Theory. NBER Working Papers 9419, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, Inc.
Guerrieri, L. and Iacoviello, M. (2015). OccBin: A toolkit for solving dynamic
models with occasionally binding constraints easily. Journal of Monetary
Economics, 70(C):22–38.
Gust, C., Herbst, E., Lopez-Salido, D., and Smith, M. E. (2017). The em-
pirical implications of the interest-rate lower bound. American Economic
Review, 107(7):1971–2006.
Hirose, Y. and Inoue, A. (2016). The zero lower bound and parameter bias in
an estimated dsge model. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 31(4):630–651.
Hohberger, S., Priftis, R., and Vogel, L. (2017). The macroeconomic effects of
quantitative easing in the Euro area : evidence from an estimated DSGE
model. Economics Working Papers ECO2017/04, European University
Institute.
Horvath, M. (2000). Sectoral shocks and aggregate fluctuations. Journal of
Monetary Economics, 45(1):69–106.
Huang, K. X. and Liu, Z. (2005). Inflation targeting: What inflation rate to
target? Journal of Monetary Economics, 52(8):1435–1462.
Iacoviello, M. (2005). House prices, borrowing constraints, and monetary
policy in the business cycle. American Economic Review, 95(3):739–764.
207
Iacoviello, M. and Neri, S. (2010). Housing market spillovers: Evidence
from an estimated DSGE model. American Economic Journal: Macroeco-
nomics, 2(2):125–64.
Ireland, P. N. (2007). Changes in the Federal Reserve’s Inflation Tar-
get: Causes and Consequences. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
39(8):1851–1882.
Ireland, P. N. (2011). A New Keynesian Perspective on the Great Recession.
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 43(1):31–54.
Jappelli, T. (1990). Who is Credit Constrained in the U. S. Economy? The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105(1):219–234.
Jeske, K. and Liu, Z. (2013). Should The Central Bank Be Concerned About
Housing Prices? Macroeconomic Dynamics, 17(01):29–53.
Junhee, L. (2009). Examining sectoral co-movement in estimated nominal
rigidities models. The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, 9(1):1–22.
Kara, E. (2010). Optimal monetary policy in the generalized Taylor economy.
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 34(10):2023–2037.
Kass, R. E. and Raftery, A. E. (1995). Bayes factors. Journal of the American
Statistical Association, 90(430):773–795.
Katayama, M. and Kim, K. H. (2010). Intertemporal substitution and sec-
toral comovement in a sticky price model. Departmental Working Papers
2010-01, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University.
Katayama, M. and Kim, K. H. (2013). The delayed effects of monetary
shocks in a two-sector new keynesian model. Journal of Macroeconomics,
Elsevier, 38(PB):243–259.
Kim, K. H. and Katayama, M. (2013). Non-separability and sectoral comove-
ment in a sticky price model. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
Elsevier, 37(9):1715–1735.
208
Klenow, P. J. and Malin, B. A. (2010). Microeconomic evidence on price-
setting. In Friedman, B. M. and Woodford, M., editors, Handbook of
Monetary Economics, volume 3A, chapter 6, pages 231–284. Elsevier.
Kliem, M. and Kriwoluzky, A. (2013). Reconciling narrative monetary pol-
icy disturbances with structural VAR model shocks? Economics Letters,
121(2):247–251.
Kollmann, R., Pataracchia, B., Raciborski, R., Ratto, M., Roeger, W., and
Vogel, L. (2016). The post-crisis slump in the Euro Area and the US: Ev-
idence from an estimated three-region DSGE model. European Economic
Review, 88(C):21–41.
Kollmann, R., Ratto, M., Roeger, W., and in?t Veld, J. (2013). Fiscal policy,
banks and the financial crisis. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
37(2):387–403.
Kydland, F. E. and Prescott, E. C. (1982). Time to Build and Aggregate
Fluctuations. Econometrica, 50(6):1345–1370.
Leeper, E. M., Walker, T. B., and Yang, S. S. (2013). Fiscal Foresight and
Information Flows. Econometrica, 81(3):1115–1145.
Levine, P., McAdam, P., and Pearlman, J. (2008). Quantifying and sus-
taining welfare gains from monetary commitment. Journal of Monetary
Economics, 55(7):1253–1276.
Linde, J., Smets, F., and Wouters, R. (2016). Challenges for Central Banks’
Macro Models. CEPR Discussion Papers 11405, C.E.P.R. Discussion Pa-
pers.
Lucas, Robert E, J. and Prescott, E. C. (1971). Investment Under Uncer-
tainty. Econometrica, 39(5):659–681.
Makowiak, B., Moench, E., and Wiederholt, M. (2009). Sectoral price data
and models of price setting. Journal of Monetary Economics, 56(S):78–99.
209
Mankiw, N. G. (2000). The savers-spenders theory of fiscal policy. American
Economic Review, 90(2):120–125.
Mankiw, N. G. and Reis, R. (2003). What Measure of Inflation Should a
Central Bank Target? Journal of the European Economic Association,
1(5):1058–1086.
Melina, G. and Villa, S. (2018). Leaning against windy bank lending. Eco-
nomic Inquiry, 56(1):460–482.
Mertens, K. and Ravn, M. O. (2013). The Dynamic Effects of Personal and
Corporate Income Tax Changes in the United States. American Economic
Review, 103(4):1212–1247.
Mertens, K. and Ravn, M. O. (2014). A reconciliation of SVAR and narrative
estimates of tax multipliers. Journal of Monetary Economics, 68(S):1–19.
Monacelli, T. (2008). Optimal monetary policy with collateralized household
debt and borrowing constraints. In Asset Prices and Monetary Policy,
NBER Chapters, pages 103–146. National Bureau of Economic Research,
Inc.
Monacelli, T. (2009). New Keynesian models, durable goods, and collateral
constraints. Journal of Monetary Economics, 56(2):242–254.
Mouabbi, S. and Sahuc, J.-G. (2017). Evaluating the Macroeconomic Effects
of the ECB’s Unconventional Monetary Policies. Technical report, Mimeo.
Nakamura, E. and Steinsson, J. (2008). Five facts about prices: A reeval-
uation of menu cost models. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
123(4):1415–1464.
Nistico`, S. (2007). The welfare loss from unstable inflation. Economics
Letters, 96(1):51–57.
Pappa, E. (2009). The effects of fiscal shocks on employment and the real
wage. International Economic Review, 50(1):217–244.
210
Peersman, G. (2005). What caused the early millennium slowdown? Evi-
dence based on vector autoregressions. Journal of Applied Econometrics,
20(2):185–207.
Petrella, I., Rossi, R., and Santoro, E. (2017). Monetary policy with sectoral
trade-offs. Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
Petrella, I. and Santoro, E. (2011). Input–output interactions and optimal
monetary policy. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier,
35(11):1817–1830.
Petrella, I. and Santoro, E. (2012). Inflation dynamics and real marginal
costs: New evidence from U.S. manufacturing industries. Journal of Eco-
nomic Dynamics and Control, 36(5):779–794.
Quint, D. and Rabanal, P. (2017). Should Unconventional Monetary Poli-
cies Become Conventional? IMF Working Papers 17/85, International
Monetary Fund.
Ratto, M., Roeger, W., and Veld, J. i. t. (2009). QUEST III: An estimated
open-economy DSGE model of the euro area with fiscal and monetary
policy. Economic Modelling, 26(1):222–233.
Ravn, M., Schmitt-Grohe, S., and Uribe, M. (2006). Deep habits. The Review
of Economic Studies, 73(1):195–218.
Reis, R. and Watson, M. W. (2010). Relative Goods’ Prices, Pure Inflation,
and the Phillips Correlation. American Economic Journal: Macroeco-
nomics, 2(3):128–157.
Romer, C. D. and Romer, D. H. (2004). A new measure of monetary shocks:
Derivation and implications. American Economic Review, 94(4):1055–
1084.
Rotemberg, J. J. (1982). Monopolistic price adjustment and aggregate out-
put. Review of Economic Studies, 49(4):517–31.
211
Schmitt-Grohe, S. and Uribe, M. (2007). Optimal simple and implementable
monetary and fiscal rules. Journal of Monetary Economics, 54(6):1702–
1725.
Schmitt-Grohe, S. and Uribe, M. (2012). What’s news in business cycles.
Econometrica, 80(6):2733–2764.
Smets, F. and Wouters, R. (2003). An estimated dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model of the euro area. Journal of the European Economic
Association, 1(5):1123–1175.
Smets, F. and Wouters, R. (2005). Comparing shocks and frictions in US and
euro area business cycles: a Bayesian DSGE approach. Journal of Applied
Econometrics, 20(2):161–183.
Smets, F. and Wouters, R. (2007). Shocks and frictions in US business cycles:
A Bayesian DSGE approach. American Economic Review, 97(3):586–606.
Sterk, V. (2010). Credit frictions and the comovement between durable and
non-durable consumption. Journal of Monetary Economics, 57(2):217–225.
Sterk, V. and Tenreyro, S. (2014). The transmission of monetary policy
operations through redistributions and durable purchases. 2014 Meeting
Papers 76, Society for Economic Dynamics.
Stock, J. H. and Watson, M. W. (2012). Disentangling the Channels of
the 2007-09 Recession. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 43(1
(Spring):81–156.
Strum, B. E. (2009). Monetary Policy in a Forward-Looking Input-Output
Economy. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 41(4):619–650.
Sudo, N. (2012). Sectoral comovement, monetary policy shocks, and input-
output structure. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 44(6):1225–1244.
Tenreyro, S. and Thwaites, G. (2016). Pushing on a String: US Mone-
tary Policy Is Less Powerful in Recessions. American Economic Journal:
Macroeconomics, 8(4):43–74.
212
Tsai, Y.-C. (2016). What do working capital and habit tell us about the
co-movement problem? Macroeconomic Dynamics, 20(1):342–361.
Uhlig, H. (2005). What are the effects of monetary policy on output? Results
from an agnostic identification procedure. Journal of Monetary Economics,
52(2):381–419.
Villa, S. (2016). Financial Frictions In The Euro Area And The United States:
A Bayesian Assessment. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 20(05):1313–1340.
Walentin, K. (2014). Housing Collateral and the Monetary Transmission
Mechanism. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 116(3):635–668.
Woodford, M. (2001). Fiscal Requirements for Price Stability. Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking, 33(3):669–728.
Woodford, M. (2003). Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Mon-
etary Policy. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Wu, J. C. and Xia, F. D. (2017). Time-Varying Lower Bound of Interest
Rates in Europe . Technical Report 17-06, Chicago Booth Research Paper
Chicago Booth Research Paper 17-06.
Zubairy, S. (2014). On fiscal multipliers: Estimates from a medium scale
DSGE model. International Economic Review, 55:169–195.
213
